Hybridization in mergers and acquisitions by Dauber, Daniel
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Daniel Dauber
Hybridization in mergers and acquisitions
Thesis
Original Citation:
Dauber, Daniel (2011) Hybridization in mergers and acquisitions. Doctoral thesis, WU Vienna
University of Economics and Business.
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/2970/
Available in ePubWU: January 2011
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
  
 
 
 
 
HYBRIDIZATION IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
Doctoral Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author: 
Mag. Daniel DAUBER 
 
 
 
Supervision: 
Univ.-Prof. Dr. Gerhard Fink 
Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Mayrhofer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) 
 
January, 2011
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgment 
 
This doctoral thesis is devoted to my loving grandmother, Susanne DAUBER, an 
extraordinary woman, who always supports me in all of my efforts. 
 
 
 
Danksagung 
 
Diese Doktoratbeit ist meiner liebevollen Großmutter, Susanne DAUBER, einer 
außergewöhnlichen Frau gewidmet, welche mich in all meinen Bestrebungen unterstützt. 
 
  
Abstract 
According to numerous studies, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) tend to fail more often than 
being profitable. While strategic fit seems to be a pre-requisit for M&A sucess, organizational 
culture differeces between merging organizations seem to set boundaries for achieving the 
synergies identified prior to the deal. 
This doctoral thesis deals with hybridization, i.e. the blending of organizational cultures, in 
the context of M&As and provides detailed insights into how this phenomenon shapes the 
outcome of such strategic activities. Based on a qualitative research design (3 case studies, 
grounded theory, 55 narrative interviews) five different forms of hybridization were 
identified: (1) Vintage concept of hybridization, (2) deck of cards concept of hybridization, 
(3) uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge, (4) boundary spannind, and (5) 
people’s twist. 
Major findings of this doctoral thesis suggest, that most forms of hybridization have rather a 
negative impact on the M&A performance. Moreover, the outcome of such deals is strongly 
depending on contextual factors and the acculturation strategy chosen to harmonize existing 
cultural values, strategies, organizational structures and operations. Finally, financial key 
ratios to assess the success of M&As could only partly illustrate what had been found through 
narrative interviews,. Thus, measuring M&A success should not only be based on quantitative 
measures. 
This doctoral thesis suggest a more holistic approach to M&A research, when considering 
cultural effects on the organizational level of analysis. 
 
 
  
Abstract 
(German translation) 
Zahlreiche Studien zeigen, dass Akquisitionen und Fusionen (M&As) zumeist scheitern. 
Während strategische Aspekte eine Grundvoraussetzung für den Erfolg von M&As darstellen, 
können organisationale Kulturunterschiede Grenzen für die Generierung von Synergieffekten 
setzen. 
Diese Doktorarbeit beschäftigt sich mit „Hybridisierung“, i.e. dem Übereinanderblenden von 
Organisationskulturen im Kontext von M&As. Die Arbeit bietet tiefgreifende Einblicke in 
welche Art und Weise dieses Phänomen den Ausgang derartiger strategischer Aktivitäten 
beeinflusst. Basierend auf einem qualitativen Forschungsdesign (3 Fallstudien, Grounded 
Theory, 55 narrative Interviews) wurden 5 Formen der Hybridisierung identifiziert: (1) 
Vintage concept of hybridization, (2) deck of cards concept of hybridization, (3) uncontrolled 
local adaptation of management knowledge, (4) boundary spannind, and (5) people’s twist. 
Als grundelegendes Ergebnis der Doktorarbeit zeigt sich, dass alle Formen der Hybridisierung 
eher einen negativen Einfluss auf die Performance von M&As haben. Darüber hinaus hängt 
der Ausgang derartiger Deals stark von kontextbezogenen Faktoren sowie gewählten 
Akkulturationsstrategien, zur Harmonisierung der kulturellen Werthaltungen, Strategien 
organisationalen Strukturen und Operationen, ab. Schließlich scheinen Finanzkennzahlen zur 
Messung des Erfolgs von M&As, im Vergleich zu den qualitativen Ergebnissen, nur teilweise 
repräsentativ. Aus diesem sollte der Erfolg von M&As nicht allein auf quantifizierbaren 
Messinstrumenten beruhen. 
Diese Doktorarbeit legt einen holistischen Ansatz zur Erforschung von M&As nahe, wenn 
kulturelle Effekte in Organisationen untersucht werden. 
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1. SETTING THE STAGE FOR HYBRIDIZATION IN MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS (M&A) 
This doctoral thesis shades light on the post-M&A phase by systematically approaching the 
phenomenon of ‘hybridization’, which refers to the process of ‘blending […] organizational 
cultures and management knowledge’ (Fink, 2008, p. 10). Thus, this empirical study relates to 
cultural and human factors in post-M&A processes and provides recommendations for 
improving M&As by understanding different forms of hybridization. The necessity to 
investigate in these issues arises from the increasing number of unsuccessful M&A deals 
being completed in the last decade. 
Mergers and acquisitions are one of the most important market entry strategies for companies 
that aim at expanding nationally or internationally. In 2006, the number of cross-border 
M&As rose to 6,974 from 5,113 in 2004 and 6,134  in 2005 (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 303), 
representing about 880 billion U.S. dollar in value (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 300). However, a 
large number of M&As is not successful. A study conducted by KMPG revealed that only 
17% of cross-border acquisitions generated value for their shareholders, while 53% destroyed 
it (Economist, 1999). Child et al. (2001) find that about 50% of all M&As fail (Child et al., 
2001, p. 20). Especially the integration process seem to play an important role during and 
after a merger or acquisition. Many researchers argue that cultural differences can build 
barriers in achieving the objectives preset by the companies in question (Cartwright & 
Cooper, 1993; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Child et al.; 2001; Datta, 1991; Fink & Holden, 2007; 
Hurt & Hurt, 2005; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; Olie, 1994; Teerikangas & Very, 2006; 
Weber, 1996; Weber, et al., 1996; etc.). Some authors consider cultural fit as even more 
important than strategic or financial fit (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Chatterjee et al., 1992; 
Weber, 1996; Weber, et al., 1996). However, managers focus rather on financial and strategic 
achievements than on human or cultural aspects. Despite the high failure rate, firms still 
pursue this market entry strategy and has caused wide-ranging discussions among researchers 
in the last decade. 
The field of M&A research is very broad. Therefore this doctoral thesis focuses on the 
following research questions: 
• What are the basic conditions for hybridization to take place? 
• Which forms of hybridization can be identified? 
• How does hybridization work in different contexts? 
• How does hybridization affect the transformation process? 
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The doctoral thesis is structured as follows: The next chapter provides an introduction to 
‘hybridization’, which is followed by a review of research on acculturation strategies, culture, 
and performance in M&As. After that, research objectives as well as research questions are 
presented. In chapter 4, the applied methodology will be described in detailed. Then, a cross-
case analysis will provide insights into conditions for hybridization and explores as well as 
explains different forms of this phenomenon independent of context. This is followed by a 
case-based perspective of hybridization, where different forms of hybridization are explored 
within the context of selected acquisitions. A discussion about the presented findings and 
research limitations conclude the doctoral thesis. 
2. RESEARCH ON HYBRIDIZATION, ACCULTURATION STRATEGIES, 
CULTURE, PERFORMANCE AND SYMPTOMS OF BAD CHANGE 
MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: A 
REVIEW 
The field of M&A research is very broad and provides the context for several research areas. 
Table 1 provides examples for major streams in M&A research based on a literature review 
by Shimizu et al. (2004). 
 
Table 1: M&A research fields based on Shimizu et al. 2004 (p. 308-309) 
Field of research Examples 
mode of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) or entry 
Andersen, 1997; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; 
Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Hennart and Reddy, 
1997; Kogut and Singh, 1988 
performance outcomes from 
acquisitive entry 
Brouthers, 2002; Li and Guisinger, 1991; Nitsch et al., 
1996 
shareholders’ wealth creation by 
the cross- border M&As 
Datta and Puia, 1995; Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; 
Kang, 1993; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Morck and 
Yeung, 1992 
integration processes Child et al., 2001; Inkpen et al., 2000; Lubatkin et al., 
1998; Olie, 1994; Weber et al., 1996 
post-acquisition turnover of 
acquired firm executives 
Krug and Hegarty, 2001; Krug and Nigh, 2001 
post-acquisition performance of 
acquired and acquiring firm 
Very et al., 1997; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; 
Morosini et al., 1998 
knowledge transfer and 
organizational learning 
Bhagat et al., 2002; Bresman et al., 1999; Vermeulen 
and Barkema, 2001 
 
This doctoral thesis belongs to the categories ‘integration processes’ and ‘post-acquisition 
performance’. While Shimizu et al. (2004) covered empirical and conceptual papers until 
2002, the following chapters will consider more recent research as well. The literature review 
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focuses on hybridization, acculturation strategies, culture, performance and symptoms of poor 
management in M&As. In the last part of this chapter, an integrative model will be presented, 
which will be applied to systematically link research findings of this doctoral thesis. 
2.1. Hybridization: A process of blending organizational culture 
“[…] hybridization is the process of blending organizational cultures and management 
knowledge to transform an acquisition into a new socially viable system with a sustainable 
culture” (Fink, 2008, p. 10). Based on this definition, hybridization is understood as (1) a 
process and not a state, and (2) a phenomenon related to post-M&A processes.  
So far, the term ‘hybridization’ is still quite new in this context and was before vaguely 
circumscribed as the creation of a “common space” (Hurt & Hurt, 2005), an “atmosphere” 
were both companies can interact and exchange knowledge (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; 
Holden, 2002; Napier, 2005) or as socialization between headquarters personnel and 
employees of the subsidiary (Hurt & Hurt, 2005). 
Dauber & Fink (2010) were the first that conceptually developed different forms of 
hybridization. Table 2 provides an overview and a categorization of these forms. 
 
Table 2: Seven conceptual forms of hybridization based on Dauber & Fink (2011)  
Conceptual forms of hybridization Level of formality 
Formal hybridization Informal hybridization 
Task forces and teams X  
Boundary spanning  X 
Deck of cards’ concept of hybridization X  
Negotiated knowledge migration X  
Uncontrolled local adaptation of 
management knowledge  X 
People’s Twist  X 
Vintage concept of hybridization  X 
 
In hierarchically structured organizations, task forces and teams might be created to allow 
for more flexibility within a company (Kiefer et al., 2009). These ‘working groups’ develop 
their own set of rules and norms of behavior, which might even stand in conflict with existing 
organizational regulations. If such task forces or teams become too widespread in an 
organization, they might endanger the existing rigid organizational system, which does not 
allow for the same level of flexibility (Dauber & Fink, 2011). In case of M&As, this might 
relate to different working styles in the acquiring and acquired organization, e.g. the acquirer 
has a strong hierarchical structure, but the target company is more strongly organized in task 
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forces and teams. These differences in operational processes might lead to barriers throughout 
the post-M&A integration process. 
Boundary spanning is a phenomenon that emerges in hierarchically organized companies 
with long information and decision channels. Individuals start to informally communicate 
across organizational boundaries in order to accelerate the exchange of information (Kiefer et 
al., 2009). By doing so, employees circumvent official organizational structures. Thus, 
besides the formal network an informal network develops, which also allows for more 
flexibility within the organization. In M&As boundary spanning might facilitate post-M&A 
processes, if such informal networks get extended across organizational boundaries, i.e. if 
informal networks consist of members of the acquirer and the target. 
The deck of cards concept of hybridization considers the multiple cultural configuration 
view of organizations by Alvesson (2002): Organizations should not be understood as a single 
unit, but as a mixture of different cultural phenomena, i.e. each organizational unit might 
represent a subset of cards, which make up the total deck of cards representing an 
organization. With references to M&As, an acquirer might wish to replace certain 
departments, teams or groups of individuals in the target company by its own ones. Thus, 
some parts of the target company continue to exist, while other parts get integrated or 
assimilated. 
Finally, negotiated knowledge migration implies the co-existence of corporate cultures in 
the target company, in order to meet fundamental rules and regulations of the acquirer. These 
requirements are necessary for the communication and cooperation between both 
organizations. This hybrid form of corporate cultures is negotiated between members of the  
acquirer and target company. In M&A literature this strategy is also known as “common 
ground” (Hurt and Hurt 2005), “reverse learning” (Napier, 2005) or “inpatriate learning” 
(Vance & Paik, 2005). 
The opposite to negotiated knowledge migration is uncontrolled local adaptation of 
management knowledge. This form of hybridization is based on the assumption that 
knowledge cannot simply be transferred from one culture to another as it is less mobil than 
other assets (Attewell, 1992; Tiemessen et al.; Kogut & Zander, 1992) and bears a certain 
level of ambuigity (Simonin, 1999). This is due to the fact that knowledge is depending on 
context and might change its meaning when transferred into different contexts (Holden and 
Kortzfleisch, 2004; Yolles & Iles, 2006). Therefore, employees of an acquired organization 
might not be able to make sense of knowledge introduced by the headquarter (Kuznetsov and 
Yakavenka, 2005; Holden and Fink, 2007), due to its limited transferability (Grant, 1996). 
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Such unsuccessful sensemaking processes become manifest in wrong actions and might lead 
to considerable misunderstandings. Headquarter’s knowledge might also become manifest in 
written texts. Bakthin (1996) stresses that the same text, ‘an utterance that belongs, by its 
grammatical and compositional makers, to a single speaker’ (Bakhtin 1996, p. 304) may 
contain two different meanings: ‘It frequently happens that even one and the same word will 
belong simultaneously to two languages, two belief systems that intersect in a hybrid 
construction’ (Bakhtin 1996, p. 305). 
People’s Twist refers to the process of proactively changing meaning of ‘official language, 
artifacts and symbols’ (Fink, 2008, p. 13). This phenomenon might emerge preferably in 
highly bureaucratic and authoritarian organizations to show hidden resistance against 
organizational top-down control (Fink, 2008), i.e. ‘survival by subversion’ (Fink et al. 2007). 
Thus, organizations become a multi-dimensional workplace where groups of employees 
challenge an organization’s supervision (Fink et al., 2007) by setting ambiguous actions. 
However, this ambuigity only becomes visible for those individuals engaging in people’s 
twist. 
The vintage concept of hybridization refers to the fact that elder generations like to transfer 
their cultural values onto younger generations (Samovar & Porter, 1991, p. 47 ff). 
Consequently, the younger generations aim at distinguishing themselves from the elder 
generations. For example, this can be achieved through ‘dress code and double meaning of 
utterances’ or ‘open revolt’ (Fink, 2008, p. 14). The necessity to properly manage such 
generation differences to improve communication, satisfaction, commitment and the overall 
productivity of organizations as been stressed by several scholars (e.g. Cennamo & Gardner, 
2008; Twenge & Campbell, 2008; Wong et al, 2008). 
As to the knowledge of the author, no empirical research has been conducted so far to fully 
understand hybridization in the context of M&As. Conclusions and findings by Dauber & 
Fink (2011) might, however, provide a good theoretical starting point. This doctoral thesis 
aims at empirically investigating in the existence of such forms of hybridization in a real life 
context and will shed light on their impact on post-M&A processes. 
2.2. Acculturation strategies in M&As: Different modes and levels of combining 
organizations 
M&A literature provides several typologies of how organizations can merge to a single 
company (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Nahvandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1988; Napier, 1989; Olie, 1990). Scholars frequently refer to the typology of 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 6 
Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), which is based on the acculturation strategies developed by 
Berry et al. (1980): Integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization. 
Integration refers to the amalgamation of two organizations involved in a merger or 
acquisition. Thus, the acquirer as well as the target company agree to combine, substitute or 
abandon existing elements of their organization in order to become a new and coherent whole.  
If one organization has to adjust completely to another organization, this would represent 
assimilation. With reference to M&As, large headquarters often impose their own 
organizational culture, strategy and structure on the target company. Consequently, the old 
affiliate is completely taken up by the headquarter and loses its identity and corporate values. 
Separation exists if the acquirer and the target company continue to work independently from 
each other. Thus, each company keeps its own culture and structures and no adjustment 
process sets in. 
Finally, marginalization can be considered of being rather a destructive strategy. An 
organization, most often the acquirer, simply exploits the resources of another organization. 
Marginalized companies are often closed down after valuable resources have been withdrawn 
(Fink & Holden, 2007, p. 18-19). 
Although these definitions exist, the term ‘integration’ is frequently used interchangeably in 
common M&A literature, i.e. it is used as an umbrella term for different types as well as 
different forms of merging organizations. In order to avoid an ambigous use of ‘integration’, 
the doctoral thesis will explicitly refer to the four acculturation strategies presented above, i.e. 
‘integration’ will always be used as defined by Berry et al. (1980). Where necessary the term 
‘transformation’ will be used as an umbrella term for the different facets of acculturation. 
‘Transformation’ is commonly defined as ‘an act, process, or instance of transforming or 
being transformed’, i.e. ‘to change in composition […], structure, […] character or condition’ 
(Gove, 2002, p. 2427). This definition fits all forms of acculturation as such changes might be 
attained through intergration, assimilation, separation and marginalization and might relate to 
change processes within the acquiring and acquired company alike.  
The presented acculturation strategies implicitly refer to different levels of transformation 
between two organizations. The consequences of different levels of transformation on post-
M&A performance has been subject to research for several years. Research findings in this 
field can be clusered in three groups: (1) studies showing that a high level of 
integration/assimilation (or low level of separation/marginalization) has a positive impact on 
M&A outcomes, (2) studies stressing that high levels of integration/assimilation negatively 
influence M&A success and (3) studies emphasizing that the choice of level of 
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integration/assimilation is dependent on the motives and goals of a merger or an acquisition. 
All three groups are discussed shortly in the following. 
 Zollo & Singh (2004), Larsson & Finkelstein (1999), Birkinshaw et al. (2000) and Meyer, 
(2008) argue that a higher level of integration/assimilation is associated with higher synergy 
realization, thus with higher M&A performance. Those studies often follow a resource-based 
view and see a chance of symbiosis through integration/assimilation. Zollo & Singh (2004) 
indicate that a higher degree of integration/assimilation increases performance through higher 
knowledge codification. This enables access to valuable know-how, which is of special 
importance in technology-driven M&As. Larsson & Finkelstein (1999) found that 
organizational integration/assimilation was the most important factor for explaining synergy 
realization. They argue that higher levels of integration/assimilation do not necessarily result 
in higher levels of employee resistance. In line with findings from Larsson & Finkelstein 
(1999), Meyer (2008) found that resistance by middle management is due to lack or low 
levels of integration/assimilation. 
In constrast to these findings, Slangen & Hennart (2008) and Vestring et al. (2004) argue that 
high levels of integration/assimilation lead to more disruptions of the post-M&A process. 
They find that a high level of integration/assimilation is seen as a source of failure if not 
managed properly and causes M&As to fail. Especially if differences between organizations 
are high, integration or assimilation rather results in low performance. Cultural differences are 
often mentioned as a major driver of unsuccessful unification (e.g. Stahl & Voigt, 2008) as 
they cause uncertainty and ambiguity (Harris et al., 2000; Vaara, 2003). Finally, Duncan & 
Mtar (2006) argue that an M&A can also be successful without integration/assimilation of the 
target. 
A third group of studies found that integration should be driven by other aspects, such as the 
goals and motives of a merger or acquisition (Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Puranam et al., 
2006, Puranam et al., 2003; Quah & Young, 2005; Birkinshaw, 1999). For example, the level 
of integration/assimilation in technology acquisitions might influence the speed at which a 
new production is launched after the takeover. Puranam et al. (2003) found that in case of low 
integration/assimilation, organizations tend to rather quickly launch a new product on the 
market after the takeover. However, subsequent innovations seem rather difficult. On the 
contrary, a high level of integration/assimilation delays the launch of a new product after the 
acquisition, but fastens subsequent innovations. Thus, a high level of integration/assimilation 
has a negative effect on short-term performance achievements, but a positive effect on long-
term performance objectives. 
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Drawing a clear conclusion from the presented findings seems difficult. All studies emphasize 
that acculturation strategies considerably affect M&A success. However, it remains unclear 
whether a high level of transformation (integration or assimilation) or a low level of 
transformation (separation or marginalization) leads to a better post-M&A performance. It can 
be expected, that acculturation strategies also affect the emergence of certain forms of 
hybridization, e.g. separation might not lead to hybridization as organizational cultures are not 
blended. 
2.3. Do cultural differences matter in M&As? 
As was emphasized in the introduction, cultural differences are seen as a major barrier to 
achieve certain M&A goals. Extent research focused on cultural differences and M&A 
performance as well as the role and relevance of national as well as organizational culture, in 
order to provide explanations for the high failure rate of such deals.  
2.3.1. 
Hybridization adresses the process of blending organizational cultures of two different 
organizations. This implicitly refers to the fact that culture influences M&A outcomes. 
Several scholars in this field have investigated in culture and there is a consensus that cultural 
differences have an important impact on post-M&A processes (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; 
Chatterjee et al., 1992; Child et al.; 2001; Datta, 1991; Fink & Holden, 2007; Hurt & Hurt, 
2005; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; Olie, 1994; Teerikangas & Very, 2006; Weber, 1996; 
Weber, et al., 1996; etc.). However, existing research dealing with the impact of culture on 
M&A success provides rather contradictory findings. While some studies show that cultural 
differences have a rather negative impact on M&A outcomes (e.g. Chatterjee et al., 1992; 
Datta, 1991; Datta & Puia, 1995; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Harrison et al., 2001; Very et 
al. 1997; etc.) other scholars find empirical evidence for a positive relationship (Barkema et 
al. 1996; Harris, & Ravenscraft, 1991; Krishnan et al., 1997; Morisini et al., 1998; Weber & 
Pliskin, (1996); etc.). Culture is often mentioned as a major driver for unsuccessful integration 
or assimilation (Stahl & Voigt, 2008), because cultural differences may cause uncertainty, 
ambuigity (Harris et al., 2000; Vaara, 2003) or collective culture shocks, which might cause 
resistance by acquired employees (Fink & Holden, 2007). In contrast, cultural differences can 
also be seen as a source for competitive advantages. In line with the resource-based view, the 
acquisition of an organization provides access to new organizational routines (Morosini et al., 
1998). Therefore, the greater the cultural differences are, the more sources for competitive 
advantages might be found. So far, less research has been conducted in order to investigate in 
Cultural differences and their impact on M&A success 
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why culture can affect post-M&A processes in both directions (Teerikangas & Very, 2006; 
Stahl & Voigt, 2008), i.e. have a positive and a negative impact on M&A success. Stahl & 
Voigt (2008) provide first insights into this matter. They found that variation in cultural 
effects is strongly depending on different moderators, such as ‘relatedeness of organizations’. 
Thus, contextual factors need to be considered throroughly when analyzing cultural aspects in 
post-M&A processes. This doctoral thesis will contribute to this line of research by exploring 
how and under which conditions hybridization, defined as the blending of different 
organizational cultures, can positively or negatively affect M&A outcomes. 
2.3.2. 
In the last decade, the importance of distinguishing between different levels of culture got 
recognized by many researchers (e.g. Schweizer, 2005; Stahl & Voigt, 2008; Waldman & 
Javidan, 2009; Weber et al, 2006; Zaheer et al., 2003). Cultural differences may refer to 
several levels of analysis: Nations, industries, organizations, groups, etc. (Fink & Mayrhofer, 
2009). In the context of M&As, mainly national and organizational culture have been 
analyzed. However, whether organizational or national culture differences have a stronger 
impact on M&A success remains unclear. For example, Stahl & Voigt (2008) and Schweizer 
(2005) suppose that organizational culture has a stronger impact on M&A outcomes. By 
contrast, Weber et al. (1996) show that ‘national culture differentials better predict stress, 
negative attitudes towards the merger, and actual cooperation, than corporate culture 
differentials do’ (Weber et. al., 1996, p. 1225). However, they relativize their conclusion by 
arguing that national as well as organizational culture are of equal importance. 
The relationship between organizational and national culture 
A reason for this inconclusive findings can be found in the fact that both levels of culture are 
strongly related to each other. Hofstede et al. (1990) and Sagiv & Schwartz (2007) posit that 
organizational culture is influenced by the ‘surrounding society’, ‘personal value priorities of 
organizational members’ and ‘the nature of the organization’s primary tasks’. Organizations 
are embedded into societies, which can be defined by certain national culture values. Sagiv & 
Schwartz (2007) argue that organizations operate under the societal pressure of national 
culture values. Therefore organizations need to operate in line with norms, values and 
regulations of societies, in order to achieve social legitimization and, consequently, sustain 
economic survivability. Moreover, organizational members bring their own value preferences 
into the organization, which represent the ‘way people select actions, evaluate people and 
events, and explain their actions and evaluations’ (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2007: 83). Thus, 
employees shape organizational culture to a certain extent. Finally, tasks, which need to be 
achieved by an organization, also affect the development of certain organizational culture 
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values (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2007). This coincides with what Hofstede (1990) defined as 
‘perceived practices’. 
In view of the above, the blending of organizational culture might also be affected by national 
culture differences. Thus, hybridization might unfold differently in cross-border M&As than 
in domestic deals. 
2.4. Performance vs. synergies: A plethora of measurement techniques 
Research on post-M&A performance frequently refers to three constructs/variables: (1) 
Performance of the acquirer, (2) performance of the target company and (2) synergy 
realization. 
Most studies consider the performance of the acquirer as a legitimate measure to indicate 
whether an M&A was successful or not (Zollo & Singh, 2004; Puranam et al., 2006; Barkema 
& Schijven, 2008; Cording et al., 2008; Porrini, 2004; Nadolska & Barkema, 2007; Meschi & 
Metais, 2006; Puranam et al., 2003; Angwin, 2004). Far fewer scholars also consider the 
performance of the target organization as important (Homburg & Bucerius, 2006; Gräbner, 
2004; Ellis et al., 2009; Stahl & Voigt, 2008). Synergy realization, represents a different 
concept compared to acquirer and target performance. It includes more than what is generally 
understood under ‘performance’ (i.e. financial performance). Harrison et al. (2001) present 
two different types of synergies that are limited to the level of similarity of organizations. 
First, organizations involved in M&As who share a high degree of similarity with their 
partners can benefit from economies of scale, economies of scope and increased market 
power. Second, if many organizational differences exist between M&A partners, it is possible 
to draw on synergies that are not limited to rationalizations. While the first form of synergies 
may not allow for sustainable competitive advantages, the latter bears the potential of a ‘value 
creating synergy’ (Harrison et al., 2001, p. 686). Such ‘value creating synergies’ might not be 
limited to synergies that directly result in visibly improved financial statements, e.g. increased 
innovation capacity or greater pool of problem solving strategies as proposed by the resource-
based view. This leaves the question, whether an increase in key ratios or realization of 
synergies is a more useful way of measuring M&A success. For this doctoral thesis, both 
approaches were applied, limited by the availability of data for the companies under 
investigation. Most frequently, articles dealing with post-M&A processes operationalize 
performance by using one or more of the following key ratios: Return on assets (ROA) (Zollo 
& Singh, 2004; Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Porrini, 2004), return on sales (Homburg & 
Bucerius, 2006), number of new products launched (Puranam et al., 2006), abnormal stock 
returns (Cording et al., 2008; Stahl & Voigt, 2008; Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Meschi & Metais, 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 11 
2006), productivity of employees (Paruchuri et al., 2006), sales growth (Ellis et al., 2009; 
Stahl & Voigt, 2008;), and perception of performance by management (Ellis et al., 2009; 
Slangen & Hennart, 2008). 
2.5. Symptoms of poor change management in the context of M&As 
This chapter will shed light on selected phenomena caused by poor M&A management related 
to acculturation, cultural differences and M&A performance. While existing research 
identified several symptoms related to poor change management, only those who are strongly 
related to the empirical findings of this doctoral thesis will be discussed. These are ‚loss of 
identity’, ‚culture shock’, ‚cultural stretch’ and ‘poor communication policy’. 
2.5.1. 
In M&As, acquired employees often completely lose their old organizational identity, due to 
assimilation or marginalization. Old organizational cultures become obsolete and 
reorientation is required in order to survive within or cope with the new setting. However, 
individuals might differently react to such change processes and might develop different 
forms of identity. On the basis of Jiménez et al. (2004), Fink & Holden (2007) indiciate three 
forms of identity, which can be related to M&A processes: (1) instrumental identity, (2) civic 
identity and (3) cultural identity. 
Loss of identity: The necessity to identify with a new organization 
Instrumental identity refers to a form of identification with an organization, which is driven 
by ‘calculated individual self-interests’ (Jiménez et al., 2004, p. 3). In line with Perrow 
(1967), instrumental identity implies that individuals are mainly extrinsically motivated by 
job security as well as good payment and therefore decide to stay with an organization. 
Civic identity emerges if individuals in a group collectively develop rules, which constitute 
the frame of reference for a ‘peaceful […] co-existence’ (Jiménez et al., 2004, p. 4) and 
identify common goals and values (Mancini, 1998; Weiler, 1999; Kersbergen, 1997). In the 
context of M&As, the acquirer and the target company might agree on common standards to 
cooperate. Separation, for example, might lead to civic identity of acquired employees. 
Finally, cultural identity implies that individuals fully undestand and identify with cultural 
norms and standards. In the context of M&As, cultural identity with a new organization 
requires the abandonment of the old organizational culture. This, however, might require a 
long period of time until the former cultural identity is replaced by a new one (Jimenéz et al., 
2004). In contrast to instrumental identity, individuals are intrinsically motivated to work 
within the new organization. 
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2.5.2. 
Culture shock is a phenomena emerging as a reaction to unfamiliar environments (Furnham 
& Bochner, 1986; Oberg, 1960; Ward et al. 2001). Such unfamiliar environments are 
commonly shaped by cultural values different from those held by an individual who suffers 
from a culture shock. 
Culture shock and cultural stretch: Response to changes in cultural values  
In M&As the organizational environment changes for most of the employees involved. In 
case of assimilation, a whole group of people loses its familiar environment and has to adjust 
to a new organizational culture. Fink & Holden (2007) investigated in this issue on the 
organizational level and identified a phenomenon called ‘collective culture shock’ which can 
be described by the following symptoms: ‘staff has problems adjusting to new conditions; 
staff at large is disoriented and disillusioned […] and [collective culture shocks] cause 
hesitancy to act or even resistance’ (Fink & Holden, 2007, p. 124). Furthermore they describe 
two general coping strategies for individuals suffering from such a collective culture shock: 
(1) Leaving the organization (e.g. Walsh, 1988), or (2) cultural stretch. 
Cultural stretch refers to the phenomenon that individuals decide to stay with an 
organization although they do not understand and/or identify with the new organization. They 
learn how to behave within the new context in order to meet certain minimum performance 
requirements. In light of the identity typology provided above, individuals only develop an 
instrumental identity, thus are less productive, motivated and loyal. 
As hybridization deals with the blending of two different organizational cultures, it can be 
expected that collective culture shocks and cultural stretch are related to this phenomenon. 
2.5.3. 
The role of communication between acquirer and target has turned out to be of considerable 
relevance in shaping post-M&A processes (e.g. Appelbaum et al., 2000; Gräbner, 2004; 
Inkpen et al. 2000; Kavanagh & Ashkanasy; 2006; Meyer, 2008; Epstein, 2004; Schweiger & 
Denisi, 1991; Tetenbaum, 1999). Change processes, and in particular M&As bear many 
uncertainties for individuals on different hierarchical levels, which might lead to resistance 
and stress. 
Poor communication policy: Relevance, timing and consistency of information 
to make sense of changes 
Lack of top-down communication throughout a merger or acquisition is called the ‚merger 
syndrom’ as defined by Marks & Mirvis (1985). Such poor communication policies cause 
individuals to rely more strongly on rumors that emerge due to lack of official information. 
Buono & Bowditch (1989) highlight, that such rumors lead to even more ‘anxiety, and, in 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 13 
many instances, counterproductive behavior. Often based on fears rather than reality, these 
rumors can significantly exacerbate employee anxiety, tensions, and stress’ (Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989, p. 257). 
Epstein (2004) shows that communication between acquirer and target needs to be 
‘significant, constant, and consistent’ (Epstein, 2004, p.177), i.e. should (1) include relevant 
information for those employees affected by changes, (2) be maintained throughout the 
M&A-phase, and (3) not be contradictory over time.  
With respect to hybridization, some forms might be more strongly related to communication 
than other forms. While ‘uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge’ might be 
considerably shaped by communication activities, the ‘deck of cards concept of hybridization’ 
might be less affected by poor communication policies. In light of existing research, it 
becomes clear, that timely, precise and comprehensible communication is key for successful 
M&A deals and might alleviate potential negative effects of certain forms of hybridization. 
2.6. Explaining hybridization by applying a generic model of organizational 
culture 
Dauber et al. (2010) developed a model of organizational culture, which allows exploring and 
illustrating the phenomenon of hybridization in a dynamic way. It considers not only 
organizational culture theories (Schein, 1985; Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006) but also organization 
theories, in particular related to strategy, structure and operations/organizational behavior 
(e.g. Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971; Argyris, 1977; Caves, 1980; Chandler, 1973; Donaldson, 
1987, 1996; Hamilton and Shergill, 1992, 1993; Whittington, 2001; Williamson, 1975; etc.). 
According to Dauber et al. (2010) the relationship between these four domains of an 
organization (organizational culture, strategy, structure, operations) can systematically be 
linked to each other as shown in Figure 1. The authors provide explanations of how and why 
these links exist by referring to common literature in the respective fields, e.g. organizational 
culture research, strategic management, organizational learning, strategy-structure-fit 
research, etc.. 
In the generic model of organizational culture operations refer to behavior of organizational 
members, which can unfold in the context of given structures. In light of M&As, different 
forms of behavior, e.g. different working styles, have to be merged and harmonized to allow 
for common coordinated processes. Operations are undoubtedly related to the human 
resources of an organization and are considerably related to ‘socio-cultural integration’ as 
defined in the M&A literature (e.g. Birkinshaw, 1999; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Björkman et 
al., 2007; Stahl & Voigt, 2008). 
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Caves (1980) argued that structures are responsible for ‘internal allocation of tasks, 
decisions, rules, and procedures for appraisal and reward, selected for the best pursuit of […] 
[a] strategy’ (Caves, 1980, p. 64). Structures set boundaries for patterns of behavior within the 
organization. Differences in structures imply that also differences in operations exist. With 
reference to M&As, organizations involved in an M&A deal might severly differ in 
organizational structure, which might cause considerable adjustment problems. 
Strategy ‘is an organization process, in many ways inseparable from the structure, behavior 
and culture of the company in which it takes place’ (Andrews, 1971, p. 53). It represents the 
general orientation of an organization in order to meet defined goals and objectives (Chandler, 
1973; Whittington, 2001). In M&As organizations might have developed different strategies 
and in order to unify them, the acquirer as well as the target company need to redefine their 
strategy or one of the M&A partners simply adjusts to the strategy of the other. Irrespective of 
whether integration or assimilation is selected as an acculturation strategy, structures and 
operations need to be aligned towards a certain strategy, as identified in common strategy-
structure-fit research (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Chandler 1973, Donaldson, 1987, 1996; 
Hamilton and Shergill, 1992, 1993; Stopford & Wells, 1972; Williamson, 1975; Wolf & 
Egelhoff, 2002, etc.). 
According to Figure 1, organizational culture influences strategies, structures and operations 
indirectly and guides the process of operationalization, i.e. the effective implementation of 
strategic goals into behavior, in order to successfully achieve these goals. Thus, the presented 
domains of an organization need to stand in line with shared values held in an organization. In 
M&As, two organizational cultures get blended which results in hybridization (Fink, 2008). 
The question how different acculturation strategies for the domain ‘organizational culture’ 
affect the overall post-M&A phase is subject to this doctoral thesis. 
The generic model of organizational culture also considers the external environment by 
referring to the legitimization environment (i.e. different groups of stakeholders) and task 
environment (i.e. the context in which operations are performed, e.g. the market). As the 
doctoral thesis mainly focuses on change processes within the internal environment of two 
organizations, a more detailed discussion with respect to these domains will not be 
considered. 
Fink (2008) defines hybridization as a process. In order to illustrate effects of hybridization it 
is necessary to select an organizational model, which reflects organizational dynamics, 
especially change processes. This can be achieved by the generic model of organizational 
culture as it proposes interactions in both directions between domains. In line with Figure 1 
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and the descriptions provided above, a merger or an acquisition represents a process, where an 
acquirer, defined by organizational culture, strategy, structure and operations, takes over or 
merges with another company, which is also represented by the same domains. However, 
these domains may differ considerably with respect to their characteristics between 
organizations, e.g. strong hierarchy vs. loose hierarchy in the domain ‘structure’. Assuming 
that no organization is totally equal to another organization, organizational differences can be 
identified in one or more domain in the generic model of organizational culture. 
Consequently, referring to ‘transformation’ might relate to all or only certain elements of the 
model, e.g. only to structural integration. Thus, a more fine-grained terminology will be used 
in this doctoral thesis to precisely explain and define phenomena that are only related to 
particular elements of the model. In line with empirical findings of this doctoral thesis, a 
differentiation between 16 post-M&A processes will be made, based on the domains of the 
generic model of organizational culture and acculuration strategies as defined by Berry et al. 
(1980). Only within quotes the term ‘integration’ will be retained to preserve the authenticity 
of interview partners. 
 
Table 3: Categorization of post-M&A processes according to acculturation strategy (Berry et al., 1980) 
and domains of the generic model of organizational culture (Dauber et al. 2010) 
 integration assimilation separation marginalization 
culture cultural integration cultural assimilation cultural separation cultural marginalization 
strategy strategic integration strategic assimilation strategic separation strategic marginalization 
structure structural integration structural assimilation structural separation structural marginalization 
operations operational integration 
operational 
assimilation 
operational 
separation 
operational 
marginalization 
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Figure 1: Generic model of organizational culture by Dauber et al. (2010, p. 13) 
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3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS: EXPLORING HYBRIDIZATION 
IN M&AS 
This doctoral thesis aims at developing a theory of hybridization. Therefore the nature of this 
phenomenon will be explored by identifying (1) major conditions of hybridization, (2) 
different forms of hybridization and (3) different effects of hybridization on post-M&A 
processes. Findings will lead to recommendations for a better management of M&As and 
provides paths for future research efforts in this field. 
As outlined above, M&As tend to fail or are, at least, considered of being difficult to manage, 
time consuming and a complex change process. While existing theories provide rather 
contradictory findings with respect to culture, integration and performance (see also chapter 
2), it is supposed that understanding hybridization provides a clearer picture of M&A 
phenomena and mechanisms that influence the outcome of transformation processes. 
Therefore, being aware of hybridization phenomena and their characteristics could help to 
improve post-M&A outcomes. 
The following research questions will be answered by this doctoral thesis: 
• What are the basic conditions for hybridization to take place? 
• Which forms of hybridization can be identified? 
• How does hybridization work in different contexts? 
• How does hybridization affect the transformation process? 
The following chapter will outline the applied methodology in order to find answers to these 
questions. 
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4. METHODOLOGY: A CASE STUDY APPROACH WITH QUALTITATIVE AND 
QUANITATIVE METHODS 
The following chapter presents the research design for the doctoral thesis and its underlying 
epistemological foundations, research processes and methods. In the last part the validity of 
the research design will be discussed. 
4.1. Constructivist epistemology and inductive theory building 
The constructivist perspective claims that the perceived reality is just a construct of the real 
world, thus, a subjective worldview. Therefore decisions are based on our personal perception 
of “reality” deriving from interpretations of the world, e.g. through interactions with other 
individuals, as postulated by symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1981). Therefore researchers 
in social sciences are confronted with the problem to analyze data that is pre-interpreted by 
individuals called first-order constructs. In order to build a valid theory it is necessary to 
reconstruct first-order constructs that can be tested and withstand validity checks. These new 
constructions are then called second-order constructs (Söffner, 2000, p. 167). 
In view of the above, it can be concluded that theory building has to follow an inductive 
research design rather than a hypothetic-deductive approach. It seems more appropriate to 
develop theory throughout the research process by collecting empirical data than elaborating a 
theory first and afterwards trying to apply it to specific “real” world situations. A good 
example for inductive theory building is the syllogism about Socrates and mortality: All men 
are mortal. This generalization was only possible due to observations that people die over 
time (induction). As a consequence, Socrates could conclude that human beings, like him, are 
mortal (deduction) (Locke, 2007, p. 886). Locke (2007) discussed both approaches and gave 
recommendations for inductive theory building. Those guidelines, which are applicable to the 
proposed thesis, are listed below:  
• “Start With Valid […] Axioms as the Base” (Locke, 2007, p. 880) 
• “Formulate Valid Concepts” (Locke, 2007, p. 881) 
• “Build a Substantial Body of Observations or Data” (Locke, 2007, p. 881) 
• “Tie in Valid Concepts From Other Sources and Theories Where Applicable (Locke, 
2007, p. 883) 
• “Integrate the Totality of Findings and Concepts Into a Noncontradictory Whole” 
(Locke, 2007, p. 883) 
• “Identify the Domain and Boundary Conditions for the Theory” (Locke, 2007, p. 884) 
• “Make Theory Building a Careful, Painstaking, and Gradual Process” (Locke, 2007). 
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The following chapters will present the application of these principles for the respective 
research context, i.e. M&As. 
4.2. The research process in detail: Grounded Theory and mixed methods-
approach 
A case study design is selected in order to build a theory of hybridization in mergers and 
acquisitions, based on empirical evidence, i.e. grounded theory. This type of empirical 
inquiries helps to analyze ‘a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context’ and 
unfolds its special applicability if the boundaries of the subject under investigation and the 
context become blurred (Yin, 2003, p. 13). This is the case for hybridization. 
Figure 2 presents a visual model of research processes for each case and Figure 3 illustrates 
the overall research design. For each case study qualitative and quantitative data was collected 
and analyzed. This approach is commonly called ‘concurrent triangulation strategy’ 
(Creswell, 2009) and is applied to cross-validate findings based on two different types of data. 
 
Figure 2: Research process for each case study 
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Figure 3: Overall research design for this doctoral thesis 
 
4.2.1. 
The selection of case studies and interview partners was driven by theoretical sampling. This 
is a common sampling technique in qualitative research, which is characterized by choosing 
cases, interview partners, incidents etc., that will enrich and fill gaps in a developing theory. 
In addition it can be applied to prove or test emerging hypotheses or propositions. This 
technique was applied to generate a theory about hybridization in mergers and acquisitions as 
commonly recommended by several researchers (Boeije, 2002, p. 393; Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 
537; Flick, 2002, pp. 64-66; Lueger, 2000, pp. 80-81; Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 201-215). 
Data collection and theoretical sampling 
In order to identify appropriate case studies, databases such as ‘Amadeus’ provided by Bureau 
van Dijk Electronic Publishing, which includes information on more than 10 million 
European companies, and articles in Austrian newspapers (e.g. Standard, Die Presse) formed 
the starting point for the selection of appropriate M&A deals. As hybridization refers to the 
blending of organizational culture, domestic mergers or acquisitions were given preference in 
order to control for national culture. However, it was planned to conduct at least one case 
study were different national cultures are involved, to conform to the principles of theoretical 
sampling. Based on these criteria three M&A deals were selected. Two case studies refer to 
domestic acquisitions, i.e. only Austrian companies were involved. A third case study was 
conducted representing a cross-border acquisition between an Austrian and Italian 
organization. 
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In total 55 interviews were conducted. 76% of the interview partners were male and 24% 
female. While Table 4 provides a more detailed overview about the statistical distribution of 
interview partners according to organizational membership (acquirer or target) and gender, 
Figure 4 illustrates the statistical distribution of interview partners by age. As can be seen, 
more interviews were conducted with individuals who were male and a member of the 
acquired organization. This is due to the fact that more male individuals worked in the 
respective companies and (2) that acquired employees provided richer narratives than 
acquiring employees, which required considerably more interviews to reach theoretical 
saturation. 
 
Table 4: Statistics for interview partners with respect to organizational membership and gender sorted by 
case study (n = 55 interview partners) 
  case 
Total 
1 2 3 
acquirer 
gender 
female 3 0 1 4 
male 7 2 5 14 
Total 10 2 6 18 
target 
gender 
female 4 2 3 9 
male 5 13 10 28 
Total 9 15 13 37 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of 55 interview partners by age 
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Theoretical sampling of interview partners was partly combined with snowball sampling, i.e. 
interview partners recommended further individuals for additional interviews. In order to 
reach theoretical saturation of codes, concepts and observed phenomena, this procedure 
turned out to be the best approach to identify appropriate interview partners, as the access to 
organizations was limited. However, after each interview, people were asked to recommend 
specific types of other interview partners. Some interview partners even considered different 
types of interview partners themselves. Therefore participants were theoretically sampled 
according to the following criteria: 
• Organizational membership (acquirer or target) 
• Age 
• Gender 
• Position in the organization (top- and middle-management, operational level, etc.) 
• Survivor or non-survivor of acquisition 
The selection of further interview partners ended, when theoretical saturation was reached, i.e. 
‘when no new information seems to emerge during coding, that is, when no new properties, 
dimensions, conditions, actions/interactions, or consequences are seen in the data’ (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1998, p.136). 
4.2.2. 
Narrative interviews provide a context-specific insight into how individuals perceive changes 
during the M&A process and how they adapt their behavior to new rules and people. This 
method was implemented to identify, define and describe the hybridization process and its 
elements represented by concepts and categories. Other qualitative data, such as memos, 
presentations, posters, etc., complemented and supported the findings. Through theoretical 
sampling of interview partners, different perspectives of the same event were analyzed. Each 
interview started with the following broad question to allow for narratives to emerge: 
Identifying forms of hybridization: Narrative interviews and other qualitative 
data 
 
I: How did you experience the takeover? 
 
If canditates did not know where to start with their stories, a more precise follow-up question 
was posed: 
 
I: How have you been informed about this acquisition? 
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The interview transcripts were coded in accordance with the methods proposed by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) (see Table 5): 
 
 
Table 5: Methods of grounded theory proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
Method Description 
Open coding “The analytical process through which concepts are identified and their properties and 
dimensions are discovered in data” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 101) 
Axial coding “The process of relating categories to their subcategories, termed ‘axial’ because 
coding occurs around the axis of a category, linking categories at the level of properties 
and dimensions” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 123) 
Selective coding “The process of integrating and refining the theory” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 143) 
 
The computer software Altas.ti V.6.1.1 was used to facilitate the coding procedure. The 
decision for choosing electronic support was based on three criteria: (1) the relatively high 
number of interviews conducted, (2) the number of codes that developed (651 codes in total), 
and (3) the possibility to turn qualitative data in to quantitative figures. Altas.ti V6.1.1 allows 
exporting coded data to SPSS by turning each quote into a case. Codes related to a case, i.e. 
quote, were coded ‘1’. In contrast, codes that were not related to a quote were labeled with 
‘0’. Finally, 6695 quotes were transformed into 6695 SPSS cases. This should, however not 
be confused with the number of case studies conducted. Another feature of Altas.ti V6.1.1 is 
the Co-Occurrence-Analysis, which allows to systematically explore qualitative data via 
quantitative methods. This analytical tool allows to measure whether certain codes were 
related to the same quote. The following exemplary quote shows a co-occurrence of three 
codes: 
 
Therefore it is totally clear, that there is an Italian on the 
board of directors, because the CEE Business for the group 
is still the market of the future, despite the financial crisis. 
Therefore it was clear that sooner or later they [the 
acquirer] will put an Italian there [on the board of 
directors].  
                                                                  [quote-ID: 36:112] 
Replacement of top management 
Loss of responsibilities 
Monitoring of the acquired employees 
 
After exporting this quote to SPSS it is translated into the following: 
 
quote-ID Replacement of top management 
Loss of 
responsibilities 
Monitoring of the acquired 
employees 
Organizational 
culture 
36:112 1 1 1 0 
  
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 24 
Consequently it was possible to analyze the nominal value of co-occurrences, i.e. number of 
quotes, and also relate codes to each other via correlation. Although, calculating the 
relationship between codes is realized through a Pearson correlation, the results represent only 
the co-occurrence of codes for a certain number of quotes. Only in connection with the 
qualitative content analysis it was possible to establish meaningful relationships. However, 
the significance of co-occurrences allowed to (1) run more complex queries on qualitative 
data and (2) systematically identify and define relationships between qualitative and 
quantitative data. 
Altas.ti V6.1.1 also provides a function which groups codes according to certain 
commonalities. These groups are called ‘Family Codes’ (FCs). A detailed list of FCs that 
were used in the analytical part of this doctoral thesis are provided in the Appendix. Creating 
FCs considerably supported the processes of selective coding. 
4.2.3. 
The qualitative approach, as illustrated above, was also applied to investigate in 
organizational differences, i.e. differences in operations, structures, strategies and 
organizational culture. Compared to organizational culture dimensions, as developed by 
Hofstede et al. (1990) or the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004), narrative interviews 
provide a more complex and case-specific view on differences in norms and values between 
organizations. This is an essential issue as differences in organizational culture constitute the 
source of hybridization (Fink, 2008). In light of the literature review, it can be expected that 
perceived values and actions change throughout the integration or assimilation process. 
Consequences and effects of blending organizational culture influencing this process can be 
better identified through narrative interviews than via cross-sectional quantitative data. In 
addition contextual factors and their impact on certain phenomena can be considered. As 
outlined in the literature review, blending of organizational cultures can have different effects 
on the M&A process, depending on certain moderating factors (e.g. Stahl & Voigt, 2008). The 
application of narrative interviews permits to analyze not only current organizational 
differences (as culture dimensions would do), but provides valuable insights into how they 
changed throughout the M&A process. As this is the subject of investigation in this doctoral 
thesis, preference was given to a qualitative approach. 
Organizational differences: Narrative interviews, NEO-FFI and PVQ 
In order to provide a richer perspective of organizational differences, data on personality traits 
(NEO-FFI, Costa & McCrae, 1992) and individual value preferences (PVQ; Schwartz, 2006) 
was collected from the interview partners. These questionnaires were applied (1) to support 
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the qualitative content analysis (triangulation of data and methods) and (2) to explore whether 
there were additional, unreported organizational differences. 
Personality traits and individual value preferences are commonly used as predictors of 
behavior. Thus they seem useful to explain differences in behavior between acquirer and 
target and help to understand reactions to changes caused by transformation processes. These 
reactions might severely affect different forms of hybridization as outlined above. 
The NEO-FFI represents the short version of the NEO-PI-R. This instrument, developed by 
Costa & McCrae (1992) is a frequently applied instrument to measure personality traits. It has 
shown high validity and reliability across different contexts, thus serves as a solid basis for 
explaining behavioral outcomes. The NEO-FFI is generally used when different facets of 
personality traits are not required. This is the case for this doctoral thesis. The Big-Five 
personality traits are: Neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experiences, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness. Each trait is shortly described in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: The Big-Five personality traits and their description based on Borkenau & Ostendorf (2008) 
Personality trait Description 
Neuroticism This trait refers to the emotional stability of an individual and measures how emotions, 
especially negative ones, are experienced. Individuals scoring high on this trait are 
considered of being easily affected by stress and often feel worried or nervous. 
Uncertainty and fear are common phenomena in M&As. Individuals who are relatively 
more emotionally stable, might be able to cope better with changes than others.  
Extraversion This trait measures to which extent individuals enjoy and long for interaction with others 
Thus, represents a preference for interaction. Scoring high on extraversion implies that an 
individual is self-confident, talk-active, optimistic, etc.. The opposite of extraversion is 
commonly known as introversion. 
With reference to M&As it could be expected that extraverted individuals more easily 
cope with organizational changes or even appreciate them. 
Openness to 
experiences 
This trait refers to which extent individuals are interested in new experiences and enjoy 
experimenting. They more likely question existing norms and rules and are open to new 
political and social values. Thus, individuals scoring high on openness to experiences 
might tend to see M&As more as a chance for something new and better, than as a threat. 
This surely could moderate the effect of reported phenomena by interview partners. 
Agreeableness Similar to extraversion, agreeableness refers to interpersonal behavior. Individuals scoring 
high on this dimension can be described as altruistic and are interested in helping and 
understanding others, as well as easily trust in people. The interpretation of this trait with 
respect to M&As follows the one highlighted for openness to experiences. 
Conscientiousness Individuals scoring high on this trait prefer to plan carefully before setting actions and can 
be considered of being reliable, disciplined, ambitious and goal-oriented. If employees 
scoring high on this trait need to collaborate with others scoring low on conscientiousness, 
conflicts may arise, due to the fact that their working styles differ considerably. This might 
very well happen in M&As and complicate the operational transformation process. 
 
According to Schwartz (2006), 10 individual values can be identified, which are 
systematically linked to each other (see Figure 5). Based on his empirical findings, opposing 
values (in the circle) are negatively related to each other, e.g. universalism vs. power. In 
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contrast, neighboring values are positively related to each other, e.g. self-direction vs. 
stimulation.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Relationships between culture values according to Schwartz (2003, 2006) 
 
 
Table 7 presents a short description of all ten individual values as defined by Schwartz 
(2006). Similar to what has been said about personality traits, differences in individual value 
preferences between employees of the acquiring and acquired company might pose barriers to 
the successful operational transformation, i.e. the merger of human resources. 
 
Table 7: Individual values by Schwartz (2006) 
Cultural value Description 
Self-direction “Defining goal: independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring.” (Schwartz, 
2006, p. 5) 
Stimulation “Defining goal: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 5) 
Hedonism “Defining goal: pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself.” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 5) 
Achievement “Defining goal: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social 
standards.” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 6) 
Power “Defining goal: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.” 
(Schwartz, 2006, p. 6) 
Security “Defining goal: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self.” 
(Schwartz, 2006, p. 6) 
Conformity “Defining goal: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others 
and violate social expectations or norms.” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 7) 
Tradition “Defining goal: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 27 
culture or religion provides.” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 7) 
Benevolence “Defining goal: preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent 
personal contact (the ‘in-group’).” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 8) 
Universalism “Defining goal: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all 
people and for nature.” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 8) 
 
Based on his empirical findings, Schwartz (2003, 2006) outlines, that it is possible to 
systematically categorize all dimensions into four groups as shown in Table 8. On the one 
hand, he distinguishes between values that have a ‘personal focus’ and those who have a 
‘social focus’. This reflects that values might either be directed at the individual itself or to a 
group of people. The differentiation accounts for the general orientation towards the external 
environment. On the other hand, Schwartz (2003, 2006) highlights that values can also (1) be 
driven by anxiety (anxiety-based values vs. anxiety-free values), (2) represent individuals 
attitude towards goal achievement (prevention of loss goals vs. promotion of gain goals) and 
(3) define ones preference for protection against threats or preference for self-expansion. 
Table 8 summarizes the categorization of individual value preferences. 
 
Table 8: Dynamic underpinnings according to Schwartz (2006, p. 5 of Annex) 
 Anxiety-based / prevention / self-protection Anxiety-free / promotion / self-expansion 
Personal 
focus 
 
 
 
SELF-ENHANCEMENT 
Achievement 
Power 
OPENNESS TO CHANGE 
Hedonism 
Stimulation 
Self-Direction 
Social 
focus 
 
 
 
CONSERVATION 
Security 
Conformity 
Tradition 
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE 
Universalism 
Benevolence 
 
In conclusion, insights on organizational differences are captured qualitatively via narrative 
interviews, and quantitatively via personality traits (NEO-FFI) and individual value 
preferences (PVQ). Where available, also other archival data was analyzed, e.g. posters, 
presentations, etc.. 
4.2.4. 
As highlighted in the literature review, the success of M&As can be measured in various 
ways. For this doctoral thesis two perspectives had been chosen: (1) perceived success of the 
M&A by interview partners. As interviews were conducted with individuals operating on 
different hierarchical levels, a more context-based evaluation of success can be achieved. (2) 
Financial data based on published financial reports. In contrast to subjective perceptions of 
Measuring the success of M&As: Narrative interviews and financial data 
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interview partners, a key-ratio analysis would allow for a more objective interpretation of  
‘success’. By considering industry benchmarks, it is possible to identify whether differences 
in performance were due to common changes in the external environment or have been due to 
case-specific events. 
By combining both approaches meaningful conclusions were drawn for each case study and 
helped to identify, whether hybridization, at least indirectly, can be blamed for differences in 
performance. 
4.2.5. 
The main requirements for theory building are construct and internal validity, thus, forming 
the base for reliable and meaningful findings. Strauss & Corbin (1998) propose criteria for 
evaluating the quality of grounded theories. These criteria, represented by questions, are 
divided into those for evaluating the quality of the research process (construct validity) and 
the quality of the empirical grounding of a study (internal validity). 
Assuring the validity of data and findings 
Table 9 summarizes them 
shortly. 
 
Table 9: Criteria for the research process and the empirical grounding of a study (adapted from Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998, pp. 269-272) 
Research process Empirical grounding of a study 
How was the original sample selected? On what 
grounds? 
Are concepts generated? 
What major categories emerged? Are the concepts systematically related? 
What were some of the events, incidents, or actions 
(indicators) that pointed to some of these major 
categories? 
Are there many conceptual linkages, and are the 
categories well developed? Do categories have 
conceptual density? 
On the basis of what categories did theoretical 
sampling proceed? That is, how did theoretical 
formulations guide some of the data collection? After 
theoretical sampling was done, how representative of 
the data did the categories prove? 
Is variation built into theory? 
What were some of the hypotheses pertaining to 
conceptual relations (i.e., among categories), and on 
what grounds were they formulated and validated? 
Are the conditions under which variation can be found 
built into the study and explained? 
Were there instances in which hypotheses did not 
explain what was happening in the data? How were 
these discrepancies accounted for? Were hypotheses 
modified? 
Has process been taken into account? 
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How and why was the core category selected? Was 
this collection sudden or gradual, and was it difficult 
or easy? On what grounds were the final analytic 
decisions made? 
Do the theoretical findings seem significant, and to 
what extent? 
 
While these criteria are strongly focusing on the qualitative part of the proposed doctoral 
thesis, the following chapters will discuss further aspects that will be considered to ensure 
construct and internal validity for all elements of the research design. 
4.2.5.1. Construct validity 
In the field of cross-cultural research, the validity of measures is often threatened by 
construct, method and item bias (Vijver & Tanzer, 1997). However, the methods proposed in 
the research design have been selected according to their applicability across cultures and are 
considered to produce comparable results. Apart from that, the explanation of differences in 
organizations, perceptions of M&A processes and, in particular the change process form part 
of the research objectives and are subject to analysis. 
As far as the narrative interviews are concerned, they were held in the interviewee’s mother 
tongue. Only two out of 55 interviews had to be conducted in English. All other interview 
partners spoke German [author’s native language], thus the likelihood of linguistic 
misunderstandings was very low for the majority of conducted interviews. In order to avoid 
bias regarding the narrative interviews deriving from single respondents (Bowman & 
Ambrosini, 1997), managers and employees from each company were interviewed 
(theoretical sampling) to receive different perspectives of the same event, i.e. different forms 
of hybridization. 
Regarding the quantitative measurement tools (NEO-FFI, PVQ, financial key ratios), the 
applied questionnaires were available in different languages (German and English) and were 
successfully tested in various countries. Therefore construct or item bias of these instruments 
can be considered as negligible. 
Finally, also observations made before, during and after interviews were documented as 
memos. However, single person observations are seen as a source of construct invalidity. 
Nevertheless, where it was possible, they were used as an additional instrument to check for 
consistency between what people perceive, say and really do. In other words, findings of 
observations were applied to crosscheck with categories and concepts found through narrative 
interviews. Identified inconsistencies lead to further narrative interviews as proposed by 
theoretical sampling. Observations did not constitute a major method in this doctoral thesis. 
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Finally, the triangulation of data, methods and existing theories also positively contributes to 
construct validity, corroborates the validity of findings and, eventually, provides a credible 
picture of hybridization in M&As (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 538; Jick, 1979, p. 608; Yin, 2003, pp. 
97-99). 
4.2.5.2. Internal validity 
According to Yin (2003), internal validity is of great importance in causal and explanatory 
case studies, but not so much in exploratory ones. As this doctoral thesis aims at exploring the 
phenomenon of hybridization and developing theories grounded in empirical data rather than 
trying to establish causal relationships, this criterion was applied to emerging theories 
themselves (see also Table 9).  
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5. A SHORT INTRODUCTION INTO THE THREE CASE STUDIES 
This chapter will outline the background of all three case studies and concentrates on the 
major drivers for each M&A deal by presenting goals and motives of the acquirer. 
5.1. Case study 01: A national takeover in the communication technology 
industry 
The first case study deals with two communication technology providers. The acquirer, ABC 
International Austria, an Austrian subsidiary of an American, globally operating, 
communication provider, decided to acquire one of its competitors in the Austrian market: 
IDE Llc. In fall 2005, both parties signed the deal and the transformation process started. 
Due to its small size, IDE Llc. was considered of being flexible, innovative and quickly 
launched new products on the market. It used a quite new technology and mainly served 
business customers. In contrast, ABC International Austria focused on private customers and 
successfully established its business in Austria. For many years ABC International Austria 
was one of the market leaders in the industry. However, technical constraints did restrict their 
access to all regions in Austria. Gaining additional market shares would have been to cost-
intensive by following their traditional business approach. Apart from that, there was a 
growing market for the new technology (called D-technology in the following) implemented 
by IDE Llc.. Thus, this M&A deal did not only provide access to a new customer segment, 
but also helped ABC International Austria to overcome their technical constraints. In order to 
further expand on the Austrian market, an acquisition was inevitable and IDE Llc. was the 
best choice. The following quotes outline the situation: 
 
P15: And then there was the question of how to start the expansion. There were mainly two options: 
Either we open up our own business, buy the Know-How and start to build up a D-technology-based  
business. At the time we were talking about it, the market for D-technology was already well-developed, 
this means, we would have been relatively late to enter, and would have needed some years until we also 
would have built up the know-how as well as the standing on the market, etc.. This means, de facto there 
was only the second option left and this was to buy an existing provider. This was actually relatively 
logical, the derivation of all this. And then we started to check the market, who was up for sale, actually 
not who was up for sale, but we were thinking about who could be up for sale, and this then we, we 
approached this very offensively, this topic. IDE Llc. initially did not want to sell, it wanted to be listed on 
the stock exchange, as an IPO. However, they were convinced, due to an adequate purchase price, which 
we offered, that it might be better to do that [i.e. agree to the takeover]. 
 
P15: And what we had planned was, this we said that way, we do not buy a competitor in order to take it 
off the market, but we buy an additional technology in order to gain an additional footprint in an 
additional market segment, because the business segment [in ABC International Austria] was very tiny, 
actually it was not existing. 
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P7: In principle we had been acquired because of the D-technology and not because we are a threatening 
competitor, because at that time we were really not such a threat for ABC International Austria, but the 
products based on D-technology were appealing to the market, yes. 
 
P16: I think it was simply [short pause] the primary motivation: Well, of course with business based on 
K-technology [technology used by ABC International Austria] you have a limited footprint in Austria and 
with the takeover of IDE Llc. with the business based on D-technology nearly all Austria was covered.  
 
In view of the above it becomes clear, that IDE Llc. was not a threatening competitor on the 
market for ABC International Austria. The takeover was mainly driven by (1) geographical 
market expansion, (2) access to new customers, i.e. business customers and (3) new 
technology. 
5.2. Case Study 02: A cross-border acquisition in the banking industry 
In the second case study a cross-border acquisition of an Italian and Austrian Bank was 
analyzed. ITA Bank, one of the largest Italian banks, took over GER Bank of Germany in fall 
2005. In 2004, GER Bank had acquired AUT Bank, the market leader in Austria. Thus, also 
AUT Bank was affected and consequently taken over by ITA Bank. The case study reflects on 
how AUT Bank perceived, experienced and rated this takeover, being already a subsidiary at 
the time when the deal was signed between GER Bank and ITA Bank. 
The takeover between GER Bank and AUT Bank was mainly driven by geographical 
expansion and the opportunity to create additional revenues. GER Bank was considerably 
underperforming and was seeking a strong partner. Although AUT Bank could cover some of 
the losses, GER Bank still could not recover, due to the financial crisis. Both banks were 
involved in corporate and retail banking. 
ITA Bank, which originated from a merger of three Italian savings banks, decided to expand 
internationally and already developed a considerable, but yet not large enough network in 
CEE. The main focus of ITA Bank was retail banking. 
According to the interview partners, there were mainly three motives why ITA Bank acquired 
GER Bank and AUT Bank respectively: (1) strengthening the position in CEE, as AUT Bank 
was among the market leaders with respect to foreign banks operating in this region, (2) 
entering the German and Austrian market, and (3) acquiring a new business segment: 
Corporate banking. 
This is how the interview partners explained the goals and motives of the M&A: 
 
P20: I mean for ITA Bank the market position in Austria was surely, ahm, with the market leadership, this 
was totally clear, an important reason to do that […] at least as important, if not even more important, so 
to speak, the network of AUT Bank in Eastern Europe, which nicely fits to ITA Bank. So, only in two 
markets we really had too many overlaps. 
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P21: In view of the structure, of course, ITA Bank is more a private, so to speak, a private customer 
oriented organization, while AUT Bank also had very, very broad experience with the business sector and 
corporate banking […] Ahm, with respect to that, there were so to speak synergies because of that […] 
and due to the takeover ITA Group [of which ITA Bank is the headquarters] gained a certain expertise, a 
certain know-how, experience. 
 
P24 [with respect to the goals of the acquisition]: Revenues in Eastern Europe. 
 
P26: But that we as a subsidiary, actually we were the subsidiary of GER Bank, we were sold together 
with GER Bank. Also GER Bank was sold to the Italians and we were so to speak the dowry. […] But 
finally it [i.e. the takeover] was not about Austria, it was about the CEE region. 
 
P27: I would say the main reason, […] the merger is not a merger for synergies, first of all. It is a merger 
for expansion in key, ahm, growth markets, in the sense that, simply if you take CEE on one side, which is 
still the engine of growth, is contributing plus Germany, Italy and Austria, which actually is not 
Germany, Italy and Austria, but is mainly Northern-Italy, Austria and [Bavaria], these are the three key[-
markets] were the GDP of Europe, the highest GDP of Europe is in these three regions. No!? So 
basically the idea was to be present were the economy is, where the highest growth rate of economies are 
and the highest level of GDP are, the higher level. And in CEE the higher growth rates. So this is the 
idea. I would say it is more a merger for growth than a merger for synergy. Exactly, we were entering 
two new markets or achieving a market share. Clearly, in order to generate value you also have to extract 
value through cost-cutting or through better process management or to enlarge the scope of products. I 
would not define the GER Bank […] as a merger for cost-cutting. It was more. 
5.3. Case study 03: A national takeover in the engineering industry 
In the third case study, two Austrian companies were involved. SMS Group Austria, a 
subsidiary of the German SMS Group, is among the market leaders in the engineering 
industry. In 2005, SMS Group Austria suggested to take over WAT Engineering and got the 
permission by its headquarters to realize this deal. WAT Engineering was a much smaller, but 
still strong competitor located in the same Austrian city like SMS Group Austria. As WAT 
Engineering had a strong focus on exports, it was not only a competitor for SMS Group 
Austria, but for the whole group on the global market. 
The motives behind this takeover are, on first sight, not as clear as in case study 01 and 02. 
The interview partners mainly reported two, somewhat related, theories about the major goals: 
(1) expansion in certain core businesses in order to dominate the market and (2) to adjust the 
market, i.e. reduce the number of potential competitors. Table 10 provides the results for these 
two M&A motives. A clear trend is observable: While the majority of the members of SMS 
Group Austria reported that market expansion was the primary goal, all interview partners 
that worked for WAT Engineering stressed that adjustment of the market was the aim of this 
takeover. Mainly poor communication throughout the transformation processes has to be 
blamed for these differences in perception of M&A goals. 
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Table 10: Goals and motives behind the M&A of case study 03 (n = 19) 
  # of interview partners # of quotes 
market/business expansion 
SMS Group Austria 
(n = 9) 
5 
(56%) 6 
WAT Engineering 
(n = 10) 
4 
(40%) 9 
adjustment of the market 
SMS Group Austria 
(n = 9) 
3 
(33%) 4 
WAT Engineering 
(n = 10) 
10 
(100%) 32 
 
The following quotes support these findings: 
 
P39: From my point of view, the reason why the organization was bought was, first, to grow or rather to 
eliminate a competitor. This I can imagine. That this was the reason. One of the reasons.  
 
P44: The reason for that was, ahm, as we are an organization operating in the electronic industry, ahm, 
we wanted to expand some core competences. WAT Engineering was a good chance to do so. 
 
P50: Goals of the takeover were surely, one the one hand the strengthening of core business A in SMS 
Group. There were generally three core businesses […] in which we [SMS Group Austria] operated. One 
of them is core business A. There we wanted to strengthen our position. And WAT Engineering fitted 
perfectly into that plan. 
 
P40: And in so far, this was the only chance. And for SMS Group Austria, ahm, yes, to buy one of the 
largest four European competitors. To strengthen oneself with respect to production sites, projects and, 
finally, to have one competitor less. 
 
P41: I think the big motivation was to dominate the Austrian market. And, it has to be said, that this was 
finally achieved. No?! On the Austrian market, with respect to core business B, SMS Group Austria holds 
a market share of 90%. They dominate the market clearly […], so they hardly ever lose a project [when 
they file an offer]. […] SMS Group Austria is strong in Austria. This [eliminating a competitor], it has to 
be said, was successful. 
 
P43: I think, in first place to eliminate a competitor. 
 
P48: To eliminate a competitor and gain losses brought forward in order to minimize tax payments. This 
is the only reason [laughs]. 
 
P49: […] because of competition. They [WAT Engineering] were a direct competitor and they simply 
aimed at buying a competitor. 
 
In the past, WAT Engineering had acquired numerous other companies worldwide and just 
before the takeover, the company suffered from a weak financial performance. Therefore they 
aimed at an increase in share capital. However, at the general meeting, this request was 
rejected and WAT Engineering faced severe problems. Thus, for SMS Group Austria it was 
the perfect opportunity to arrange this deal and take over their former competitor. The CEO of 
SMS Group Austria described it as follows: 
 
P47: It need to be said, and this applies in particular to WAT Engineering, with respect to everything that 
happened, also the negative things, what would have happened if SMS Group Austria would not have 
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taken over [WAT Engineering]. So if we say that these acquisitions are not successful, then you need to 
pose the question, if somebody says it was not successful, but it was successful I think, if somebody claims 
that [that it is not successful], what would have happened? No?! Because if SMS Group Austria would 
not have taken over WAT Engineering, WAT Engineering would not exist anymore. The company would 
have gone bankrupt and would have disappeared from the world map and all employees would have been 
fired. 
 
This discrepancy in perceived goals of the M&A had a severe impact on the whole 
transformation process. Mainly it was a communication issue, as employees of WAT 
Engineering were not informed about the goals of this acquisition or did not believe in what 
they were told: 
 
P42: It was never clear where they wanted to go. 
 
P55: Actually the motives behind the takeover where unclear for members of WAT Engineering and I am 
sure that employees of SMS Group Austria did not realize that at that time. […] The goals were not 
communicated.  
5.4. Summary of goals and motives of all three case studies 
Table 11 summarizes the key characteristics of all three case studies prior to the M&A deal. 
Case study 01 and 03 are both domestic acquisitions, however differ with respect to the goals 
and motives. Case study 02 represents a cross-border acquisition and was driven by similar 
motives like case study 01. Therefore it can be expected that all case studies share some 
similarities, but at the same time provide enough differences to develop a rich multi-faceted 
theory of hybridization. 
 
Table 11: Key characteristics of all three case studies prior to the M&A deal 
 case study 01 case study 02 case study 03 
industry communication industry banking industry engineering industry 
M&A 
type domestic acquisition  cross-border acquisition domestic acquisition 
acquirer ABC International Austria ITA Bank SMS Group Austria 
target IDE Llc. AUT Bank WAT Engineering 
goals/ 
motives 
• market expansion 
• new technology 
• new customer segment 
• market expansion 
• new business 
• new customer segment 
• adjustment of market 
• strengthen core 
businesses 
 
6.  NATURE OF HYBRIDIZATION: CONDITIONS AND DIFFERENT FORMS 
BASED ON ALL THREE CASE STUDIES 
In order to understand how hybridization affects the transformation process in M&As, it 
becomes necessary to define under which general conditions hybridization can emerge. In 
addition, this chapter will present different forms of hybridization identified across case 
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studies. The effects of hybridization on each case study will be discussed separately in chapter 
7. 
6.1. Conditions for hybridization: Organizational differences and interaction 
between them 
A major criterion for the identification of hybridization lies in organizational differences. 
According to Fink (2008, p. 10), ‘[…] hybridization is the process of blending organizational 
cultures and management knowledge to transform an acquisition into a new socially viable 
system with a sustainable culture’. However, it can be assumed that in case of identical 
organizational cultures no hybridization process will take place. Thus, only if different 
organizational cultures are involved in an acquisition or merger, hybridization will take place. 
This thought can be extended by arguing: While hardly any organization shares the same 
organizational culture, the degree of organizational culture differences influences the degree 
of hybridization. Therefore, the higher the degree of organizational culture differences, the 
higher the degree of hybridization might be. 
As organizational culture affects and is affected by strategy, structure and operations (Dauber 
et al., 2010), observed differences in one domain might lead to observed differences in other 
domains. In line with all three case studies, organizational culture differences were most 
frequently reported as differences in working style followed by differences in organizational 
structures, i.e. culture becomes manifest on the phenomenological level (Dauber et al., 2010). 
Table 12 provides an overview of how organizational differences co-occurred across all case 
studies and suggests that each domain of the generic model of organizational culture is related 
to at least two other domains, i.e. to differences among them. 
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Table 12: Co-Occurrence ratios for organizational culture differences across all case studies (n = 6695 
coded quotes) 
 
different 
organizational 
culture 
different 
national 
culture 
different 
strategy 
different 
structure 
different 
working 
style/ 
processes 
different 
organizational 
culture 
Pearson Correlation 1 .037** .015 .026* .062** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .003 .235 .037 .000 
different 
national culture 
Pearson Correlation .037** 1 -.010 .003 .205** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003   .391 .821 .000 
different 
strategy 
Pearson Correlation .015 -.010 1 .065** .048** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .235 .391   .000 .000 
different 
structure 
Pearson Correlation .026* .003 .065** 1 .125** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .037 .821 .000   .000 
different 
working style/ 
processes 
Pearson Correlation .062** .205** .048** .125** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000   
different 
behavior 
Pearson Correlation .081** .276** .014 -.003 .149** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .254 .819 .000 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Throughout the qualitative analysis a distinction between work-related behavior, i.e. different 
working style, and general behavior was made. Table 12 shows the differences between the 
two codes. Work-related behavior is linked to all four domains of the generic model. 
Differences in general behavior were most frequently mentioned in conjunction with national 
and organizational culture. This finding is, of course, strongly influenced by case study 02, 
where different national cultures were blended, which made differences in behavior even 
more obvious. This is empirically confirmed by considering that more than 50% of all coded 
quotes that related to differences in working style originated from case study 02. 
Organizational structure was most often mentioned with reference to differences in 
organizational culture, strategy and work-related behavior. In line with the generic model of 
organizational culture, the most significant relationship of ‘different structure’ was found with 
‘different working style’. 
Finally, differences in strategy were most frequently mentioned in relation to structures and 
working style. However, there was no significant relationship found between strategy and 
organizational culture, because interview partners hardly ever related strategy to cultural 
factors. In addition differences in strategy were least often mentioned compared to other 
organizational differences (see also Table 13). 
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Table 13: Number of quotes related to organizational differences across all case studies (n = 6695 coded 
quotes) 
 # of interview partners # coded quotes 
Different working style 48 87% 273 
Different organizational culture 44 80% 171 
Different structure 43 78% 129 
Different behavior 26 47% 65 
Different national culture 24 44% 137 
Different strategy 22 40% 35 
 
In conclusion, forms of hybridization might not only affect one but several domains of the 
generic model of organizational culture (i.e. organizational culture, strategy, structure and 
operations) and their processes respectively. 
However, organizational differences do not automatically lead to hybridization processes. In 
line with Fink (2008), only the blending of organizational differences might lead to a 
hybridization process, i.e. there needs to be an interaction of those differences. This 
constitutes the second binding condition for the emergence of forms of hybridization. With 
respect to acculturation strategies, either culture, strategy, structure or operations need to be 
assimilated or integrated throughout the M&A. Pure separation and marginalization cannot 
trigger hybridization as potential organizational differences are not blended. According to 
that, hybridization can emerge at any point in the transformation process, i.e. as soon as 
organizational differences are blended. 
Figure 6 provides a visual representation of hybridization. While the grey lines show the 
underlying relationships between organizational domains of the target company and of the 
acquirer, the black lines indicate the processes of hybridization, i.e. the interaction between 
organizational domains. Blending of organizational culture and strategy cannot be 
realized/observed directly, therefore the interaction between these domains are represented by 
dotted lines. Any form of hybridization becomes manifest on the phenomenal domain, thus 
becomes visible for employees through the interaction of differences in structures and 
operations. 
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Figure 6: Hybridization in the generic model of organizational culture  
 
6.2. Five different forms of hybridization identified across case studies 
In the following, five forms of hybridization will be presented and their nature and general 
impact on the post-M&A transformation process will be explained. 
6.2.1. 
The vintage concept of hybridization refers to the co-existence of different generations of 
employees within organizations. It accounts for the phenomenon that elder members of an 
organization react differently to an M&A than younger ones. Many scholars highlight the 
importance of adequately managing such generational differences among employees, in order 
to improve communication, satisfaction, commitment and the overall productivity of an 
organization (Cennamo & Gardner, 2008; Twenge & Campbell, 2008; Wong et al, 2008). 
This is even more important in M&A contexts. 
Vintage concept of hybridization: The generation gap 
While differences between generations might have existed before the M&A, this form of 
hybridization sets in if fundamental changes are imposed on them. Thus, organizational 
differences between acquirer and acquired, as well as differences within the target company, 
i.e. differences in age, are the source for the vintage concept of hybridization. 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 40 
In view of all three case studies, a trend can be observed: Elder people or people who spent 
many years in the acquired organization tend to be more resistant to change than younger 
employees. Major reasons for that are differences in willingness to change due to their strong 
identification with their old organization, i.e. their old organizational culture.  While Table 14 
lists the codes that were assigned to the vintage concept of hybridization, Table 15 shows 
differences between elder and younger employees. The assignment of codes to a certain form 
of hybridization is based on the qualitative content analysis as well as the quantitative co-
occurrences analysis. 
 
Table 14: Codes related to the vintage concept of hybridization (n = 6695 coded quotes) 
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes 
Vintage concept of 
hybridization (FC) 
Identification with old organization 86 
Age (elder) 60 
Adjustment problems 58 
Identification with new organization 50 
Age (younger) 49 
No identification with the acquiring company 29 
No adjustment problems 21 
Acceptance 15 
Age 7 
No identification with old company 7 
No acceptance 5 
 
The co-occurrence ratios (see Table 15) support the argument that elder employees (1) tend to 
have more adjustment problems, because they do not want to accept changes, (2) rather 
identify with their old organization and its organizational culture respectively, i.e. the one that 
existed before the acquisition, and (3) identify less with the new organization, referring to the 
company during or after the transformation process. 
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Table 15: Relationship between age of employees and their willingness to adjustment to changes as well as their identification with the new and old organization (n = 
6695 coded quotes) 
 age (elder) 
age 
(younger) 
no 
acceptance 
adjustment 
problems 
no 
adjustment 
problems 
identification 
with old 
organization 
identification 
with new 
organization 
no acceptance Pearson Correlation -.003 -.002 1 .056** -.002 -.003 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .832 .848   .000 .900 .799 .846 
adjustment problems Pearson Correlation .162** .011 .056** 1 .024 .061** -.008 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .373 .000   .054 .000 .507 
no adjustment problems Pearson Correlation .023 .089** -.002 .024 1 -.006 .026* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .060 .000 .900 .054   .601 .032 
identification with old organization Pearson Correlation .060** .006 -.003 .061** -.006 1 .021 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .637 .799 .000 .601   .087 
no identification with old organization Pearson Correlation -.003 -.003 -.001 -.003 -.002 -.004 .105** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .801 .820 .942 .805 .882 .763 .000 
identification with new organization Pearson Correlation -.008 .013 -.002 -.008 .026* .021 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .500 .291 .846 .507 .032 .087   
no identification with the acquiring 
organization 
Pearson Correlation .042** -.006 -.002 .018 -.004 .053** -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .643 .883 .133 .762 .000 .640 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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The following quotes provide examples of these relationships: 
 
P14: And, of course, it was not easy to make that [i.e. the takeover] tempting to IDE Llc., especially for 
those who already worked there for a long time. 
 
P15: Also the elder employees left, partly by themselves. 
  
P36: Often I think, AUT Bank should fire all employees over 45 and only fill the positions with younger 
people [P36 himself is 52 years old!]. Because there walk many elder employees around in AUT Bank, 
who are just moaning. […] And the younger employees that we have, the very young ones, they do not 
have such problems [with adjusting to changes], because they know nothing else [than ITA Bank] […]. 
 
P40: This is of course for employees who know the culture for twenty or thirty years, to accept this [that 
there are changes] will take some years or [they] even never [will accept the changes]. But that’s the way 
it is. 
  
P42: […] people who were interested or younger [people] […] said: ‘Yes, I would be interested in that’ 
or ‘Can I join working with you.’ 
 
P46: You need to understand, we also have people who worked 35 years in district A [a part of the city 
were WAT Engineering was located and which was quite far away from the district were SMS Group 
Austria had its building]. So if you replant an old tree, it is not that easy and to do so and […] just 
recently we had a discussion: The old times get glorified. 
 
As the vintage concept of hybridization originates from differences in people, it can be 
expected that it is mainly related to operational transformation. This is confirmed by results of 
the co-occurrence analysis as shown in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: The vintage concept of hybridization and its relationship to acculturation strategy and facets of 
transformation processes (n = 6695 coded quotes) 
 
vintage concept 
of hybridization 
(FC) 
integration Pearson Correlation .001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .911 
assimilation Pearson Correlation -.022 
Sig. (2-tailed) .069 
separation Pearson Correlation -.027* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 
marginalization Pearson Correlation -.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .542 
cultural transformation Pearson Correlation .020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .098 
structural 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation -.038** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
operational 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation .031* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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In addition, negative co-occurrence ratios are found for separation and structural 
transformation. This indicates that interview partners tended to talk considerably more about 
this form of hybridization, when they did not talk about structural transformation or 
separation. Indeed, only one quote related the vintage concept of hybridization to separation 
or structural transformation. This can be interpreted as follows: (1) if the acquirer pursues a 
separation strategy with respect to operations, the vintage concept of hybridization will not 
exist, because if there are no changes, hybridization will not take place (see above). (2) A 
negative co-occurrence for structural transformation confirms that this code is not related to 
this form of hybridization. It indirectly strengthens the relationship between the vintage 
concept of hybridization and operational transformation. The co-occurrence analysis provides 
no significant relationship between this form of hybridization and cultural transformation. 
In line with the qualitative content analysis, identification with the new and old organization 
is inevitably related to organizational culture. Thus, cultural transformation processes might 
moderate the effect of the vintage concept of hybridization. E.g. if the acquirer successfully 
implements a cultural integration, younger as well as elder employees might more easily 
identify with the new organization and its culture. This might alleviate negative consequences 
of the vintage concept of hybridization or avoid its emergence at all. Therefore, cultural 
transformation is related to this form of hybridization. As organizational cultures are 
influenced by national cultures as well, the identification with a new organization in a cross-
border M&A might be even more difficult for elder employees than in domestic mergers. 
Whether this argument holds will be explored in case study 02. 
Finally, it was analyzed whether this form of hybridization is linked to any other codes that 
had been developed throughout the coding procedure. The results are provided in Table 17.  
Mainly two codes are significantly related to this form of hybridization, which moderate the 
effect of the vintage concept of hybridization and its symptoms: ‘Openness to change’ and 
‘poor job alternatives’. Employees who worked for quite a long time tend to identify strongly 
with their old organization. According to the interview partners, identification with the target 
company, adjustment problems and no acceptance of changes was considerably more often 
mentioned with reference to elder employees. However, openness to change can alleviate the 
negative effects of the vintage concept of hybridization: 
 
P26: It is an advantage for the younger employees that they do not know these [old] structures anymore, 
but they are more open for that [i.e. acquisitions and changes]. Also because the loyalty to the 
organization decreases. And they just enter here [into one organization], work [in the organization] and 
leave [the organization] […], without any fear of contact or any big affinity to the organization. This is a 
job where I get money and if I don’t like it anymore I go somewhere else. 
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P28: [talked about different working styles in each company involved] and it depends on whether you are 
flexible enough to adjust and to position yourself in the new [structure]. 
 
P41: I think this is also related to the character of a person [whether he or she] really did not want to 
adjust or did not want to integrate [himself or herself]. No?! […] and the small rest [of people] were 
those who maybe were prepared to accept the new. 
 
Negative effects of the vintage concept of hybridization include: 
• Negative attitude to the M&A 
• Group formation 
• Resistance by acquired as well as acquiring employees 
• Resignations by acquired employees 
• Instrumental identity 
 
The last two negative effects, are influenced by good or bad job alternatives, i.e. whether there 
are chances to change the job. In case of poor job alternatives, especially elder employees 
decide to stay with the organization until they retire. Consequently, they are less motivated, 
because they deny identifying with the new organization and only develop an instrumental 
identity. With respect to the vintage concept of hybridization this implies: Elder employees, 
who often face bad job alternatives on the market, and who are not open to new experiences 
rather prefer working for a company they hate, than having no job and no payment. 
According to Table 17, resistance by acquired and acquiring employees are related to each 
other, i.e. not only employees of the acquired company resist to changes, but also employees 
of the acquirer. This suggests that resistance on one side leads to resistance on the other side. 
In this context, the term ‘employee’ refers mainly to individuals on the operational level and 
less to middle or top managers. Resistance by managers of the acquiring company is rather 
expressed by unauthentic behavior or communication (see also case study 03 chapter 7.3.6). 
By doing so, they show their disagreement to the acquisition. 
Figure 7 summarizes the major relationships between this form of hybridization and other 
codes. 
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Table 17: Relationship between vintage concept of hybridization and other codes (n = 6695 coded quotes) 
 
vintage 
concept of 
hybridization 
(FC) 
it was 
better 
before 
the M&A 
instrumental 
identity 
group 
formation 
resignations 
by acquired 
negative 
attitude 
towards 
the M&A 
poor job 
alternatives 
resistance 
by 
acquiring 
employees 
it was better before the M&A Pearson Correlation .043** 1 .032** .028* -.009 -.005 -.002 .043** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .009 .024 .465 .679 .840 .000 
instrumental identity Pearson Correlation .045** .032** 1 -.007 .009 -.008 .233** -.005 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .009   .553 .482 .521 .000 .681 
group formation Pearson Correlation .086** .028* -.007 1 -.005 -.009 -.004 .129** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .024 .553   .653 .472 .727 .000 
cooperativeness Pearson Correlation .030* -.002 -.003 -.004 -.007 -.004 -.002 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .857 .780 .755 .551 .735 .870 .829 
resignations by acquired Pearson Correlation .046** -.009 .009 -.005 1 -.007 -.008 -.011 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .465 .482 .653   .541 .505 .380 
negative attitude towards the 
M&A 
Pearson Correlation .031* -.005 -.008 -.009 -.007 1 -.005 .019 
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .679 .521 .472 .541   .706 .124 
openness Pearson Correlation .025* -.005 -.007 -.008 -.015 -.009 -.004 -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .038 .707 .561 .514 .214 .480 .732 .651 
poor job alternatives Pearson Correlation .072** -.002 .233** -.004 -.008 -.005 1 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .840 .000 .727 .505 .706   .809 
resistance by acquiring 
employees 
Pearson Correlation .067** .043** -.005 .129** -.011 .019 -.003 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .681 .000 .380 .124 .809   
resistance by acquired 
employees 
Pearson Correlation .079** .010 .011 .071** .041** .053** -.008 .204** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .412 .373 .000 .001 .000 .533 .000 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 7: Visual representation of the relationships between the vintage concept of hybridization and other codes 
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In Figure 8 the vintage concept of hybridization is illustrated by applying the generic model of 
organizational culture under the condition, that domains, which are not directly affected by 
this form of hybridization, are kept separate. This considerably reduces the complexity of this 
figure and shows the phenomenon isolated from other influential factors that are context-
based, e.g. selected acculturation strategies for other domains. The grey lines describe those 
processes that are not affected by the vintage concept of hybridization. 
 
Figure 8: Vintage concept of hybridization represented by the generic model of organizational culture 
 
 
As highlighted above, individuals in the target company differently react to interactions with 
the acquirer. In view of the above, younger employees tend to be more open to new 
experiences, thus, there are less likely barriers to communication. However, elder employees, 
who perceive the acquisition as a threat might block the communication between them and the 
acquirer (indicated by ‘X’). Instead, they might show resistance, i.e. destructive behavior. In 
case of instrumental identity, communication with the acquirer is not blocked, but individuals 
might only do what they are told and become more extrinsically motivated. 
In conclusion, the vintage concept of hybridization rather has a negative impact on the 
operational transformation process in the analyzed case studies. 
 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 48 
6.2.2. 
This form of hybridization metaphorical refers to organizations as a deck of cards, i.e. each 
individual in the organization represents a card and can be replaced by cards of another deck. 
With respect to M&As this implies that the acquirer might wish to replace employees, teams 
or whole departments of the target company by its own managers. This creates a hybrid 
organization due to the fact that parts of the target company are assimilated as managers of 
the acquiring organization lead these departments. Other parts of the target company, 
however, remain as they are, what creates organizational differences, even within one 
organization. With respect to the three case studies, this is represented by the fact that (1) 
departments/individuals are differently affected by the M&A, (2) personnel are replaced and 
(3) there is a stepwise transformation. 
Deck of cards’ concept of hybridization: Complete replacement of coherent 
groups, teams or departments of the target company by groups, teams or 
departments of the acquirer 
Table 18 provides those codes, which are related to the 
deck of cards concept of hybridization based on the qualitative content analysis. 
 
Table 18: Codes related to the deck of cards concept of hybridization (n = 6695 coded quotes) 
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes 
Deck of cards concept 
of hybridization (FC) 
Departments/individuals are differently affected by the M&A 169 
Stepwise transformation 48 
Replacement of supervisors 43 
Replacement of owners 15 
Replacement of personnel 1 
 
The deck of cards concept of hybridization strongly refers to changes in structure and HR. 
Consequently, it can be expected that structural transformation and operational transformation 
are considerably related to this concept. In addition, replacements always imply assimilation 
as elements of the acquiring company, e.g. managers, working style, etc., are ‘transplanted’ 
into the target company. Therefore the phenomenon might mainly relate to the process of 
assimilation. In case of integration, the deck of cards concept might not take place, as changes 
in a certain department are negotiated, thus should be partly compatible with the acquirer and 
the target company. Findings of this study empirically support these conclusions (see also 
Table 19). For this analysis the family code ‘operational transformation’ was applied. This 
was done because it considers all facets of operational transformation reported by interview 
partners. As this form of hybridization covers several forms of operational transformation, 
this approach turned out to be more appropriate for this cross-case analysis. 
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Table 19: Deck of cards concept of hybridization and its relationship to acculturation strategy and facets 
of transformation (n = 6695) 
 deck of cards concept of hybridization (FC) 
integration Pearson Correlation .002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .847 
assimilation Pearson Correlation .024* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .046 
separation Pearson Correlation .023 
Sig. (2-tailed) .055 
marginalization Pearson Correlation -.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .572 
cultural transformation Pearson Correlation -.014 
Sig. (2-tailed) .251 
structural transformation Pearson Correlation .056** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
operational transformation 
(FC) 
Pearson Correlation .079** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 20 shows the results of the co-occurrence analysis of the deck of cards concept of 
hybridization with other codes. 
 
Table 20: Relationship between deck of cards concept of hybridization and other codes (n = 6695 coded 
quotes) 
 
deck of 
cards 
concept of 
hybridization 
(FC) 
trust 
monitoring 
of the 
acquired 
organization 
fast trans-
formation 
support 
units 
trust Pearson Correlation .037** 1 .031* -.010 -.008 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003   .010 .423 .528 
no/few changes Pearson Correlation .030* -.007 -.004 -.008 -.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .014 .547 .766 .492 .589 
monitoring of the 
acquired 
organization 
Pearson Correlation .086** .031* 1 .026* -.004 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .010   .031 .755 
new employees Pearson Correlation .032** -.005 -.002 -.005 -.004 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .694 .846 .653 .724 
fast 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation .048** -.010 .026* 1 .060** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .423 .031   .000 
support units Pearson Correlation .132** -.008 -.004 .060** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .528 .755 .000   
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Based on the narratives of the interview partners, the deck of cards concept of hybridization 
mainly affects support units, such as controlling and finance, and results from the desire to 
monitor or control the target company: 
 
P15: Finance was actually unified from the first day on. This was reasonable. […] The purchasing 
department was pooled together quite rapidly. Yes, this also made sense, because this is less problematic. 
  
P36: When we [AUT Bank] were independent and took over subsidiaries in CEE, then we also have put 
Austrians into the essential, i.e. from our point of view essential positions. E.g. heads of finance in CEE 
typically were very often Austrians. […] So typically, positions where trust is required [e.g.] head of 
finance, […][we]have put an Austrian. Therefore it is totally clear, that there is an Italian on the board of 
directors, because the CEE Business for the group is still the market of the future, despite the financial 
crisis. Therefore it was clear that sooner or later they [the acquirer] will put an Italian there [on the 
board of directors].  
 
P53: Although, nearly exclusively the engineering capacity was integrated. In contrast, the sales 
capacities are rather […] the autonomous sales activities are controlled in country X [country where the 
headquarters of SMS Group lies]. 
 
With respect to the monitoring of the acquired organizations, acquiring organizations tend to 
replace existing managers by those whom they trust, i.e. they put their own loyal mangers into 
the right positions. Thus, those affected by such replacements are dismissed or moved to 
another position: 
 
P6:  All four directors retired after the signing. 
 
P29: They put those people into place, whom they trust. 
 
P32: The supervisory positions in the department where I am working are dominated by Italians and they 
bring their people of trust with them. So this is Mr. M, who is in charge of CEE, who also is a member of 
the board of directors in the group. […] and brought his network with him from Italy and in the meantime 
[he] puts those people into positions for CEE, who he knows and who are often no Austrians. 
 
P36: Don’t trust any statistics which you haven’t manipulated yourself. This would be the famous phrase. 
No?! And therefore you normally put people you can trust into the position as a head of finance. 
 
A consequence of the deck of cards concept of hybridization is that other departments are, at 
least temporarily, kept separate and no/few changes are made. If all departments are 
simultaneously replaced, i.e. adjusted towards the acquirer, this would refer to a pure 
assimilation strategy without hybridization. Therefore, departments need to be affected 
differently by an M&A, otherwise this form of hybridization will not emerge. Most 
commonly, interview partners reported about a stepwise transformation characterized by an 
early and fast transformation of certain departments as outlined in the quotes above.  Figure 9 
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visually summarizes the relationships between the deck of cards concept of hybridization and 
other codes.  
 
Figure 9: Visual representation of the relationships between the deck of cards concept of hybridization 
and other codes 
 
 
Figure 10 shows how the deck of cards concept unfolds in the generic model of organizational 
culture. As can be seen, structures of the acquirer and the target co-exist. However, some 
processes are blocked and cause dysfunctionalities. While those processes aligned to the 
organizational culture and strategy of the target company (represented by dotted lines), are not 
blocked with respect to operations set by the target company, the newly introduced structures 
and operations by the acquirer fail to properly connect to the strategy of the acquired 
company. This is due to the fact that strategies and structures need to fit each other properly to 
allow for a positive performance of an organization (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Chandler 
1973, Donaldson, 1987, 1996; Hamilton and Shergill, 1992, 1993; Stopford & Wells, 1972; 
Williamson, 1975; Wolf & Egelhoff, 2002, etc.). At the same time, operations of the target 
company are not compatible with operations of the acquirer. This highlights that the 
introduction of structures and operations by the acquirer causes instabilities within the target 
company due to the fact that certain organizational units are not compatible with the rest of 
the organization. Such negative effects get intensified if the former organizational units, 
which were replaced by those of the acquirer, are strongly linked to other parts of the target 
company, i.e. if many organizational processes depend on the replaced organizational unit. 
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Figure 10: Deck of cards concept of hybridization represented by the generic model of organizational 
culture 
 
6.2.3. 
This form of hybridization occurs if organizational practices, structures and strategies are 
blindly applied to the target company. Two basic conditions exist for uncontrolled local 
adaption of management knowledge: (1) there need to be organizational differences with 
respect to at least one of the following domains: organizational culture, strategy, structure or 
operations. (2) Only if the acquirer has opted for an assimilation approach to harmonize 
organizational differences, this form of hybridization will show effects. 
Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge 
With respect to the first condition, it seems plausible that, for example, the structures of an 
acquirer might not fit the target company. The target company might have developed different 
business practices to achieve their strategy, which might considerably deviate from the 
strategy of the acquirer. If there are no organizational differences to be found between 
merging organizations, this form of hybridization might have no or less influence on the 
transformation processes, as they are nearly identical and members of the acquired company 
would fully understand the other organization. Therefore, organizational differences are a pre-
requisite for hybridization as outlined in the beginning of this chapter. 
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With reference to acculturation strategies, only assimilation can result in uncontrolled local 
adaption of management knowledge, which was often reported as standardization of 
organizations by the interview partners. In case of separation, every organization remains as it 
was and no interaction between existing organizational differences takes place. Also an 
integration process might not result in this form of hybridization, as integration implies 
changes towards a third form of organization as a whole. Therefore new forms of 
organizational culture, strategy, structure and operations are negotiated in a way that everyone 
can make sense of such changes and consequently the new organization. Thus, only faulty 
transformation management may also cause this form of hybridization, e.g. poor 
communication. In case of assimilation, uncontrolled local adaptation of management is most 
likely to happen, as only the target organization has to adjust toward the acquirer who 
provides the rules and standards, which might not be understood by members of the target 
company. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to assume, that every assimilation process 
automatically leads to uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge. As the name 
implies the assimilation process needs to take place ‘uncontrolled’. This implies that the 
process is run almost ‘blindly’ or ‘unreflected’, i.e. without consideration of the acquired 
company. Therefore it is possible that an organization gets assimilated to another organization 
without the emergence of this form of hybridization. However, this requires that employees of 
the target company can properly make sense of changes related to the assimilation process. 
This can only be achieved through interaction between both companies, e.g. through good 
communication. Consequently, if the acquirer manages to communicate clearly why the M&A 
takes place and why certain changes are necessary, problems related to the 
assimilation/integration process are considerably alleviated. The necessity of a good 
communication policy throughout the post-M&A phase is also stressed by the interview 
partners (77 quotes assigned to ‘good communication (FC)’), thus supports findings of other 
scholars who argue that a proper communication policy is key for the success of M&As (e.g. 
Appelbaum et al., 2000; Gräbner, 2004; Inkpen et al. 2000; Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 2006; 
Meyer, 2008; Epstein, 2004; Schweiger & Denisi, 1991; Tetenbaum, 1999). 
Following these considerations, uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge is 
characterized by those codes shown in Table 21. As can be seen, almost all codes are related 
to communication between acquirer and target.  
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Table 21: Codes related to uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge (n = 6695 coded 
quotes) 
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes 
Uncontrolled local 
adaptation of 
management 
knowledge (FC) 
Guidelines by acquirer 96 
Poor communication 35 
Communication problems 28 
Lack of understanding 26 
No/few communication/information 23 
Misunderstandings 22 
No transparency 19 
Goals of the M&A/changes are not communicated 8 
Future perspectives not communicated 7 
 
That this form of hybridization is related to assimilation, is supported by the findings 
presented in Table 22. 
 
Table 22: Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge and its relationship to acculturation 
strategy and facets of transformation (n = 6695 coded quotes) 
 
uncontrolled local 
adaptation of 
management 
knowledge 
integration Pearson Correlation -.013 
Sig. (2-tailed) .272 
assimilation Pearson Correlation .096** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
separation Pearson Correlation -.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .110 
marginalization Pearson Correlation -.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .565 
cultural transformation Pearson Correlation -.009 
Sig. (2-tailed) .479 
structural 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation .011 
Sig. (2-tailed) .373 
operational 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation -.016 
Sig. (2-tailed) .190 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
With respect to uncontrolled local adapation of management knowledge, many times 
differences in working style resulted in lack of understanding, i.e. people could not make 
sense of new rules and standards. In some cases this was due to strategic differences, e.g. the 
acquirer and the target company served different customer segments before the acquisition. In 
other cases cultural differences were blamed for the lack of understanding: 
 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 55 
P1: And he [an acquired employee] tried to explain with arms and legs to ‘ladies and gentleman’ 
[sarcastically] that this is something different. That you need to take care of certain basic conditions and 
that a orchid needs to be treated differently from a rose, because otherwise it will die. The grower of 
roses [used as a synonym for the acquirer in the following metaphor by P1] says: ‘Don’t tell me about 
flowers. I know about flowers. Flower is flower. That’s that!’ The grower of orchids says: ‘No, flower is 
not flower. Take care. If you do not take care about that, that and that, this thing [orchid] will die.’ ‘Bull 
shit. Don’t tell me.’ [answers the grower of roses]. 
 
P26: ITA Bank is doing nothing different from other organizations in groups. But, ahm, many things are 
yet not clear, but that is the way it is. 
 
P28: But both [working styles] are successful. And this was then the difference, because some people 
were stubborn and continued with their old working system. They did not understand how the others saw 
things. 
 
P29: Now you have everywhere the problem, because you are simply saying: ‘That’s it. Why should I 
explain it. I know that this is a good way to do it.’ […] and you are not explaining and simply say: 
‘Tomorrow, this needs to be done. That’s that.’ 
 
P36: So, this is not clear to us. This we did not understand, we Austrians, why this is the way it is, why so 
much, so much details are necessary [for planning projects]. 
 
Finally, Table 23 provides those codes, which are related to uncontrolled local adaptation of 
management knowledge. The assimilation strategy of acquirers was often perceived as 
arrogant and ignorant behavior, as processes in the acquired organization were hardly ever 
considered: 
 
P1: This integration [i.e. transformation] was already in the beginning shaped by a remarkable 
ignorance. […] that there exist requirements and necessities of business customers, which go beyond the 
performance description of sold products was not recognized. They did not care as long as cash was 
flowing. That one thing depends on the other was ignored [by the acquirer]. 
 
 P8: There simply exist certain rules [in this business]. […] from my point of view there was made a 
mistake. That input which was provided [by acquired employees] was partly ignored [by the acquirer]. 
 
P21: […] and if you introduce certain standards and rules which are new and you say: ‘What you have 
done so far was nonsense.’ Ahm, this can have fatal consequences. 
 
P48: I think they [i.e. target company] had good tools and this was simply ignored […]. They [i.e. 
acquiring company] did not even ask for it. 
 
As the last quote highlighted, uncontrolled local adaptation can have undesirable negative 
effects, e.g. resignation of acquired employees. Positive effects of this form of hybridization 
on transformation processes were not mentioned by any interview partner. 
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Table 23: Relationship between uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge and other codes 
(n = 6695 coded quotes) 
 
uncontrolled 
local adaptation 
of management 
knowledge 
ignorance faulty transformation 
ignorance Pearson Correlation .048** 1 .069** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .000 
resignation of acquired 
employees 
Pearson Correlation -.027* -.010 -.013 
Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .430 .301 
faulty transformation Pearson Correlation .048** .069** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   
language barriers Pearson Correlation .037** -.004 -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .729 .649 
standardization of 
organizations 
Pearson Correlation .036** -.004 -.005 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .758 .687 
lack of knowledge Pearson Correlation .401** .028* -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .020 .625 
arrogance Pearson Correlation .050** .075** -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .835 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Figure 11 presents a summary of the relationships between this form of hybridization and 
other codes. 
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Figure 11: Visual representation of the relationships between uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge and other codes 
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Finally, Figure 12 shows how uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge 
unfolds in the generic model of organizational culture. As can bee seen, many processes are 
blocked, due to the fact that the target cannot make sense of operations set by the acquirer and 
vice versa. Consequently, both organizations fail to learn from each other and are not able to 
adjust. Therefore they still set actions in line with their existing organizational culture, 
strategy and structure. As highlighted by Figure 11, this may result in misunderstandings or 
severe resistance to change. Resistance (on both sides) would even increase the effect of 
uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge. This form of hybridization might 
emerge together with the deck of cards concept of hybridization, if, together with the 
replacement of organizational units, also management knowledge gets replaced without any 
adjustments. As a consequence ‘old’ knowledge becomes obsolete and does not represent a 
valuable asset anymore. 
 
Figure 12: Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge represented by the generic model of 
organizational culture 
 
 
In conclusion, uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge is a barrier to the 
transformation of organizations. In extreme cases it might not only lead to resignations of 
employees, but to strong resistance. Therefore, in order to successfully pursue an assimilation 
strategy, communication is of crucial importance. Consistent communication of relevant 
information increases the likelihood that employees, who are affected by changes, can (1) 
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understand these changes and their necessity (i.e. sensemaking), and (2) comprehend how 
they provide a fruitful ground for future achievements (i.e. sensegiving) (see also Bartunek, 
1984; Ranson et al., 1980; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). 
6.2.4. 
Informal networks are important to gain a certain level of flexibility within an organization. 
They constitute the source for boundary spanning, because informal organizational networks 
commonly include individuals from different departments of a single organization. This is 
even more important during an acquisition or merger. Most interview partners who referred to 
organizational networks mentioned that (1) the acquirer aims at destroying old power 
networks and (2) that it is essential to extend the existing personal network in order to survive 
the transformation processes and receive new responsibilities. The latter refers to the fact that 
new informal information networks should consist of elements of the old and new network. 
As the acquirer aims at controlling the new organization to boost the transformation process, 
old power networks are destroyed as they can be a source of resistance to change. Therefore 
such power networks are eliminated via fundamental structural changes: 
Boundary spanning: Extending informal networks 
 
P26: But, the dynamics with which big companies operate, with respect to mergers, destroys very quickly 
old structures. What also makes sense. Yes?! Because, in particular large companies are not interested in 
maintaining old structures, ahm, because otherwise nothing can change. Therefore, in order to change 
and to execute changes you need to destroy […] and rebuild new structures very quickly. It also can 
happen that it [structures] will be rearranged again later on, but it will never be the same structure 
again. 
  
P31: She [an Italian colleague] was in the project when I was in the headquarters. She took over the 
group at some point, which consisted of a German, an Italian and three Austrians. And I was the second 
[Austrian] in this group. And I had intense contact to them [people in the group] and I helped her [the 
Italian group leader] a lot. When we both left the project [because it ended] she [the Italian group 
leader] said: ‘P31 [she used the first name of P31], if you ever need something, just call me.’ And this 
are these interpersonal contacts that you make. She is very nice and always replies instantly [P31 
particularly refers to her as she offered help with translating Italian emails. P31 did not speak Italian.] 
 
P46: The networking needs to take place into the direction of the headquarters […], in order to gain 
more freedom, no?! Or to identify my degree of freedom. 
 
One of the interview partners stressed that power networks and information networks need to 
be considered as separate issues. While power networks are destroyed, information networks 
continue to exist throughout an acquisition; see the following quote: 
 
P26: On the other hand, thank god, there are networks which cannot be destroyed. Yes?! Basic 
structures. But you always need to distinguish between information networks or power networks. What 
gets destroyed are power networks. Not information networks. Power networks get destroyed, because 
otherwise they block me [and change processes]. So, these I need to destroy. Information networks not, 
because there it is still working. In reality, much business is run on information. Without partners it is 
always hard for me to work in a group and if nobody knows you, you could not run a company. 
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In view of the above, this form of hybridization can have a positive and negative influence on 
the transformation process. Boundary spanning through informal networks has a positive 
impact on the transformation process if individuals involved in the M&A start to develop 
informal information networks. They help to overcome problems, e.g. language barriers as in 
the case of P31, throughout the transformation process, but only if these information networks 
are extended beyond organizational borders. This means, individuals need to actively engage 
in the operational transformation and be willing to get in touch with members of the acquiring 
organization. Thus, openness to new experiences might very well moderate effects of this 
form of hybridization. 
A small number of interview partners reported about power networks, but those who referred 
to this topic indicated that they have rather a negative impact on the transformation process 
process. Table 24 provides those codes that are related to this form of hybridization based on 
the qualitative content analysis. 
 
Table 24: Codes related to boundary spanning (n = 6695 coded quotes) 
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes 
Boundary spanning 
(FC) 
Strong hierarchy 165 
Operational inertia 50 
Cooperativeness 12 
Long communication channels 5 
Networks 5 
Boundary spanning 4 
Creating new networks 3 
Strong internal networking due to business activities 2 
Circumvent/adjust systems 2 
Power networks 1 
 
Boundary spanning through informal networks was only a few times identified in the 
interviews. In addition the codes ‘strong hierarchy’ and ‘operational inertia’ are contributing 
most quotes to this form of hybridization in the analyzed case studies. Therefore a co-
occurrence analysis would mostly show relationships to these two codes and distort results. 
Apart from that, they just represent conditions under which boundary spanning is favored, but 
they do not necessarily trigger this form of hybridization as it depends considerably on the 
individuals involved in the M&A. 
Figure 13 visually summarizes this form of hybridization. Dotted lines indicate that 
relationships are purely based on the qualitative content analysis and that no significant co-
occurrence was identified. As can bee seen, in particular ‘openness’ and ‘company size’ have 
an impact on the emergence of boundary spanning. 
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Figure 13: Visual representation of the relationships between boundary spanning through informal 
networks and other codes 
 
 
In Figure 14 boundary spanning through informal networks is illustrated by applying the 
generic model of organizational culture. As informal networks represent elements of 
organizational structures it is possible to distinguish between formal and informal structures 
within an organization. While formal communication, represented by the interaction of formal 
operations might be blocked, informal communication, represented by the interaction of 
informal operations, could help to overcome barriers to sensemaking. Consequently, problems 
resulting from transformation processes might not be resolved on the formal level, but on the 
informal level, which, in return, could help to overcome or at least alleviate the negative 
consequences of problems on the formal level. 
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Figure 14: Boundary spanning through informal informal networks represented by the generic model of 
organizational culture 
 
 
In conclusion, this form of hybridization relates to the interaction of individuals beyond 
formal organizational boundaries. People engaging in developing informal information 
networks need to be willing to learn about the organization and rather appreciate getting in 
contact with members of the acquiring company. This can be expected to have a positive 
effect on the transformation process process and might even help to make sense of changes. 
Precisely speaking, this process could also be labeled ‘integration of informal information 
systems’, as the old network changes and new elements, i.e. people, are added to it. However, 
boundary spanning might also have a negative impact on the transformation process, if power 
networks continue to exist and those who are part of it, decide to resist against the M&A. 
Thus, the co-existence of an informal and formal organizational network might constitute a 
barrier to changes.  
6.2.5. 
People’s Twist refers to the phenomenon of actively changing the meaning of “official 
language, artifacts and symbols” (Fink, 2008, p. 13) and represents another form of 
hybridization. While employees of the target company purposefully attach new meaning to 
People’s Twist: Saying something but meaning something else 
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texts and behavior, the acquirer believes that everything is meant the way things are 
expressed. This is due to the fact that members of both organizations differently make sense 
of what they observe, caused by differences in organizational culture. People’s Twist is a 
phenomenon that is difficult to assess empirically. It would require a participative research 
approach and knowledge about when actual behavior implies a different meaning than 
observed. Nevertheless, throughout the interviews it was possible to gain examples of 
People’s Twist expressed as sarcasm. In one case study it was possible to experience People’s 
Twist between two interview partners. This form of hybridization represents a form of hidden 
resistance to a takeover. The following situation describes People’s Twist in action between 
two interview partners based on recorded field notes: 
 
On this day I had a series of interviews at the location of IDE Llc. As the interview with P1 lasted longer 
than expected (about 90 minutes) I was already late for the second interview with P16. As they knew each 
other quite well, P1 offered to bring me to P16’s office and excuse my late arrival. As we reached the 
office, P1 and P16 greeted each other in a very friendly way and the following dialogue took place: 
 
P1: Hi P16 [uses first name of P16], it was my fault that Mr. Dauber is late. 
P16: I can imagine it. If somebody has a meeting with you it always takes time. 
(both laugh) 
P1: I told him about the ‘synergies’ of this takeover. You know, synergies for them (raises his left arm to 
the left) and synergies for them (raises his right arm to the right) and we are here (lowers his right arm to 
the middle, thus having pointed to corners of an invisible triangle) 
(P1 and P16 laugh) 
P16: Ah, ok. I see. 
 
This can be interpreted as People’s Twist as P16 refers to achieved synergies but finally indirectly refers 
to ‘there were no synergies for us’ by lowering his arm. Consequently, there seem to be only synergies for 
ABC International Austria (acquirer) and none for IDE Llc. (target). 
 
As mentioned above, some interview partners expressed forms of People’s Twist by sarcasm, 
mostly identified either by longer breaks between sentences or an indicative smile, which 
suggested that what just has been said was actually meant the other way round: 
 
P7: This was not a pleasant time. In particular it was around Christmas. […] this is already a tradition in 
our company [the target company]. […] The ‘good news’ [sarcastically referring to bad news] are 
always announced in December. 
 
P8: Simply not communicating, holding back information, backdoor. [I: Also that people say something 
and mean something else?] Yes, of course. 
 
P29: The decision of who fills which position was decided elsewhere and then they explained us with nice 
and logical reasons [laughs] [why a certain decision was made]. But, in principle, everyone knew that 
three people were sitting together having coffee, and they made a decision [as they liked, i.e. not 
necessarily a fair decision]. […] Loss of face, everything I say can be judged and therefore I am very 
abstract [referring to employees of the acquiring company]. This is surely a phenomenon. Then they also 
like to wangle, so that what they said turns into a fact, although it is not a fact. 
 
P31: In our department there are no Italians. We are ‘Multinational Corporate’ [i.e. the name of the 
department] [laughes]. 
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P33: […] The management is saying that we do this and we do that. And we do that with passion. At the 
beginning they [colleagues] laughed so much when I said ‘with passion, with passion, with passion’. This 
was already a stereotype [and refers to the philosophy of the acquirer regarding working attitude]. But 
this is really true. The Italians, and this is their strength, receive an order and then they start to work 
hard on it. You cannot believe it. 
 
Dialogue: 
I: Because you said ‘with a firm hand’ […]. 
P35: Ahm, there was not doubt about what should be done. 
I: The rails are set and the train is going? 
P35: There was no, no doubt. 
I: Ok, I see. 
P35 [laughes, which indicates, by considering the interview context, that the acquirer was very strict and 
orders had to be followed instantly.] 
 
Some interview partners mentioned the term ‘success stories’. It refers to a tendency that 
headquarters do not want to hear about problems, but about ‘success stories’. While this is not 
necessarily a phenomenon that relates to change processes, it is comparable, but distinct from 
People’s Twist. While People’s Twist originates from organizational culture differences, 
‘success stories’ refer to a certain facet of organizational culture that is shared among the 
group. In the context of all three case studies, ‘success stories’ describe the act of disguising 
problems by labeling them as ‘success stories’. The following two quotes are the most 
representative references for this phenomenon: 
 
P1: The most important thing in this group are so called ‘success stories’. Even if they are completely 
fictitious. 
 
P29: But in the end, this is the biggest problem of an Italian group that you cannot talk about problems. A 
‘problem’ is something negative and should not be mentioned. We [the target company] talk about 
problems, because we are searching for solutions and not for guilty people. But their [acquirer] 
undestanding is: ‘I am not allowed to have problems, because with problems I am not a good supervisor 
and therefore there are no problems.’ 
 
Figure 15 shows how People’s Twist visually unfolds by considering the generic model of 
organizational culture. As can be seen, this form of hybridization affects the interaction 
process of operations between target company and acquirer by adding two meanings to certain 
behavior. Only the explicit meaning of behavior can be observed and interpreted by the 
acquirer. Hidden meaning, however, can only be identified by in-group members who 
participate in People’s Twist. Consequently, the acquirer can only make sense of what can be 
observed, and sensegiving processes related to the hidden meaning of interactions are 
blocked. This also confirms that a participative research design would be necessary in order to 
fully explore the nature of this form of hybridization. 
 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 65 
Figure 15: People’s Twist represented by the generic model of organizational culture 
 
 
In conclusion, People’s Twist originates from differences in sensemaking and sensegiving 
processes, i.e. to the same behavior different meanings are attached. In addition, this form of 
hybridization is used to express hidden resistance to change and implies that people still 
identify with their old organization. In contrast to other forms of hybridization, People’s Twist 
cannot emerge if communication processes, i.e. interaction of operations, are blocked. There 
is also a variation of People’s Twist, which does not necessarily refer to M&As: Turning 
problems into ‘success stories’. 
In line with the presented quotes, People’s Twist has rather a negative impact on the 
transformation process and is more strongly related to operational transformation. 
6.2.6. 
All interview partners reported about communication issues throughout the transformation 
processes. 45 codes were subsumed under the general code ‘communication (FC)’ (see also 
The role of communication and different forms of hybridization 
Appendix B) and refers to 697 coded quotes. As several empirical studies emphasize the 
importance of communication in M&As (e.g. e.g. Appelbaum et al., 2000; Gräbner, 2004; 
Inkpen et al. 2000; Kavanagh & Ashkanasy; 2006; Meyer, 2008; Epstein, 2004; Schweiger & 
Denisi, 1991; Tetenbaum, 1999), its relevance and impact on different forms of hybridization 
needs to be investigated. Table 25 shows the relevance of communication and different forms 
of hybridization based on a co-occurrence analysis. Uncontrolled local adaptation of 
management knowledge and boundary spanning are most strongly related to communication 
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as both forms of hybridization are strongly characterized by codes reflecting certain patterns 
or modes of communication. 
 
Table 25: Co-Occurrence of communication (FC) and different forms of hybridization 
Forms of hybridization co-occurring with communication (FC) # of quotes where codes co-occur 
Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge (FC) 113 
Boundary spanning (FC) 30 
Deck of cards concept of hybridization (FC) 9 
Vintage concept of hybridization (FC) 5 
 
In conclusion, some forms of hybridization are more strongly affected by communication than 
others. In addition, all interview partners stressed the importance of adequate communication, 
which supports common research in this field. In particular rumors were frequently mentioned 
as a substitute for official information (see also Buono & Bowditch, 1989), which was often 
perceived as rare and hardly trustworthy. Based on the conducted interviews, communication 
strongly affects the (1) emergence of certain forms of hybridization and (2) strengthen or 
weaken their effects on post-M&A processes. 
 
6.3. Categorizing forms of hybridization 
In line with Dauber & Fink (2008) the presented forms of hybridization can be categorized as 
follows: 
 
Table 26: Categorizing hybridization by four factors 
 Acculturation 
strategy 
applied 
Organizational 
domains 
affected 
Hybridization 
initiated 
Impact on 
transformation 
processes 
Vintage concept of 
hybridization - 
Organizational 
culture (identity) 
Operations* 
Bottom-up +/- 
Deck of cards concept of 
hybridization 
Assimilation* 
Separation 
Structure** 
Operations** Top-down - 
Uncontrolled local 
adaptation of management 
knowledge 
Assimilation** Operations Top-down - 
Boundary spanning - Operations Bottom-up - (power networks) + (information networks) 
People’s Twist - Operations Bottom-up - 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Entries without * or ** represent results solely based on the qualitative content analysis 
 
While the deck of cards concept and uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge 
are forms of hybridization which require a certain acculturation mode, the vintage concept of 
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hybridization, boundary spanning and People’s Twist can emerge irrespective of the selected 
acculturation strategy. However, interaction of organizational differences between acquirer 
and target still need to take place, as pure separation strategies would result in no 
hybridization. Consequently both basic conditions need to be met: (1) existence of 
organizational differences and (2) interaction between organizational differences. 
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7. PUTTING HYBRIDIZATION INTO CONTEXT: A CASE-BASED ANALYSIS 
After having identified different forms of hybridization across case studies, the following 
chapters will explore hybridization processes within each single case study. Thus, contextual 
factors are added and will provide valuable insights into the functioning of hybridization 
under different real-life conditions. 
In order to define whether a form of hybridization emerged during the transformation process 
in a single case study, five analytical steps were taken: 
1. Exploring whether organizational differences existed between acquirer and target. 
2. Exploring whether organizational differences were blended throughout the 
transformation process, i.e. analysis of selected acculturation strategies. 
3. Exploring whether quotes related to certain forms of hybridization, represented by 
their assigned sets of codes, existed. 
4. Exploring whether the assigned codes for each form of hybridization show a certain 
co-occurrence. The sole existence of two or more single codes related to hybridization 
does not necessarily imply that hybridization took place. 
5. Cross-checking via qualitative content analysis whether the findings of the co-
occurrence analysis really resulted in a certain form of hybridization. 
 
While step 1 and 2 refer to the general conditions of hybridization, steps 3, 4, and 5 are 
applied to evaluate the existence of certain forms of hybridization. Step 3 accounts for the fact 
that hybridization is represented by a set of interrelated codes and not by a single code, i.e. the 
more quotes are related to a certain set of codes, the more likely a form of hybridization may 
exist. In terms of the software atlas.ti, such sets of codes are called ‘family codes’. On the 
contrary, if many quotes are only related to one of the codes in a family code, this will – ex-
ante – provide weak evidence for the existence of hybridization. In order to identify whether 
codes within a family code are interrelated, a co-occurrence analysis will follow (Step 4). 
There might be many quotes related to a set of codes representing a specific form of 
hybridization, but they might not necessarily be related to each other as expected, i.e. as 
outlined in chapter 6. Significant co-occurrences will speak in favor of a certain form of 
hybridization. Finally, step 5 will include a form of validity procedure: A qualitative content 
analysis will reveal whether the quantitative data analysis correctly identified a form of 
hybridization or not. This analytical step also helps to explore even more influential factors 
that were not captured by the co-occurrence analysis, e.g. phenomena that are indirectly 
related to forms of hybridization. Thus, steps 4 and 5 are applied to assure that quantitative 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 69 
findings are meaningfully interpreted and help to distinguish between hybridization and other 
influential phenomena that have a similar impact on transformation processes. 
In view of the above, for each case study (1) organizational differences and their interactions 
(conditions for hybridization), (2) forms of hybridization and (3) particular consequences of 
hybridization throughout the transformation process will be discussed. References to other 
observed phenomena will be made to provide a more holistic perspective of each case study. 
7.1. Case study 01: A successful M&A through partial separation  
7.1.1. 
In this national takeover, ABC International Austria acquired IDE Llc. in order to gain (1) 
access to new customers, i.e. business customers as well as (2) new technology. This allowed 
ABC International Austria to further (3) expand on the Austrian market and maintain their 
strong position. 
Organizational differences between ABC International Austria and IDE Llc.: 
The big fish eats the small fish 
The described motives are also reflected by perceived organizational differences, i.e. merging 
these two companies made sense by considering their complementarity. Table 27 shows the 
most frequently mentioned differences. While different markets played a minor role (11%)  
and was only mentioned by members of ABC International Austria, a new customer segment 
(58%) as well as the acquisition of a new technology (68%) were seen as important reasons 
for this deal. However, these strategic advantages were accompanied by other organizational 
differences, which did not always positively influence the transformation process and the 
outcome of the takeover, e.g. different working style. 
 
Table 27: Major organizational differences as reported by interview partners (n = 19) of case study 01 (n = 
2822 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # of quotes 
Company size (FC) 18 95% 117 
Different workings style 16 84% 77 
Different structure 15 79% 43 
Different systems 14 74% 26 
Different technology 13 68% 37 
Different organizational culture 12 63% 51 
Different customers 11 58% 27 
Different strategy 7 37% 11 
Different markets 2 11% 2 
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7.1.1.1. Different structure: Company size matters 
Almost all interview partners (95%) stressed that the biggest difference between ABC 
International Austria and IDE Llc. was company size. ABC International Austria is part of a 
global and publicly listed group, which has its headquarter in the United States. This implies 
that the organization is structured in such a way that it does not violate national law in Austria 
(for the Austrian subsidiary) or strict regulations introduced by the American Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC), as the headquarters in the U.S. is a publicly listed organization. 
In contrast, IDE Llc. was a relatively small privately held organization, which was not listed 
on the stock exchange and was led and owned by three young engineers. Consequently, ABC 
International Austria and IDE Llc. did not only differ in size, but also strongly differed with 
respect to structure. Table 28 provides the co-occurrence ratios for organizational differences 
(only those who co-occurred significantly often with other codes) between ABC International 
Austria and IDE Llc. As can be seen, company size and different structure where quite often 
mentioned together and seen as a major reason for different working style within the two 
organizations. 
 
Table 28: Co-Occurrence analysis for organizational differences between ABC International Austria and 
IDE Llc. (n = 2882 coded quotes) 
 different strategy 
different 
structure 
different 
working 
style 
different 
customer 
segment 
different 
systems 
different strategy Pearson Correlation 1 .085** .024 .052** -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .194 .005 .749 
different structure Pearson Correlation .085** 1 .103** -.012 .049** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .000 .516 .010 
different working 
style 
Pearson Correlation .024 .103** 1 .006 .007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .194 .000   .755 .725 
different market Pearson Correlation .212** -.003 -.004 -.003 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .860 .813 .889 .892 
different customer 
segment 
Pearson Correlation .052** -.012 .006 1 .067** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .516 .755   .000 
different system Pearson Correlation -.006 .049** .007 .067** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .749 .010 .725 .000   
different 
technology 
Pearson Correlation -.007 -.014 .000 .053** .054** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .702 .446 .992 .005 .004 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The following quotes underline the assumption, that larger organizations require other 
structures than small organizations: 
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P5: At a certain company size and organizational dynamic it does not work that way [the way of IDE 
Llc.]. Then you need to get more formal. Then you need to set up certain communication channels and 
maintain them. 
 
P14: It is, we are the group […] with standards and field of activities. And IDE Llc. was not like that. It 
was rather a family business. 
7.1.1.2. Different working style: Fast vs. slow 
About 84% of all interview partners in this case study talked about differences in working 
style. Table 29 provides a detailed list of most frequently observed differences that described 
differences in behavior or were seen as a reason for differing working styles. 
 
Table 29: Reported differences between ABC International Austria and IDE Llc. 
ABC International Austria IDE Llc. 
Observed by acquirer Observed by acquired Observed by acquirer Observed by acquired 
• Strong hierarchy 
• More structured 
customer 
treatment, 
• Formal processes 
(communication, 
decisions, etc.), 
• Slow 
• Increased 
complexity 
• Outsourcing 
• Strong hierarchy, 
• Slow processes 
(decisions, 
communication, 
etc.), 
• Increased 
complexity, 
• Large company, 
• International group, 
• Less customer 
friendly 
• Inflexible 
• Specialists 
• Flexible 
• No outsourcing 
• More people 
involved in 
decisions 
• Loose hierarchy, 
• Loose control, 
• Quick processes, 
• Young, 
• Dynamic, 
• Flexible, 
• Family business, 
• Small company, 
• Direct contact to 
customers, 
• Very customer 
friendly 
• Engaged in 
counter-trade, 
• Generalists 
 
According to Table 29, it is possible to argue that ABC International Austria and IDE Llc. are, 
to a large extent, very different: Large vs. small company, strong vs. loose hierarchy, 
specialist vs. generalist, etc.. In line with the generic model of organizational culture (Dauber 
et al., 2010) the empirical findings provide evidence for the manifestation of organizational 
differences in organizational operations, i.e. different working behavior. The following quotes 
provide examples for the described differences and the connection to differences in working 
style: 
 
P8: Because simply, as I said, with 100,000 customers you can, probably, look after the small ones as 
well. And it was also, due to the fact that it was a small company, easier to collaborate, yes. If there was 
any problem, you knew who were those three people, who I need in order to solve the problem, yes. With 
1,100 employees, I mean, you will never know it. And then it is much more, if an organization is larger, 
[the following] becomes the condition: ‘What is my responsibility and about the rest I don’t care.’ And 
this was something, which did not exist in IDE Llc. 
 
P10: Today you call an employee and say: ‘Yes, I would need this and this.’, and yes and you say: ‘Well, 
I am sorry. I know how to do it, but I am not allowed to do it. You need to create an entry in the ticketing 
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system.’ This will then be assigned, I don’t know, maybe to the right or otherwise to the wrong person. If 
it [the entry in the ticketing system] will not be assigned it returns to the big collecting point and there it 
will be re-assigned and some day it will be done. And even though you know that it would have all been 
done within 20 seconds during the phone call, you are not allowed to do it. 
 
P13: Because of a bagatelle the feelings of an employee of ABC International Austria don’t run high. 
Bagatelles in quotation marks, yes?! The former employees of IDE Llc. respond quicker [to requests]. I 
think this is in the nature of the beast that it takes longer or that it finds its balance. Yes?! But I also 
neither say that it is probably better the way it was in IDE Llc., nor do I say, this is the golden way as it is 
established at ABC International Austria. Because I say, the one is sluggish the other was probably a 
little bit too fast. 
 
P13: There is […], as I said, a strict process. Yes?! They had to adjust also the working process. But in 
the past when we only had development [as a task], we did made some improvements [to a product]. 
 
7.1.1.3. Different culture: National vs. organizational culture 
Although ABC International Austria represents the affiliate of an American group, it is 
mainly perceived as an Austrian organization by the interview partners. Only few interview 
partners mentioned national culture differences: 
 
P6: And then it is a quite laborious process. In this case it was extremely laborious, to bring together two  
cultures, Austrian business-driven company with standards of an American firm, with all the lawyers. 
This means, often it failed due to all these papers, the […] non-binding [agreement] with exclusive 
[rights for a due diligence]. Until everyone signed these [agreements] from the other side [i.e. IDE Llc.], 
this was madness. 
 
P10: So this was my impression. The impression that I gained. This company, with this Americanism. 
 
P16 [highlights that ABC International Austria and IDE Llc. were located in different regions of 
Austria]: And the one [culture] from X [a region in Austria] is also a little bit different from Y [another 
region of Austria]. 
 
In view of the above it becomes obvious that cultural differences between Americans and 
Austrians were identified, but also cultural differences within Austria, i.e. between different 
regions. Nevertheless, national culture did hardly play a role throughout the transformation 
process, as almost all members of ABC International Austria were Austrians. This also 
explains why only eight quotes are related to national culture differences. 
 
On the contrary, organizational culture was mentioned by 63% of all interview partners. Not 
all of them reported about organizational culture differences directly, but observable 
manifestations of it, such as different working style, structure or business approach: 
 
P5: Yes, well the culture, the organizational culture of IDE Llc. was fundamentally different from our 
organizational culture, in that, from my perception, it is, ahm, IDE Llc. was a very fresh, young, 
dynamically led company. Yes?! Ahm, which grew faster than they [members of IDE Llc.] planned. 
 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 73 
P6: They [employees of IDE Llc.] have the culture of IDE Llc.. They are those fast and good engineers, a 
little bit the hacker group, which are necessary in our time and are useful. Then we have the old K-
technology guys, […] again another culture. They are different. Each has its legitimacy. 
 
P8: And in principle, the culture of both organizations is totally different. 
 
P9: This rigor which we have now and this inflexibility and non-innovative [environment] […] rather 
this: ‘Let’s make sure that we are ready for mass-production.’ This is really a big culture difference. 
 
7.1.1.4. Different strategy: Same country, different markets, different customers, different 
technology 
 While the interview partners reported quite a lot of differences regarding their organizational 
structures, there were also differences in strategy. ABC International Austria and IDE Llc. are 
both operating on the Austrian market, but serve different customer segments. Before the 
takeover ABC International Austria had a strong focus on private customers. Their aim was to 
serve a huge number of people, thus followed a standardization strategy in order to cut costs 
and stay competitive. In contrast, IDE Llc.’s main target group was business customers, who 
seek tailor-made IT-solutions for their company. Thus, IDE Llc. worked more closely 
together with their clients. These differences are also reflected by the co-occurrence ratios 
presented in Table 28, which highlight that the difference in strategy was also mentioned in 
connection with different customers and different markets: 
 
P1: ABC International Austria was […] a residential provider. They had [censored: different products] 
for private customers. […] This was their business, which they dominated. B2B was totally new to them. 
Now they have had two unfamiliar factors: D-technology and B2B. 
 
P4: These were business customers and we had private customers. Business customers are a different 
type of customer care. With respect to the call-center, in general, they [IDE Llc.]had a different service. 
Because a business customer cannot wait. If he needs something he needs it now and not the day after 
tomorrow, if something is not working. And, ahm, also with respect to contracts, because a private 
customer is bound to it for a year, at maximum. Then he can do what he wants. A business customer, this 
goes up to three, one, three, five year lasting annual contracts and […] we do not have extensions of a 
contract for the private segment. There is no extension of a contract. 
 
In conclusion, organizational differences existed with respect to all domains represented by 
the generic model of organizational culture. Therefore the first condition of hybridization is 
fulfilled, i.e. considerable differences between the acquirer and the target were found. 
Whether these differences interacted with each other throughout the transformation process 
and allowed for the emergence of forms of hybridization in this case study will be explored in 
the next chapter. 
 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 74 
7.1.2. 
Table 30
Acculturation strategy: Different approaches for cultural, structural and 
operational transformation 
 shows that structural transformation and operational transformation were most 
frequently mentioned by the interview partners, thus played the most important role 
throughout the entire post-M&A process. Considering that company size and structure were 
the most frequently reported differences between ABC International Austria and IDE Llc., 
this is not an unexpected result. With respect to acculturation mode, the transformation 
process was mainly influenced by a separation and assimilation strategy. 
 
Table 30: Facets of transformations and acculturation strategies as reported by interview partners (n = 
19) of case study 01 (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # of quotes 
Structural 
transformation 17 89% 80 
Operational 
transformation 16 84% 68 
Separation 15 79% 76 
Assimilation 10 53% 28 
Integration 6 32% 17 
Cultural transformation 3 16% 5 
Marginalization 1 5% 2 
 
While separation, as an acculturation strategy, dominated the discussions with the interview 
partners, a more fine-grained analysis reveals that the transformation process was split in two 
phases: (1) A phase were nothing changed and both companies continued working separately 
from each other, and (2) a phase of assimilation, where certain parts of the organization were 
structurally and culturally adjusted or partly integrated. Table 31 relates acculturation 
strategies to facets of transformation processes represented by the co-occurrence of codes in 
case study 01. These findings empirically support that (1) operational transformation is related 
to cultural and structural transformation in this case study, and (2) that a separation between 
acquiring and acquired organization existed due to a late start of the transformation process. 
The qualitative content analysis shows that the second phase was characterized by ‘structural 
assimilation’ and ‘cultural integration/assimilation’.  
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Table 31: Co-Occurrence ratios for acculturation strategy and facets of integration in case study 01 (n = 
2882 coded quotes) 
 cultural transformation 
structural 
transformation 
operational 
transformation 
late 
changes 
integration Pearson 
Correlation 
.106** .014 .018 -.008 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .448 .349 .685 
assimilation Pearson 
Correlation 
.081** .069** .008 -.010 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .687 .601 
separation Pearson 
Correlation 
-.007 -.028 -.012 .119** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .710 .131 .529 .000 
marginalization Pearson 
Correlation 
-.001 -.005 -.004 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .952 .809 .824 .889 
cultural 
transformation 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.007 .158** .082** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .702 .000 .000 
structural 
transformation 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.007 1 .085** -.017 
Sig. (2-tailed) .702   .000 .373 
operational 
transformation 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.158** .085** 1 .032 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .089 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
7.1.3. 
In light of these findings, it can be confirmed that both conditions for the existence of 
hybridization are fulfilled: (1) organizational differences existed and (2) these differences 
were blended via a mix of integration and assimilation. Furthermore, the process of unifying 
ABC International Austria and IDE Llc. was split in two phases, thus represents a stepwise 
transformation process. 
Identified forms of hybridization in case study 01 
Figure 16 provides a visual summary of organizational differences identified in each domain 
of the generic model of organizational culture and the acculturation processes applied by ABC 
International Austria. 
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Figure 16: Visual summary of organizational differences between ABC International Austria and IDE 
Llc. 
 
 
In Table 32 to Table 35 the number of quotes related to family codes for different forms of 
hybridization are presented. As People’s Twist was hardly ever identified directly in the 
interviews, this form of hybridization will not enter the case-based analysis as no meaningful 
results can be deduced from the collected data. As for case study 01, several quotes relate to 
different forms of hybridization. Results of the co-occurrence analysis reveal (see also Table 
36 to Table 39) that mainly the vintage concept of hybridization, the deck of cards concept of 
hybridization and uncontrolled local adaptation seem to have emerged throughout the post-
M&A phase. For boundary spanning, only the qualitative content analysis provides some 
minor evidence for the existence of this form of hybridization, however had not considerable 
impact on the transformation process. Thus, this form of hybridization will also be excluded 
from the case-based analysis.  
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Table 32: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing the vintage concept of hybridization in case study 01 (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
  Case study 01   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in % TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes* 
Vintage concept of hybridization (FC) Identification with old organization 37 43% 86 29 
Age (elder) 11 18% 60 20 
Adjustment problems 7 12% 58 19 
Identification with new organization 13 26% 50 17 
Age (younger) 14 29% 49 16 
No identification with the acquiring company 8 28% 29 10 
No adjustment problems 5 24% 21 7 
Acceptance 0 0% 15 5 
Age 2 29% 7 2 
No identification with old company 4 57% 7 2 
No acceptance 0 0% 5 2 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
 
Table 33: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing the deck of cards concept of hybridization in case study 01 (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
  Case study 01   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in % TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes* 
Deck of cards concept of 
hybridization (FC) 
Departments/individuals are differently affected by the M&A 77 44% 177 59 
Stepwise transformation 23 48% 48 16 
Replacement of supervisors 6 14% 43 14 
Replacement of owners 10 67% 15 5 
Replacement of personnel 0 0% 1 0 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
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Table 34: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing the uncontrolled local adaptation of management in case study 01 (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
  Case study 01   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in % TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes* 
Uncontrolled local adaptation 
of management knowledge 
(FC) 
Guidelines by acquirer 23 24% 96 32 
Poor communication 20 57% 35 12 
Communication problems 21 75% 28 9 
Lack of understanding 7 27% 26 9 
No/few communication/information 10 43% 23 8 
Misunderstandings 8 36% 22 7 
No transparency 4 21% 19 6 
Goals of the M&A/changes are not communicated 1 13% 8 3 
Future perspectives not communicated 0 0% 7 2 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
 
Table 35: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing boundary spanning through informal networks in case study 01 (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
  Case study 01   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in % TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes 
Boundary spanning 
through informal networks 
(FC) 
Strong hierarchy 85 52% 165 55 
Operational inertia 39 78% 50 17 
Cooperativeness 3 25% 12 4 
Long communication channels 4 80% 5 2 
Networks 0 0% 5 2 
Boundary spanning 2 50% 4 1 
Creating new networks 0 0% 3 1 
Strong internal networking due to business activities 2 100% 2 1 
Circumvent/adjust systems 2 100% 2 1 
Power networks 0 0% 1 0 
* … represents the mean number of quotes across all three case studies 
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Table 36: Co-Occurrence analysis: Vintage concept of hybridization in case study 01 (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
 
identification 
with old 
organization 
age 
(elder) 
adjustment 
problems 
identification 
with new 
organization 
age 
(younger) 
no 
identification 
with acquired 
organization 
no 
adjustment 
problems 
age 
identification with old 
organization 
Pearson Correlation 1 .043* .120** -.008 -.008 .052** -.005 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .023 .000 .677 .666 .005 .797 .871 
age (elder) Pearson Correlation .043* 1 -.003 -.004 .562** -.003 -.003 .212** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .023   .868 .821 .000 .859 .889 .000 
adjustment problems Pearson Correlation .120** -.003 1 -.003 -.004 -.003 -.002 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .868   .857 .852 .888 .911 .944 
identification with new 
organization 
Pearson Correlation -.008 -.004 -.003 1 .070** -.004 .122** -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .677 .821 .857   .000 .847 .000 .923 
age (younger) Pearson Correlation -.008 .562** -.004 .070** 1 -.004 -.003 .188** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .666 .000 .852 .000   .842 .874 .000 
no identification with 
acquired organization 
Pearson Correlation .052** -.003 -.003 -.004 -.004 1 -.002 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .859 .888 .847 .842   .905 .940 
no adjustment problems Pearson Correlation -.005 -.003 -.002 .122** -.003 -.002 1 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .797 .889 .911 .000 .874 .905   .952 
age Pearson Correlation -.003 .212** -.001 -.002 .188** -.001 -.001 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .871 .000 .944 .923 .000 .940 .952   
no identification with old 
organization 
Pearson Correlation -.004 -.002 -.002 .276** -.003 -.002 -.002 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .818 .900 .921 .000 .888 .915 .933 .958 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 37: Co-Occurrence analysis: Deck of cards concept of hybridization in case study 01 (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
 
departments/individuals 
are differently affected 
by the M&A 
stepwise 
transformation 
replacement 
of 
supervisors 
departments/individuals 
are differently affected by 
the M&A 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .227** -.008 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .681 
stepwise transformation Pearson 
Correlation 
.227** 1 -.004 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .824 
replacement of supervisors Pearson 
Correlation 
-.008 -.004 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .681 .824   
replacement of owners Pearson 
Correlation 
-.010 -.005 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .596 .774 .884 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 38: Co-Occurrence analysis: Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge in case study 01 (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
 
guidelines 
by 
acquirer 
poor 
communication 
communication 
problems 
lack of 
understanding 
no/few 
communication/ 
information 
mis-
understandings 
no 
transparency 
guidelines by acquirer Pearson Correlation 1 .039* -.008 -.005 -.005 -.005 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .037 .677 .810 .774 .797 .856 
poor communication Pearson Correlation .039* 1 .091** -.004 .066** -.005 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .037   .000 .823 .000 .811 .866 
communication problems Pearson Correlation -.008 .091** 1 .079** .064** -.005 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .677 .000   .000 .001 .806 .862 
lack of understanding Pearson Correlation -.005 -.004 .079** 1 -.003 -.003 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .810 .823 .000   .875 .888 .921 
no/few 
communication/information 
Pearson Correlation -.005 .066** .064** -.003 1 -.003 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .774 .000 .001 .875   .866 .905 
misunderstandings Pearson Correlation -.005 -.005 -.005 -.003 -.003 1 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .797 .811 .806 .888 .866   .915 
no transparency Pearson Correlation -.003 -.003 -.003 -.002 -.002 -.002 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .856 .866 .862 .921 .905 .915   
goals of the M&A/changes 
are not communicated 
Pearson Correlation -.002 -.002 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .928 .933 .931 .960 .952 .957 .970 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 39: Co-Occurrence analysis: Boundary spanning in case study 01 (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
 strong hierarchy 
operational 
inertia cooperativeness 
long 
communication 
channels 
boundary 
spanning 
strong internal 
networking due to 
business activities 
strong hierarchy Pearson Correlation 1 .068** -.006 -.007 -.005 -.005 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .760 .724 .803 .803 
operational inertia Pearson Correlation .068** 1 -.004 -.004 -.003 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .838 .813 .867 .867 
cooperativeness Pearson Correlation -.006 -.004 1 -.001 -.001 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .760 .838   .948 .963 .963 
long communication 
channels 
Pearson Correlation -.007 -.004 -.001 1 -.001 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .724 .813 .948   .958 .958 
boundary spanning Pearson Correlation -.005 -.003 -.001 -.001 1 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .803 .867 .963 .958   .970 
strong internal 
networking due to 
business activities 
Pearson Correlation -.005 -.003 -.001 -.001 -.001 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .803 .867 .963 .958 .970   
circumvent/adjust 
systems 
Pearson Correlation -.005 -.003 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .803 .867 .963 .958 .970 .970 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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In the following, the cultural, structural and operational transformation for case study 01 will 
be described and the impact of forms of hybridization on these processes will be highlighted. 
In order to provide a complete picture of this case study, not only hybridization, but also other 
related phenomena will be discussed that considerably shaped the post-M&A phase. 
7.1.4. 
As ABC International Austria and IDE Llc. were organizations located in Austria and 
consisted of mainly Austrian citizens, national cultural differences were hardly ever reported 
(see chapter 
Cultural transformation in detail: Join the big ones 
7.1.1.3). However, due to the fact that the acquiring company was very large 
compared to the target company, great differences were observed with respect to structures 
and working style. Following the generic model of organizational culture they are shaped and 
shape organizational culture (Dauber et al., 2010). Thus, differences in company size might 
also imply differences in organizational culture. The following quotes show that cultural 
transformation is not only difficult, but also represents a slow process: 
 
P6: […] this is then an operative issue how to merge two cultures, which were of course different from 
each other, as described before, into a meaningful single unit. And that is difficult. 
 
 P16: It will take a long time until it is really in the heads and in the feelings and experiences of all 
employees. […] There we are at the topic. Then this depends on the leaders that they lead their 
subordinates during this integration, to culturally lead and accompany them. 
 
Interview partners from the acquired company reported about two events that were organized 
by ABC International Austria which can be related to cultural transformation: (1) People from 
the subsidiary made a trip to the headquarter to get to know their new colleagues and 
supervisors, and (2) the first joint Christmas celebration. However, these findings relate to 
only 4 quotes. Therefore, hardly any specific cultural transformation processes were reported 
by the interview partners. Another reason that might explain the lack of an explicit 
management of the cultural transformation refers to that fact that most acquired employees 
who are still working for ABC International Austria are located in the subsidiary, which lies 
about 175km away and has hardly changed with respect to personnel. One of the interview 
partners highlighted this with the following words: 
 
P5: And now it is like that: Let’s take the branch in [region of Austria where IDE Llc. is located], there is 
no one sitting there from the traditional ABC International Austria company. There is no head of section, 
no head of department from ABC International Austria. They have, so to speak, […] still only an IDE Llc. 
organization. 
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While only few interview partners talked explicitly about cultural transformation (only 5 
quotes) a great number of individuals reported about identification with the new or old 
organization (coded quotes related to the family code ‘identity’ in case study  01 = 114). 
Thus, it is worth looking at who identified with the new organization as well as how and why. 
Table 40 provides an answer to who did identify or at least referred to identification with the 
new or old organization. In general, interview partners tended to identify more with their old 
organization. 
 
Table 40: Number of quotes related to identification with new and old organization sorted by pre-M&A 
organizational membership (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
  # of interview partners # of quotes 
identification with 
new organization 
ABC International Austria 
(n = 9) 
5 
(50%) 6 
IDE Inc 
(n = 10) 
5 
(50%) 7 
identification with old 
organization 
ABC International Austria 
(n = 9) 
7 
(78%) 15 
IDE Llc. 
(n = 10) 
6 
(60%) 22 
 
The following quotes provide some details about identification with the organizations 
involved in this acquisition: 
 
P2 [former member of IDE Llc.]:  So, to be honest, I am [a member of] ABC International Austria. As 
people from IDE Llc. always ail me […] I am actually the first who shouts: ‘Let’s sell IDE Llc. again!’ 
 
P5: Well, they surely said when they decided to work for IDE Llc.: ‘Wow, I like this company.’ […], 
because this is a young, dynamic and by no means a bureaucratically organized company. And now 
suddenly, you have the large ABC International Austria bureaucracy. Yes?! Ahm, and this had been a 
fairly cultural factor. 
 
P6: There will surely be some who feel like [a member of] IDE Llc.. Especially those who successfully 
positioned themselves within ABC International Group. This is easier. To some extent they are even 
called like that [i.e. members of IDE Llc.]. They take on a job and because it was another know-how 
[which they had], this can easily be described: That is the IDE Llc.-Group. 
 
P7: I do not identify myself as a member of IDE Llc. anymore, because this is only, how shall I say it, 
mourning or something like that. So it would be nostalgia to still say that you are a member of IDE Llc., 
because, as I said, it is not anymore the case. 
 
P9: Actually we still had, so to speak, how shall I put it, they built their own group: We are IDE Llc. and 
not ABC International Austria. 
 
P14: [laughs] this is so difficult. I cannot identify anymore with IDE Llc., because the company does not 
exist anymore. […] So either I am a member of ABC International Austria or otherwise I would not be 
here [in the organization] anymore. 
 
P17: I think there is no difference anymore that somebody only feels like a member of IDE Llc. or only of 
ABC International Austria. I think, this has grown together so much. This is ABC International Austria 
and that’s it. There are surely employees, who are only working in the business segment, only in the IDE 
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segment [that might only feel like a member of IDE Llc.]. But I think, also this kind of thinking has been 
given up. 
 
P19: There surely exist employees, who think that way [i.e. that they are still a member of IDE Llc.], but 
we are ABC International Austria. We get our salary from ABC International Austria. It is not worse. 
There are some things that have become better and some things that are worse, because you were not 
used to work in this manner. 
 
As can be seen, there was a strong identification with the brand of IDE Llc. and a relatively 
large number of individuals enjoyed working for a small company rather than a large one. It 
has to be mentioned that some interview partners from IDE Llc. do identify with ABC 
International Austria or at least accept working for this organization, while those who did not 
had left the organization right after the takeover. However, there seems to be a tendency 
towards instrumental identity, i.e. people decided to stay with the organization as they receive 
good payment: 
 
P10: If they [ABC International Austria] want it that way. They transfer me my money […] I am easily 
bought, [I am a member of] ABC International Austria. You really have to admit, the one who pays me 
my salary I am loyal to. […] And as long as he pays my salary I will be loyal, because there is no reason 
[to mourn for] the old times, because in the past it has been better, yes, ok, maybe, but I rather live now 
and not tomorrow. 
 
P18: With respect to salary and job title and from the name, […], or what have you, there have been no 
changes. So most of them accepted it. 
 
P19: You get your salary on time and in today’s time this is important that you get your salary. 
 
In conclusion, many facets of the vintage concept of hybridization were mentioned by 
interview partners, e.g. strong identification with the old organization, instrumental identity, 
etc.. In line with findings presented in Table 36, interview partners highlight that rather elder 
employees identified with their old organization, while younger individuals more easily 
identified with ABC International Austria. Thus, the vintage concept of hybridization 
emerged and influenced the post-M&A phase in this case study. Figure 17 shows this form of 
hybridization and related codes in case study 01. As can be seen, elder employees tended to 
resist more to changes and there was a considerable negative attitude towards this takeover. 
As will be explained in detail in the following chapters, resistance by employees of IDE Llc. 
also posed barriers to the successful accomplishment of the structural and operational 
transformation, but was not only triggered by the vintage concept of hybridization. 
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Figure 17: Vintage concept of hybridization in case study 01 
 
7.1.5. 
During the interviews structural transformation (80 coded quotes) and operational 
transformation (68 coded quotes) were the major topics regarding the post-M&A process. 
Considering the organizational differences between the two organizations involved, the major 
motives for this acquisition had been the new technology, and, consequently, the know-how 
that is necessary to use this technology. Therefore, structural transformation and operational 
transformation are closely linked to each other in this case study as only members of IDE Llc. 
knew how their technology can be embedded into the existing structure of ABC International 
Austria, i.e. only through proper operational transformation, structural transformation was 
possible: 
Structural transformation: The deck of cards concept of hybridization driven by 
‘quick wins’ and  lack of knowledge about the new technology. 
 
P5: We knew our assets. We knew how much server X in the computer centre costs. […] but we did not 
know all these things [which belong to IDE Llc.], also not the backbone-structure of IDE Llc. […] This 
could only tell us someone of IDE Llc., well ex-IDE Llc. in this case. 
  
Table 41 shows the most frequently assigned codes that are directly related to structural 
transformation based on the qualitative content analysis. Many of them relate to observed 
organizational differences as mentioned above, e.g. flexibility, fast processes, operational 
inertia, etc.. Also codes related to the deck of cards concept can be found, e.g. strong 
hierarchy, operational inertia and support units. The qualitative content analysis supports the 
findings presented in Table 37, which suggest the existence of the deck of cards concept of 
hybridization in this acquisition. Apart from that, Table 42 provides further evidence for the 
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existence of the this form of hybridization, as the majority of codes that co-occur with 
structural transformation represent this form of hybridization.  
 
Figure 18 shows the relationships between the deck of cards concept of hybridization and 
other codes in this case study. In the following, the relationships will be explained, based on 
quotes of the interview partners. 
 
Table 41: Most frequently assigned codes related to structural transformation in case study 01 (n = 2822 
coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
Company size (FC) 18 95% 117 
Company size of target 17 89% 54 
Different working style 16 84% 77 
Strong hierarchy 15 79% 85 
Different structure 15 79% 43 
Company size of acquirer 14 74% 48 
Different systems 14 74% 26 
Different technology 13 68% 37 
Flexibility 13 68% 29 
Fast processes 12 63% 23 
Operational inertia 11 58% 39 
Additional work load 10 53% 30 
Support units 10 53% 28 
Spacious distance 10 53% 27 
Fast implementation 9 47% 20 
Spacious changes 8 42% 27 
Fast adaptability 7 37% 10 
Fast decision-making 6 32% 8 
Slow decision-making 6 32% 7 
Complexity (FC) 5 26% 6 
Duality in structure 4 21% 33 
 
Table 42: Codes that were most frequently co-occurring with structural transformation in case study 01 (n 
= 2822 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners 
# of quotes co-occurring 
with structural 
transformation 
# quotes coded 
Operational transformation 6 32% 8 68 
Synergy 4 21% 7 59 
Departments/individuals are 
differently affected by M&A 4 21% 4 69 
Fast transformation 4 21% 4 29 
Assimilation 3 16% 4 25 
Stepwise transformation 3 16% 4 23 
Faulty transformation 3 16% 3 17 
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Figure 18: The deck of cards concept of hybridization in case study 01 
 
 
The fact that ABC International Austria is a giant compared to IDE Llc. posed a barrier to 
structural transformation. Members of IDE Llc. were not used to work in a larger structure, 
were the complexity of working streams is much higher, e.g. additional reporting. This was 
often perceived as operational inertia, due to a strong hierarchy, that slows down the working 
processes and decreases flexibility: 
 
P2: That is gigantic, because, I think, IDE Llc. had 300 employees, about 300 and ABC International 
Austria has 1,300 if not even more right now. Especially, I mean, at IDE Llc. [in the branch in region Y in 
Austria] most people were salesman, accountants, marketer, who were located all on one floor, at least 
those people who were there. And you were much more in contact with your colleagues. Now, of course, 
and in such a big building, the personal contact of course is not there anymore. 
 
P3: Well, realization [of ideas] had been simply achieved within some days and at ABC International 
Austria it is different, because there is a larger machinery behind it. Especially with the owners in the US 
[…]. So this is something totally different. Of course, also the whole processes are considerably larger 
and everything takes a little bit longer and is sluggish, which is not necessarily an advantage in my 
context of product management. 
 
P8: They have 700,000 customers. You cannot be so flexible as with 100,000. This is simple, and this is, it 
was rather going in the direction of mass production. Not in a negative sense [i.e. P8 does not see this as 
something negative]. It is logical. With a certain size it is like that. And this was something members of 
IDE Llc. were not used to. 
 
P16: ABC International Austria has been a large company for a very long time and of course developed 
structures and an organization correspondingly, which of course also brings about more bureaucracy, 
more formalities. And this was a considerable cultural shock. 
 
 P18: Because we had a headquarter in Amsterdam [the headquarter for Europe, besides the one in the 
U.S.]. And to this headquarter in Amsterdam the members of IDE Llc. were not used to. And this I think 
was the largest break [i.e. biggest change], that they were, from a fast growing, but still relatively small 
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organization, taken up by an international group. With all the concomitants which you have. If you buy 
hardware, then you need to include [in the decision-making] the headquarter, and similar things. Which 
you cannot do off the top of your head. […] it is a little bit sluggish, but very, considerably better 
planned. 
 
The structural transformation set in about a year after the signing and was dominated by 
assimilation (see also Table 31) as ABC International Austria is part of a global group, which 
uses standardized structures to collaborate efficiently. While IDE Llc. was only a small 
company in comparison to the whole group, it was clear that IDE Llc. will mostly have to 
adjust towards the international group for at least two reasons: (1) standardization allows for 
easier control and cost-cutting and (2) ABC International Austria wanted to benefit from 
certain synergies by pooling together departments which were support units, e.g. controlling, 
finance, accounting, etc.. However, some departments, like customer service for business 
customers, were left separately, due to missing know-how of ABC International Austria about 
this customer segment. Consequently, not all departments of IDE Llc. were equally affected 
by this takeover, which resulted in the deck of cards concept of hybridization. In case study 
01, the stepwise transformation was characterized by a period where nothing changed and 
nearly everything was kept separate, e.g. brands, IT-systems, departments, etc.. About a year 
after the announcement of the deal, first changes set in. Table 44 lists those codes which are 
related to speed/timing of transformation and draws a clear picture: (1) there was a stepwise 
transformation, (2) the transformation and the changes set in lately, and (3) when 
transformation started, ABC International Austria aimed at quickly adjusting IDE Llc. Thus, 
speed and timing of transformation, considerably affected the deck of cards concept of 
hybridization. 
 
Table 43: Most frequently assigned codes related to speed/timing of transformation in case study 01 (n = 
2822 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
Late changes 16 84% 27 
Stepwise transformation 10 53% 23 
Fast transformation 9 47% 29 
Late transformation 8 42% 12 
Early changes 4 21% 8 
Early inclusion of affected employees into 
the transformation process 4 21% 5 
Slow transformation 3 16% 4 
 
A more fine-grained analysis reveals that cultural transformation and operational 
transformation were slow processes, but structural transformation was mainly perceived as a 
fast process. 
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Table 44: Co-Occurrence ratios for speed of transformation and cultural, structural and operational 
transformation (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
 speed of transformation 
fast 
transformation 
slow 
transformation 
fast transformation Pearson Correlation .451** 1 -.004 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .838 
slow transformation Pearson Correlation .190** -.004 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .838   
cultural 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation .062** -.004 .222** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .820 .000 
structural 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation .069** .067** -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .733 
operational 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation .060** .034 .060** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .073 .001 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The following quotes describe the situation in greater detail: 
 
P5: Where we rather started in the first six month, let’s put it that way […] this was the internal merger. 
This means, the structural transformation of IDE Llc. into ABC International Austria. […] Therefore we 
said: ‘Good, if we start with this one [operational transformation] and try to harmonize it, ahm […] if 
you do it in the beginning it might be to early.’ Because, probably, IDE Llc. will have no sympathy for 
this, why this is happening und maybe misinterpret it if you, so to speak, dictate roles at a very early 
stage of the integration. […] Now we said: ‘The whole HR part, the integration of people of IDE Llc., 
[…]into the […] organization of ABC International Austria, we do at a later point in time.’  
 
P8: In general, ABC International Austria had the say in first place, […] [and] wanted to integrate it as 
fast as possible and […] very often, when they visited us, they simply ignored us, for which, afterwards, 
someone had to pay for [as they made mistakes], because it [the technology] works differently. 
 
P9: There exists a plan that they want to integrate the companies and there are mile stones, which was 
the goal to integrate as fast as possible the customer stock of IDE Llc. into our [ABC International 
Austria’s] system. 
 
That differences in know-how considerably moderated the effect of the deck of cards concept 
in this case study was expressed by interview partners as follows: 
 
P4: We realized synergies, yes. Accounting is always immediately such a topic. Marketing is also always 
such a topic [were synergies can be realized]. Partly it happened that way that you said: ‘We take 
marketing to region Y [were ABC International Austria is located]. Who wants, can come with us.’ But 
how many are really moving? 
 
P5: Then I need the know-how in order to service and further develop this thing [certain IT-system]. And 
there IDE Llc. had a structural problem, but already before the takeover. This means they had many, […] 
for the servicing of their large systems, where you say: ‘On this I build my daily business’, so all this 
tools and applications, etc., were all open source systems. And two, three employees of IDE Llc. were 
specialized in how to program it, how to convert it, how to patch it. How to, I don’t know, how to 
integrate new features for business, etc. And at some point there were, by accident [ironically], or 
unfortunately all three employees gone. They said: ‘No, I found another company. They made an offer. 
Bye.’ And the know-how was gone. Because this was of course a specific application. I cannot ask 
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anybody in the world: ‘Hey, can you help me, there is something in the corner. I do not know how it 
works, but I need this or that conversion of it.’ [as a response you receive] ‘Ahm, I do not know what you 
have done here.’ I need the know-how. 
 
P6: And the obvious things, where you say, where dualities emerge, which, if this is a specific know-how, 
and therefore we have bought it, of course do not exist, but I have bought know-how, which I did not 
have. […] But, of course, accounting, controlling, sure I make it from here [centralized in ABC 
International Austria]. This, people can also imagine. With this you come up relatively quickly [laughs]. 
 
P8: This was surely in some way a change in thinking. But I need to say, my department was less affected 
[by this takeover]. There have been more serious changes in other departments, which were realized 
quite rapidly. 
 
P18: Then I need to analyze, which organizational format is the more mature one. And ideally I 
[referring to ABC International Austria], as a mature organization, take someone over, who has in his 
processes, controlling, order to cash management, debtor management and similar things, which were 
not yet well-developed. Because this helps a lot in the first month, just because of the better and faultless 
processes, to realize very, very good financial synergies. 
 
P19: And we mainly make that, also the IDE Llc. team […] with respect to billing. Sales is separated 
anyway. But actually billing, production it is the same right now [i.e. unified], but support, for example is 
in region Y [region in Austria where IDE Llc. was located] for business customers. Also with the former 
employees. 
 
In addition, individuals mentioned that ABC International Austria aimed at quickly 
harmonizing only parts of the structures within IDE Llc. (see also Table 45), which further 
contributed to the emergence of the deck of cards concept of hybridization: 
 
P13:  In July 2007, we migrated all B2C customers into the ABC International Austria System. Doing this 
we actually adjusted our whole system to the ABC International Austria standard. […][this change was 
made] from one day to the other. I mean, of course, at the beginning you have many discussions, because 
of course, you have something that worked until July 27th perfectly. […] Well, we made some mistakes 
and had some discussions. But by and large and we were thrown in at the deep end and now we are 
swimming. There we started to feel it [that changes take place]. 
 
P18: […] and there was in another phase a merger of certain departments, where we believed that it 
makes sense. 
 
The high speed of structural transformation of certain organizational units was driven by the 
desire to quickly realize synergies, as requested by the headquarters. There were precise 
measurable quantitative goals that had to be achieved within a certain period of time. This 
generated additional pressure on the integration teams. ‘Quick wins’, as they were often 
mentioned in interviews, were most easily and quickly realized by pooling together 
departments that existed in both organizations. Thus, cost-cutting was one of the primary 
goals at the beginning of the structural transformation in order to achieve quantitatively 
measurable synergies, which can be clearly reported bottom-up. The top-down pressure to 
gain ‘quick wins’ can be seen as a major trigger for the deck of cards concept of hybridization 
as preference was given to those structural transformation processes that allowed for easy and 
fast benefits for ABC International Austria and the whole group respectively. Mainly those 
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organizational units where no special knowledge was required were assimilated very early in 
the transformation process. In this case study mainly support units were affected by an early 
assimilation as they were not related to the new technology. This was an additional reason 
why the deck of cards concept emerged. The team leader of all integration teams explained it 
as follows: 
 
P5: But in the beginning we had other work to do. Namely, we needed to gain quick-wins. This was then 
the keyword. We said: ‘Ok, our financial department needs now hard [i.e. measurable] synergies.’ Why? 
We needed for IDE Llc. a certain amount X [to buy it] and we needed to justify, on group level, that we 
will gain a considerable value added Y for value X. So we needed to prove value-added due to this 
merger. This was the real economic goal. And, in order to score quickly we said: ‘Ok, let’s start with the 
objects, these assets.’ Because these you can measure, these you can touch. You can stop one and let the 
second continue and you have quick-wins. You have quick results which you can put on the table. If I start 
with the more difficult things, where I say: ‘Ahm, this I need to analyze first and structure it and search 
for solutions and terminate 15 contracts with partners.’ and such things, then nine month pass and I 
cannot put anything on the table. Doing this we would have immediately created the impression that we 
did not achieve our goal. Not even working on it, because you cannot see anything. This would have been 
bad. So we wanted to achieve quick-wins. This was the premise at the beginning. 
 
The structural transformation was designed as a project, which included teams that worked on 
specific transformation processes, e.g. IT-transformation, synergies, etc.. These teams 
consisted of members of the acquired and acquiring organization: 
 
P5: And for this working group I needed, in my role as a project leader, of course people from the front-
line, i.e. from IDE Llc. itself, who can tell me where I can find their assets. 
 
However, the collaboration within these hybrid teams was not always successful. Members of 
IDE Llc. were very afraid of losing their positions if they give away what saves their jobs: 
Know-how about the new technology. This resistance is strongly related to and influenced by 
problematic issues in the operational transformation process (see also next chapter). Thus, 
while support units were relatively easily unified, ABC International Austria struggled to 
harmonize, in a second step, the core units of both organizations. The following exemplary 
quotes describe the situation and provide first evidence for uncontrolled local adaptation of 
management knowledge due to communication problems and the desire of ABC International 
Austria to standardize work flows and processes: 
 
P5: In reality, when we started to work, we had a relatively large communication vacuum. Many 
colleagues of IDE Llc. bailed out with their contributions and simply did not collaborate anymore. […] I 
think this is due to […] there had been huge fear, ahm, on the side of IDE Llc., that we will now, ahm, 
drain the people dry and will take over the business ourselves and we want to get rid of the people. […] 
this was not and never, and never the intention. It was simply not possible to communicate this plausibly 
to the people.  
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P9: On the other side [the side of IDE. Llc.] there was of course partly fear […] by the people of IDE Llc. 
[…] there is the threat of downsizing, because if they give away their knowledge, then they can 
theoretically be replaced. Knowledge is power. 
 
The structural transformation was only partly successful. Some interview partners stressed 
that it is still not finished and that at the beginning there was resistance by members of IDE 
Llc., due to fear related to loss of job, loss of responsibilities and, as just mentioned, loss of 
know-how. As ABC International Austria did not know how IDE Llc. and their IT-system 
worked, the acquiring company did strongly depend on the collaboration and the know-how 
of the target company to meaningfully harmonize the IT-structures. The following quotes 
provide a more detailed overview of the structural transformation and some barriers to it: 
 
P4: Especially the merger of IT-systems. They still do not work, for two years. […] [this resulted in] bad 
image, which also has an impact on the K-technology segment; on our segment [i.e. the one of ABC 
International Austria], although we are really good. So, with this takeover they tried to find as many 
potentials for synergies, with accounting and finance, this is relatively easy, but with the call-center, 
where suddenly employees get new agents, who have no glue. Because learning something in theory and 
applying it in practice are two different pairs of shoes. This we know all together. I can read something, 
but if it has to be turned into practice, then I really need to take something into my hands. Then I know if 
something is easy or difficult. […] and this, ahm, was not easy. […] after the migration, two years ago, 
where we merged the systems, they did not work for half a year. 
 
 P9: Or for changes in the CRM [customer relationship management] system, there were of course 
routines which had to be defined in order to make it work […] then I do this and that on the system and 
during this processes there were partly no feedbacks which would have been necessary from the D-
technology people. This means, mainly the K-technology people worked on it. Of course, this is not 
perfect. And when it was to late, because it was already programmed and tested, we [ABC International 
Austria] found out that it does not work this way and the D-technology people [said]: ‘Yes, it cannot 
work’. So in this way [they responded]. Afterwards. So there were some things not running optimal. It 
was possible to correct it, but it took us about a year after the migration to correct the precedences [i.e. 
the mistakes resulting from a wrong programming]. 
 
P15: Among other things, it resulted in resignations, because we did a lot of bullshit, in particular in the 
D-technology segment, for quite a long time. This I need to say in all honesty. And I mean, we also 
handled it then again. Like every problem. At some point you can handle it. But you could have saved 
yourself all this. And if I look at it, how much this had cost us, just the manpower, money and lost 
customers, I am sure, I did not calculate it, because afterwards no one is interested in it anymore when it 
is over, but, I am pretty sure that this was not a meaningful activity. 
 
In view of the above, empirical evidence was found for the existence of the deck of cards 
concept of hybridization, which influenced the structural transformation of ABC International 
Austria and IDE Llc.. Findings presented in Table 37 support the existence of this form of 
hybridization in case study 01. In addition symptoms related to the deck of cards concept of 
hybridization were identified, e.g. fast changes for support units and no or only few changes 
for core units. Moreover, elements of uncontrolled local adaptation were found and a more 
detailed discussion will follow in the next chapter as this form of hybridization deals rather 
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with individuals than with structures, but also influenced the structural transformation 
process. 
7.1.6. 
In this case study, operational transformation was one of the key elements for a potential 
success of the whole M&A. The new technology, developed and applied by employees of 
IDE Llc., was totally different from the technology implemented by ABC International 
Austria. Consequently, the acquiring company needed the employees of IDE Llc. to 
successfully operate with this new technology and sell the corresponding products profitably 
to costumers. Additionally, ABC International Austria was inexperienced with business 
customers, who have to be treated differently, as pointed out by members of both 
organizations: 
Operational transformation: Knowledge is power  
 
P10: And yes, they gave us the free choice, which I found quite nice: ‘We [ABC International Austria] do 
not want to lay-off people, but we need you, because we are sitting in [city were ABC International 
Austria is located] and you need to look after the whole thing so that it works. And we will need you in 
the future and this is the way it looks like.’ 
 
P12: ABC International Austria had no products for business customers. This was also a difference. Of 
course […] people who were responsible for the business products were also taken over and I do not 
think that they rigorously sorted them out. As far as I can remember, there were also no resignations. 
 
P15: […] [people are afraid] that the big one [i.e. ABC International Austria] comes and more or less 
kicks out all the others and gets the technology between its fingers. By the way, this would have been not 
very meaningful, because we do not have the know-how ourselves. And this turned out that this is really 
the case, because people always say: ‘Ok, IT is IT and network is network […].’ But in practice this is not 
true. This became clear very quickly, because this business we are talking about, […] follows totally 
different rules. 
 
P18: This was even a big risk. If we would have lost important people, we hardly would have been able to 
continue this business. […] So losing people at this point in time would have been a risk. This we needed 
to avoid. This was our first premise. 
 
Table 46 lists the most frequently assigned codes related to operational transformation. 
Although one of the major objectives was to keep employees of IDE Llc., about 89% of all 
interview partners mentioned that people left the company due to this takeover. 
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Table 45: Most frequently assigned codes related to operational transformation in case study 01 (n = 2822 
coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
Resignations of acquired employees 17 89% 61 
Loss of job 14 74% 35 
Loss of responsibilities 11 58% 30 
Lay-offs due to acquirer 10 53% 36 
Retain employees 8 42% 20 
New supervisor 7 37% 13 
Exchange of top management 7 37% 10 
Inclusion of affected employees into the 
transformation process 6 32% 13 
Exchange of supervisors/managers 6 32% 6 
New team 4 21% 11 
New employees 4 21% 9 
Early inclusion of affected employees into 
the transformation process 4 21% 5 
Consider individual needs 3 16% 10 
Allocation of responsibilities 3 16% 9 
Personnel gets mixed up 3 16% 6 
Joint social activities/meetings 3 16% 4 
 
Among the most frequently mentioned reasons why individuals left the organization was fear 
and negative emotions respectively. In addition, the impossibility to identify with this huge 
organization, its strong hierarchy and bureaucracy was a barrier to accept those changes, in 
particular elder employees (see also Table 36). Thus, the vintage concept of hybridization also 
unfolds its negative effects in the operational transformation process and considerably 
contributes to the resistance of acquired employees. Therefore, some individuals were not 
willing to adjust to this new structure and/or working style of ABC International Austria and 
directly or indirectly resisted these changes before they left. Table 47 provides those codes 
that were most frequently co-occurring with the family code ‘operational transformation’. 
Examples of codes that were included in the family code ‘operational transformation’ can be 
found in Table 46.  
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Table 46: Codes that were most frequently co-occurring with operational transformation (FC) in case 
study 01 (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
 
 
# of interview 
partners 
# of quotes co-occurring 
with operational 
transformation (FC) 
# quotes coded 
Negative emotions (FC) 13 68% 28 168 
Fear 10 53% 16 40 
Structural transformation 9 47% 11 80 
Departments/individuals are 
differently affected by M&A 6 32% 10 69 
Resistance of acquired 
employees 6 32% 9 47 
Internal communication 6 32% 8 69 
Positive slogans 5 26% 5 8 
Quarrels 4 21% 7 17 
Synergy 4 21% 7 59 
Integration management 4 21% 6 9 
Different organizational 
culture 4 21% 6 51 
Different working style 4 21% 6 77 
Separation strategy 3 16% 6 76 
Face-to-face communication 3 16% 5 19 
Different structure 3 16% 4 43 
Negative attitude towards 
the M&A 3 16% 3 21 
Positive attitude towards the 
M&A 3 16% 3 27 
Strong hierarchy 3 16% 3 85 
 
A considerable number of codes listed in Table 47 are also related to the deck of cards 
concept of hybridization, e.g. strong hierarchy, departments/individuals are differently 
affected by M&A, etc.. Thus, it seems as if this form of hybridization also affected the 
operational transformation process. As structures and operations are strongly linked to each 
other (Dauber et al., 2010), this is not an unexpected finding. Apart from that, the assimilation 
process applied in the structural transformation process was hardly understood by IDE Llc.’s 
employees due to a poor communication policy. This clearly indicates the existence of 
uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge, which also complicated the 
operational transformation process and resulted mainly in fear by acquired employees. Figure 
20 shows how uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge is related to other 
codes in this case study. As communication played a particular role throughout the 
operational transformation, a separate chapter is devoted to it. After that, other influential 
factors related to uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge and the operational 
transformation process are explained. 
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Figure 19: Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge in case study 01 
 
 
7.1.6.1. The role of communication: Uncontrolled local adaptation of management 
knowledge and the moderating effect of timing of communication 
In case study 01 all interview partners reported about communication, resulting in 350 quotes. 
This represents 13% of all coded quotes in this sample and 52% of all quotes related to 
communication in the whole study. In line with existing research (e.g. Appelbaum et al., 
2000; Gräbner, 2004; Inkpen et al. 2000; Kavanagh & Ashkanasy; 2006; Meyer, 2008; 
Epstein, 2004; Schweiger & Denisi, 1991; Tetenbaum, 1999), communication was identified 
as an essential and crucial factor for the success or failure of M&As by all interview partners. 
Especially two aspects were most important for this acquisition: (1) when did communication 
take place, (2) how did those involved communicate with each other. Many codes presented 
in Table 48 are also related to uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge, e.g. 
communication problems, poor communication, misunderstandings, etc.. 
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Table 47: Most frequently assigned codes related to communication (FC) in case study 01 (n = 2822 coded 
quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
Internal communication 13 68% 69 
Limited number of those who know about 
M&A before signing 13 68% 24 
Rumors 10 53% 23 
Communication problems 10 53% 21 
Face-to-face communication 10 53% 19 
Poor communication 9 47% 20 
Fast information of those who are affected 
by M&A/change 8 42% 16 
Good communication 8 42% 12 
Quarrels 7 37% 17 
Positive slogans 7 37% 8 
Knowledge transfer 6 32% 30 
Official communication 6 32% 13 
Filtered information 6 32% 12 
Bad timing for informing the acquired 
people 6 32% 11 
Informal communication 6 32% 10 
Fast decision-making processes 6 32% 8 
Slow decision-making processes 6 32% 7 
Authentic communication 5 26% 10 
Meaningless slogans 5 26% 9 
Misunderstandings 4 21% 8 
Communication top-down 4 21% 5 
Lying 3 16% 8 
 
Before the signing it is very common to just inform a limited number of people about a 
potential merger or acquisition. This is due to the fact that before and during the due diligence 
no decision is made about the realization of the deal. In order to avoid that intentions about an 
M&A are made public, ABC International Austria only invited few individuals of their 
company to participate in the pre-M&A phase. The same was true for IDE Llc., i.e. they did 
not inform their employees about a potential takeover by ABC International Austria. 
Therefore, the announcement that there will be an acquisition, was surprising for both sides, 
but mainly members of IDE Llc. reported about that (see also Table 49).  
 
 Table 48: Number of quotes related to the fact that this takeover was surprising (n = 2822 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
surprising M&A 
IDE Llc. 8 80% 15 
ABC International Austria 3 33% 3 
 TOTAL 11 58% 18 
 
The quotes below provide examples of how employees got informed about the acquisition: 
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P3: This happened actually out of the blue. There were, however, some rumors, but all in all it was 
surprising for everyone. 
 
P4: This was actually quite a surprise for most employees of ABC International Austria. For me as well. 
 
P8: Well, and then on December 23rd, as I said, about 90% of the people were informed about the 
takeover, out of the blue. 
 
 P13: And I received an SMS from a colleague. Actually my colleague should have called me in order to 
arrange something and instead I received an SMS were it said, more or less: ‘We get currently sold.’ At 
that time I smiled softly. I don’t care. Stupid jokes. Until I called him and he told me that it is the truth. 
 
P15: And people were that angry that they were, more or less, taken by surprise and that the former 
owners [of IDE Llc.] left them in the lurch. 
 
Some interview partners stressed, that members of IDE Llc. were very frustrated and angry, 
not only because they were taken over by a competitor, but also due to the fact that the former 
owners of IDE Llc., with which most employees had a quite close relationship, had left them 
alone. One of the interview partners indicated that IDE Llc. even organized an event were 
they discussed the future of their company as an independent organization, although it was 
already clear that an acquisition will very likely take place: 
 
P1: Well, in retrospect you can count two and two together and you cannot hide a certain 
disappointment, because you become aware of the fact that at that time where the situation was still a 
totally different one, this direction [towards this acquisition] was already decided. IDE Llc. was a very 
friendly, very amicable company, where a high level of trust existed, which finally was very much, I say, 
betrayed. It was somehow a disappointment. Because this was not half bad. If you say you want to sell 
this watch, then I say: ‘Ok, this is a goal. It is your company. If you want that let’s lead it [the company] 
into this direction and tell me what is in it for me.’ Because it is all about miserliness, because, obviously, 
you [the former owners] want to avoid that somebody is involved. 
 
P15: But what they [the members of IDE Llc.] held against their former owners was that they [the former 
owners] did not inform them. Because it was a company, which within five years grew from zero to 300 
people. This means, many people were in a friendly contact with the owners. It was more or less a 
‘friends and family business’. Except the call-center, which [consisted of] some agents, who came from 
university, but the group of engineers were all friends and acquaintances of the ex-owners. And actually 
they expected that their friends, with whom they went out to eat privately and at weekends, I don’t know, 
made LAN-parties, would inform them about it and that they will cream off X Million Euro. […] The 
former owners did actually say in two sentences: ‘So, we sold the company. These are the new owners. I 
may introduce [names of new owners].’ And then they left without explaining people why all this 
happened. And this made people that angry that they were more or less taken by surprise and that the 
former owners left them more or less alone that they relatively quickly adjusted, I have to say. 
 
P19: That is actually ingenious that you can keep it as secret that such a large company gets sold. I find it 
ingenious. Especially, because in October the managers of IDE Llc. started to present the mission, vision 
and where are we in two years. And we worked that well up to now. And there were workshops for that 
and the employees were so much motivated. And those who worked for IDE Llc. made it very well, I say. 
The employees were so fascinated: ‘Yes, we are IDE Llc.. We are allowed to work here. We stick 
together.’ And so on. And not even two months later we [were] already sold. 
 
In a way, these negative emotions against the old owners were perceived as a facilitator to 
operational transformation by the acquirer. Nevertheless, the majority of interview partners 
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reported about a poor communication policy during the M&A, which led to a negative 
perception of the operational transformation process and to misunderstandings. This clearly 
describes uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge by ABC International 
Austria. Consequently, individuals only developed either a civic or instrumental identity with 
ABC International Austria. The signing was taking place just before Christmas and 
individuals were informed about it on their last working day. ABC International Austria had 
the good intention to early inform all employees of IDE Llc. before they get to know about 
the deal from the newspapers. However, this was mainly perceived as bad timing and created 
uncertainty and fear about their future and resulted in many rumors: 
 
P1: And as a special ‘delicacy’ there was the order on December 23rd for all managers of IDE Llc. to 
stay in their offices and to be present […]. Some already had taken a day off. 
  
P2: Yes, of course there were rumors: ‘[…] now we will be sold. And now we all lose our jobs, because 
they surely have enough employees for our work.’ 
 
P6: Now you were able to say: ‘Well, we could have informed them on January 6th as well.’ Well, what is 
better about that? Nothing. Then people read it in the newspapers and this always excites the feeling 
[…]: ‘Well, now they sell me and this I read [short pause] I get notified about that in the newspapers.’ 
This you cannot make undone. You have for this kind of communication no second chance. There is no 
other way. 
 
P8: Which was, regarding the date, a little bit inconvenient, I would say. Yes, because normally, of 
course, rationalization measures and such things accompany takeovers. This means, about 300, 350 
employees started with a bad feeling into the Christmas holidays. I mean, even though you get told there 
will be no lay-offs and bla, bla, bla. No one really believes in it. […] This was, as I said, the timing was 
simply very inconvenient. 
  
P12: Well, I think that such things just before Christmas, as well as lay-offs are never a good idea. […] 
on the one hand it was good that we got informed, on the other hand we partly did not know how to cope 
with these news. […] and the wildest fantasies [emerged] about what will happen in the future […]. 
 
P14: It was Christmas and then it was announced officially. So it was rather inconvenient, the whole 
situation. We all were shocked.  
 
P16: Unfortunately it was, and emotions played a role here again, it was exactly at Christmas time. So 
just before the Christmas holidays. 
 
P19: Exactly before Christmas, because everyone was afraid about what will happen now. Will we all 
lose our jobs, fear for our existence. And is this necessary now, just before Christmas? And on January 
1st we have no job anymore […]. 
  
This uncertainty was created because (1) members of IDE Llc. did not receive sufficient 
information and (2) the information provided was not communicated in an authentic way with 
positive but rather with sometimes meaningless slogans; i.e. employees of IDE Llc. did not 
trust in what they were told. This can be interpreted as a symptom of uncontrolled local 
adaptation of management knowledge, as acquired employees were not able to properly make 
sense of information provided to them: 
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P1: There were […] the common phrases and clichés, which are known from this area [i.e. M&As]: ‘We 
are good, we are nice and you have the technology, which we do not have and there will change nothing 
and everything stays as it is. And of course the brand IDE Llc. will remain and of course you continue to 
do what you have been doing until now, because you are so successful. Otherwise we would have not 
bought you. Nothing will change. But the owners need to change […]. And everything is beautiful and so 
well and so great! Merry Christmas! [very sarcastic]’ 
 
P19: Everyone was afraid that something will happen, but nothing happened. I mean, finally, they said 
from the beginning […], ABC International Austria, they are not going to lay-off any employees, and no 
departments will be dissolved. But, somehow, no one wanted to believe in it. Because, of course, if you get 
bought, then something needs to happen, also in the departments, because there existed two of them. 
 
Throughout the transformation process, communication also affected the structural 
transformation. As mentioned above, knowledge about the new technology was an asset, thus 
sharing this knowledge would have meant giving up a competitive advantage. Employees of 
ABC International Austria perceived this as resistance and members of IDE Llc. explained 
that their communication policy was a result of poor treatment. Some of the acquired people 
even stressed that ABC International Austria seemed arrogant, due to lack of proper 
communication. This represents another symptom of uncontrolled local adaptation of 
management knowledge: 
 
P8: And partly these were relatively heavy fights […] Simply not communicating, holding back 
information […] 
 
P16: Well, it was actually, it was never really sufficiently communicated to colleagues or employees that 
it is a cooperation, a cooperation with equal rights. But it was rather like: ‘We are the big network 
people […], we are the huge ABC International Austria and we tell you now how it works.’ […] Because 
I experienced it a little bit that certain objections, doubts, help, support, [by employees of IDE Llc.] now 
with respect to the integration [i.e. transformation] of systems, were not really dealt with […] but rather 
were played down and therefore this created already barriers. Because it was quite a belly-landing. The 
integration of systems went quite wrong. Now the members of IDE Llc. or the former members of IDE 
Llc. were even more confirmed regarding their doubts. And this created an even larger gap […]. 
 
In conclusion, communication played an important role throughout the transformation 
process. On the one hand, timing and authenticity of communication at the beginning of this 
acquisition played a crucial role. On the other hand, communication was also used to show 
resistance. With respect to ABC International Austria and IDE Llc., the official ways of 
communication were quite different from each other, mainly due to their differing company 
size and structures. In combination with a poor communication policy, individuals could not 
properly make sense of the changes that affected their working life. The uncontrolled local 
adaptation of management knowledge by ABC International Austria created 
misunderstandings, and can be partly blamed for the resignation of acquired employees e.g.: 
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P13: If you asked somebody how far he has come with [solving] the problem, then I would have 
answered: ‘It is solved.’, ‘It is not solved.’, ‘50% is solved.’, but I would not have told a litany about what 
I have already tried to do. Yes?! Because, basically no on is interested in it. […] And in the beginning 
[ABC International Austria might have thought]: ‘They do nothing.’ [because members of IDE Llc. did 
not say what they have already tried to solve a problem.] This means, this was the gained impression. 
[…] you get your instant [a message in the IT systems that something needs to be done] and it is about 
entering the system and assigning the right status to this instant. If it is set to the right status, then you are 
doing something. If it is on the wrong status, then it seems as if you are not working on it […] but then it 
seriously got to me, because they were of the opinion we did not work. 
 
7.1.6.2. Other phenomena observed throughout the operational transformation process 
While communication was a central issue in the operational transformation of ABC 
International Austria and IDE Llc. other phenomena played an important role as well. Fear, 
for example, was reported by 53% of interview partners in this case study. The following 
quotes provide examples of how individuals reported about their fear or observed fear during 
the operational transformation process: 
 
P2: I was afraid that I will lose my job. In the same way like my colleagues. 
  
P4: And then there was a huge resistance, because many employees of IDE Llc. were afraid that they will 
lose their job. 
 
P16: Now, irrespective of emotionality or loyalty to the company, of course there is immediately a lot of 
fear, which is comprehensible. This means, the classic thing is of course the following: You do not need 
two overheads, at least not in that way […]. Everyone who takes over wants synergy effects. This is 
legitimate. [This] also needs to be the goal. But on the level of employees, the first thought is: ‘Ok, now I 
need to be afraid about my job.’ And they were quite left alone from both sides, not only from the former 
owners of IDE Llc., but also from the new owners of ABC International Austria. 
 
P18: […] this was fear of people that they will be swallowed and lose their jobs, which had been 
substantial issues. 
 
 P19: I had two colleagues, two employees who resigned due to that [takeover]. They were, for example, 
afraid about what will happen to them. They really had fear for their existence. They both had built a 
house, so they have created a life for themselves, they were afraid, that something will happen, and 
therefore they decided to make one step ahead and resigned. However, they would have not needed to do 
that, because they would have not been laid-off. But they left, for example. 
 
The decision to stay or leave the organization was mainly driven by personality. Similar to 
what Dauber & Fink (2010) found in their study on merger survivors. An instrumental 
identity was developed by individuals who either tried to see a chance in the takeover and 
were open to new experiences (a moderator of the vintage concept of hybridization) or who 
stayed, because they had a well-paid job and rather adjusted and accepted the changes 
imposed on them: 
 
P7: As I said, not everything was bad or so. Of course, now there is more money for projects and so on. 
There are new things, to which, for example, I would never have had access to in our department, 
because in times of IDE Llc. there was no interest or no money for that in order to run such big projects. 
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P15: Most have been shocked for a short time. Most of them, however, identified very quickly with their 
role and found out that there are opportunities to personally develop further. With respect to this there 
was relatively little resistance, I need to say. Less than I would have expected. So people are relatively 
flexible, if something affects their job from which they live. Obviously. 
 
P19: And you also have your contacts you can talk to. There are also surely career opportunities at ABC 
International Austria and if you want to change, there where also employees who went to [city were ABC 
Internationals Austria is located]. 
 
P17: There was actually enough openness of everyone that we got along with each other. There were only 
problems with one colleague who had to take a little, hmmmmmm, step backwards in his position. 
 
P19: […] not to think negatively. Simply, as I did it, simply wait and see. Because it can change into this 
or that direction. Finally, you cannot influence it. Because […] either it continues normally or there are 
any reasons why the number of employees has to be reduced. And finally you cannot do much against it, 
if this is the case. It does not help if you scratch your head months or years ahead. And I say, there were 
enough reports in the company: ‘Now there will be lay-offs of people, but now people will resign, now 
departments will be closed down’, and so on. If you scratch your head every time, then you cannot sleep 
well anyway. Just wait and see and continue working as usually. 
 
In line with the deck of cards concept of hybridization, especially employees in supporting 
units were affected by the takeover as they did not necessarily require the special technical 
know-how in which ABC International Austria was interested. This is of course strongly 
linked to synergy realization via cost-cutting, as mentioned before. Therefore, knowledge was 
an asset that was used to save ones position and resulted sometimes in non-collaborative 
behavior and other forms of resistance to change, in particular when ABC International 
Austria tried to unify IDE Llc.’s core units: 
 
P2: […] the creditor department of IDE Llc., it is very much, there is a noticeable difference. It is still: 
‘We are IDE Llc. and belong together.’ They never do something as it should be, or as the regulations 
are. This means, if they order something like a rubber [they do it like they did before ignoring the pre-
defined processes].[…] The people of IDE Llc. resist it. As it was in IDE Llc: No permission, they order 
what is needed, everyone of them and then there are problems, because I need to call and ask every time 
the responsible person of the creditor department and say: ‘Who has ordered what?’ Because with 1,300 
employees, it is difficult to call everyone: ‘Did you order something?’ […] This is the typical IDE Llc. 
behavior: It will stay as it was. And partly I have the feeling they do this on purpose to make my life 
difficult. 
 
P8: Of course they mourned a lot, yes. But it is also difficult for ABC International Austria to distinguish 
between ‘what is resistance, because I do not like ABC International Austria’ and what is really justified 
change. And especially in an area, in which I do not have any knowledge. This is inconceivably difficult. 
[…] of course, I mean, in principle, I never seen a takeover, where from one day to the other everyone 
loved each other. This does not exist. 
  
P9: Well, on the one hand you experience it in the meetings. On the other hand if you make any requests 
and you do not get any answer for a longer period of time or not the correct answer or get the 
information afterwards, well, […] but until the end we did not believe in it [i.e. the takeover]. These were 
statements that were made. 
 
P16: That everything has its advantages and disadvantages is, I think, clear for everyone. […] but if you 
leave the employees alone with what they feel in their daily business […] this is often rather negative, this 
resistance or the awkwardness, bureaucracy, formalities and so on, employees simply perceived this as 
rather negative. 
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Most interviewees of IDE Llc. mentioned that they strongly identified with their organization 
prior to this takeover. Some even started to work for IDE Llc., because of its small size, 
flexibility and innovation friendly working environment. This represented an additional 
difficulty in adjusting to a totally different organization and was also influenced by the 
existence of the vintage concept of hybridization as outlined before: 
 
P8: I really feel sorry for some things of IDE Llc., yes. Simply this sense of togetherness and also this 
thing that we are the good ones and we are there for the customers. This is something, which would be 
nice if this would still exist, yes. I am maybe whole-hearted for certain things which existed in IDE Llc. 
 
P15: I need to say, some of them were very hostile. However, this was only a handful of people, I need to 
say, maybe three, four people, which left the company relatively quickly, I need to say in all honesty. 
Because simply, because for them [employees of IDE Llc.] ABC International Austria was more or less 
the devil incarnate, especially in the IT department, IDE Llc. was a classic technique-shop, where 
actually these IT-hardcore guys and engineers were working, who chose this company [i.e. IDE Llc.], 
because it was a small start-up company, where the bosses all were engineers. 
 
P16: And this I still hear from one or the other employee, this is simply hurting somewhere. So, those who 
grew up with IDE Llc. […] their heart and soul belong to it. 
 
P18: Well, people were proud of IDE Llc., as a dynamic, young, thriving company. And the big worries 
were that they will be swallowed by a sluggish thing, from a huge group, from an international one, and 
that there will be no flexibility and development possible. 
 
Finally, loss of responsibilities represented as a reason why individuals decided not to stay 
with the organization. IDE Llc. was an autonomously operating company and individuals had 
to cope with the fact, that major strategic decisions were now made elsewhere: 
 
P10: [I: what were your first thoughts about this takeover?] That we all lost a lot of responsibilities. […] 
This is for me the bitter taste which accompanies all this. I can remember, throughout the integration we 
once compared the organization charts […] and we saw that what the internal IT at IDE Llc. did, was 
done by seven to eight different teams [in ABC International Austria]. 
 
P13: Maybe from this perspective, because there [in IDE Llc.] you had something for which you were 
responsible, which you could regulate. Today, if I turn back time [when IDE Llc. existed], well you had 
your system. With the system you were able to do something. There [in IDE Llc.] I did not need to ask 
10,000 people, whether I am allowed to do this or not. 
 
P18: There was a separate corporate communication department at IDE Llc. and one at ABC 
International Austria and it was clear that there will be only one. But the woman that was affected [by 
this situation] was informed in time and they talked about it and found a solution. And she decided to 
leave the company, because she did not want to work under somebody else [she was a supervisor 
herself]. And that is how it is. 
 
P18: Many, many were downgraded by one level, because it was a flat structure [in IDE Llc.]. With 
respect to salary, job title […], or what have you, nothing changed. Therefore most of them accepted it. 
 
In view of the above, it has to be concluded that the operational transformation was only 
partly successful and was mainly driven by assimilation. Due to the fact that ABC 
International Austria had no knowledge about the newly acquired technology, they strongly 
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depended on the collaboration with IDE Llc. Apart from that, the late start of first changes 
(about a year after the signing) caused fear among the acquired employees. Most interviewees 
of the target company reported that poor communication severely complicated the operational 
transformation. In particular the timing of the official announcement of the deal – just before 
Christmas –  was seen as rather negative. 
7.1.7. 
After having outlined the most important facts of the M&A between ABC International 
Austria and IDE Llc., the success of this merger needs to be investigated. There seems to be 
no clear perception about the success of the M&A (see also 
Success of the M&A deal: Different perceptions and hard facts 
Table 50), however, interview 
partners tended to talk more about what went wrong (68 coded quotes) than about what 
worked well (43 coded quotes). 
 
Table 49: Perceived success of the M&A and the transformation process in case study 01 (n = 2822 coded 
quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
successful transformation (FC) 
IDE Llc. 8 42% 21 
ABC International Austria 6 32% 22 
unsuccessful transformation (FC) 
IDE Llc. 9 47% 30 
ABC International Austria 7 37% 38 
 
The following quotes support the conclusion that the transformation process and the M&A 
were only partly successful: 
 
P4: All in all, in quotation marks, it worked. There are always some quarrels between departments: Who 
is responsible for what. But these were actually, let’s say, the normal clashes of opinion. 
 
P17: It may be that this did not go over well with some of them, but these are surely the things, which 
then, those changes, ahm, surely there were some good things not retained, but surely some things have 
changed to the better. 
 
P18: And among all, it turned out that due to poor quality of data other organizational muddles, that it is 
not easy to merge this without losing a customer. […] so you need to pay attention not to lose a customer. 
 
Figure 21, 22, and 23 provide financial key ratios, which help to interpret the success of this 
acquisition from another perspective based on quantitative data. Due to the fact that ABC 
International Austria is a subsidiary of an international group only limited data from the 
consolidated financial reports were available. In addition, IDE Llc. was a private company, 
thus, did not publish financial key ratios and only data from newspapers were available. In 
case of IDE Llc. data was retrieved from different articles published on ‘wirtschaftsblatt.at’. 
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IDE Llc. was a fast growing organization and their growth in revenues ran into double figures 
(see also Figure 21). The acquisition resulted in an increase in revenues for both 
organizations, however, this increase seems considerably smaller by considering the 
combined revenues of ABC International Austria and IDE Llc. before and after the 
acquisition. Since 2007, a slightly negative trend can be observed. 
 
Figure 20: Revenues of ABC International Austria, IDE Llc. and combined revenues before and after the 
takeover 
 
 
In constrast, a remarkable positive trend is reported considering the operating cash flow. This 
key ratio provides insights in how well an organization can generate liquid funds by its 
operating activity. As shown in Figure 22, the operating cash flow of ABC International 
Austria increased before and after the acquisition. As no industry benchmark was available 
for this financial key ratio, it is not clear whether the acquisition of IDE Llc. contributed to 
this increase. However, it seems as if the acquisition did not financially harm ABC 
International Austria. 
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Figure 21: Operating cash flow of ABC International Austria before and after the takeover 
 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) are frequently used ratios to measure 
M&A performance (e.g. Zollo & Singh, 2004; Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Porrini, 2004). 
Figure 23 shows the development of both financial ratios for ABC International Austria 
before and after the takeover. In the year of the acquisition (i.e. 2005) ROE and ROA were 
positive and slumped in 2006. Due to lack of comprehensive data, three major reasons could 
be responsible for this development: (1) external effects, i.e. negative economic 
developments, (2) the number of assets/equity increased considerably, or (3) negative 
developments in the income statement, e.g. revenues decreased and/or costs increased. 
Considering the fact, that interviewees reported about a late structural transformation (i.e. end 
of 2006), the co-existence of assets in both organizations might have led to to a negative ROE 
and ROA. However, in 2007 and 2008 ABC International Austria recovered, which could 
have been caused by the structural assimilation. 
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Figure 22: ROE and ROA of ABC International Austria before and after the takeover 
 
 
In view of the above, it can be concluded that the acquisition can be considered of having 
been rather successful than unsuccessful. The goals of entering the B2B segment and to 
acquire a new technology have been achieved, although the transformation process was only 
partly successful. 
7.1.8. 
The acquisition of IDE Llc. by ABC International Austria was mainly driven by the 
opportunity to get access to a new technology as well as a new customer segment. 
Summary of case study 01: Goals were achieved 
Figure 24 graphically summarizes the situation after the merger. As can be seen, IDE Llc. was 
culturally, structurally and operationally assimilated to meet the requirements of the American 
headquarters and ABC International Austria respectively. However, due to lack of knowledge 
about the new technology, the strategy of IDE Llc. was kept separate and all departments that 
were related to it. Thus the operationalization of these separate strategies reflects the different 
customer segments, which require different treatment. Up until today, the B2B segment is 
mainly served by former IDE Llc. employees and the B2C segment is primarily covered by 
members of the former ABC International Austria. However, both strategies are embedded in 
the same structure and individuals are expected to conform to them. 
With respect to hybridization, the vintage concept of hybridization, the deck of cards concept 
of hybridization and uncontrolled local adaptation of management influenced the 
transformation process. The vintage concept of hybridization emerged, because organizational 
cultures between IDE Llc. and ABC International Austria differed strongly. Especially elder 
employees of the target company had problems with adjusting to larger and more bureaucratic 
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structures. Therefore, they strongly identified with their former organization. Those who 
decided to stay with ABC International Austria mainly developed an instrumental identity. 
The deck of cards concept of hybridization was triggered by top-down pressure to realize 
‘quick wins’ after the signing. Therefore those organizational units, which promised early 
gains from cost-cutting synergies were given preference. This mainly affected support units as 
the transformation of core units would have required know-how about the new technology. As 
individuals resisted changes, the operational transformation was delayed. 
Moreover, assimilation, bad timing and poor communication between organizations resulted 
in uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge. 
The acquisition of IDE Llc. was neither perceived as successful nor as unsuccessful by 
interview partners. However, they rather stressed negative aspects of the transformation 
process. The financial data analysis reveals that the M&A had at least no negative impact on 
revenues and the operating cash flow of ABC International Austria, as both showed a positive 
trend. Only with respect to ROA and ROE a negative development can be observed in the 
year following the acquisition. Nevertheless, considering the preset goals of ABC 
International Austria, the acquisition was more a success than a failure, although considerable 
problems existed throughout the unficiation process. 
 
Figure 23: Summary of case study 01 – Results of assimilation and separation of IDE Llc. 
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7.2. Case study 02: Enhanced complexity through double-layered 
acculturation? 
In case study 02, organizations from different countries are involved. Therefore not only 
organizational cultural differences become relevant, also the blending of national culture 
affects the transformation process and the perception of employees working in the companies 
involved. 
7.2.1. 
Among the most often perceived differences, national culture differences can be found, 
followed by organizational culture differences (see also 
Organizational differences between ITA Bank and AUT Bank 
Table 51). These also explain to a 
large extent the reported differences in working style (see also chapter 7.2.1.1). Also major 
differences with respect to structure were reported. Due to the different cultures involved, also 
language and consequently language barriers had a considerable impact on the overall 
transformation process. 
 
Table 50: Major organizational differences as reported by interview partners (n = 17) of case study 02 (n = 
1930 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # of quotes 
Different working style 16 94% 97 
Different national culture 15 88% 110 
Different organizational culture 14 82% 48 
Different structure 12 71% 39 
Different behavior 12 71% 34 
Different language 7 41% 22 
Different strategy 7 41% 13 
Different business 4 24% 5 
Different systems 4 24% 4 
Different products 3 18% 7 
 
49 quotes were related to company size, but this factor was hardly ever mentioned as a major 
difference between ITA Bank and AUT Bank as both organizations were relatively large. 
Most interview partners referred to it as an influencing factor on the transformation process or 
as an ultimate, often positively perceived, result of the takeover. Therefore it was not included 
in Table 51: 
 
P23: But coming back to the very first point, it was actually the mood, I think, it was for people around 
me and for me as well, positive, absolutely. It still is, because we grew up to a European player. 
 
P26: […] and it is necessary to mention that such huge companies are well prepared or have tools, to 
monitor or test the change with instruments, […] and then react to that [change]. 
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P32: And because you mix both [companies] you get to a balanced ratio [i.e. both organizations 
complement each other], and this is something which turns profitable only if you reach a certain size, 
no?! Because as a start-up company in a country I cannot build up a new network of branches. This I can 
only do as a large bank, which maybe buys or merges with other banks, as we did it. We are now the 
number one in four countries in Eastern Europe. Not only in retail banking, but also in corporate 
banking. And before [the takeover] we were maybe in one country the number one. Maybe among the top 
5. 
 
The following chapters explain in more detail to which extent the organizations differed and 
how these differences relate to each other. 
7.2.1.1. Different culture: Austria vs. Italy 
If two organizations from two different nations merge, national culture becomes a much more 
influential factor. Following Table 51 almost all interview partners reported about national 
culture differences. The question how these cultural differences are related to other observed 
organizational differences is answered by Table 52. 
 
Table 51: Co-Occurrence analysis for organizational differences between ITA Bank and AUT Bank (n = 
1930 coded quotes) 
 
different 
organizational 
culture 
different 
national 
culture 
different 
business 
different 
working style 
different 
organizational culture 
Pearson Correlation 1 .076** .057* .055* 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .001 .012 .016 
different national 
culture 
Pearson Correlation .076** 1 -.013 .342** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001   .582 .000 
different structure Pearson Correlation -.023 .012 .065** .034 
Sig. (2-tailed) .314 .588 .004 .131 
different systems Pearson Correlation -.007 -.011 .222** .042 
Sig. (2-tailed) .749 .623 .000 .067 
different business Pearson Correlation .057* -.013 1 .035 
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .582   .125 
different working style Pearson Correlation .055* .342** .035 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .000 .125   
different behavior Pearson Correlation .029 .409** -.007 .222** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .200 .000 .764 .000 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
In view of the above it becomes obvious that cultural differences were mainly observed by the 
interview partners through differences in working style and behavior. Although both codes 
relate to behavior, most interview partners distinguished between general behavior and 
behavior that is mainly related to their work in the organization. This also explains why 
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differences in behavior were significantly related to national culture but not to organizational 
culture. 
The following quotes provide examples of how ITA Bank and AUT Bank differed with 
respect to culture: 
 
P21: Already the organizational culture is a different one. Ahm, and then also the mentality is a different 
one. I mean, here you deal with Italians. And we are actually Austrians. This is also an issue. 
 
P26: Of course, many things, decisions are shaped by the Italian culture. No doubt about that. And 
something that plays an important role here as well is the issue that large organizations are also cultural 
organizations. Because a company, especially where the owners are now Italian owners, is strongly 
shaped by Italian culture. […] This is related to decisions. This is related to strategic aspects. And also 
requires from many of us a certain new understanding of working style. 
 
P27: If you have it in Italy, it is mainly, for instance in Italy was mainly, I don’t know City A vs. City B vs. 
City C vs. City D [referring to cities in Italy]. No?! But still different culture. No?! It is a cross-regional 
[smiles softly] game, but still you have different banks, different organizational culture.  The same, I 
think, was here, cross-border. […] It is more, I would say, if you would ask me the number one key 
criteria is organizational culture. Number two is national culture. 
 
P33: So our culture is a little bit more complex than the German one. Yes, and this is like a binary logic, 
[…] it lies in between zero and one, and there we, Austrians, are really specialists [i.e. for Austrians 
there is not only zero or one, but also different levels in between like a grey zone] And the Italians are 
similar. There is only the difference that we question [e.g. decisions] far too often. 
 
Finally, someone might expect that differences in national culture, especially between Austria 
and Italy would also result in differences in language. Although language (mentioned by 41% 
of the interview partners) did play a role in the transformation process, it was not considerably 
related to national culture. Due to the fact that English was the group language, other national 
languages were not a barrier. However, language barriers still existed, as not everyone knew 
sufficiently how to speak English. Statements of interview partners underline this: 
 
P22: […] and then there was of course something else: Because we were in the past only involved in the 
German speaking region, also with respect to mergers […] now we also have the issue of languages. On 
the one hand the Italians, on the other hand the German speaking [companies] […] This was a totally 
new challenge. […] Because first the majority of people were domestic bankers. […] English was 
reduced to the necessity to be able to understand things and to communicate during holidays. So to 
understand the menu. And suddenly you should present. Suddenly you should be able to discuss and 
argue. But when it gets to content, you do not order a Wiener Schnitzel [a typical Austrian dish] and 
that’s it, then you do the full monty. 
 
P23: I mean, we have English as our group language. This is not a problem. It poses no problems in 
those units were international activities are undertaken. No question about that. It is just with larger 
loans that we have to go to [the headquarter] into the loan committee in order to clarify how, what and 
why [we think that it is reasonable to offer a loan]. […] I can remember, two, three years ago in Italy, 
you could have discussed with any risk manager […], he might be good in his job, but within the last 30 
years he did not need to speak a single word in English. Only if he read an analysis or something similar. 
[…] And to some extent it was really difficult for them [to speak English]. 
 
P31: It is said that in Italy it is different. But I cannot imagine it. But I never was there. […] I always was 
in Vienna. What I heard is that those Italians who are here [in Austria] speak very well English, […] but 
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those in Italy you cannot even talk to. It’s problematic. They bought banks [Italian ones], without 
recruiting employees who speak English. In the past, this was not important. 
7.2.1.2. Different structure: A matrix for a larger group 
Banks, in general, tend to be more hierarchically structured. However, there are differences to 
be found with respect to organizational systems, i.e. banking systems, which are tailored to 
the business segment they belong to. One of the interview partners described it as follows: 
 
P35: […] you need not compare [the headquarter or subsidiaries of ITA Group], because [structural 
differences] are enormous among Austrian banks as well […]. You only need to consider four banks and 
each banks has its own accounting system. And now you could say. ‘Well, we have the [specific legal 
rules to which banks have to conform to]. […] and there are accounting rules and it is impossible [that 
each bank has a different accounting system]. […] Each position in the balance sheet should be 
comparable between banks.’ No, it is not possible. And therefore you can imagine that already the whole 
calculation of costs is different between Austrian banks. Especially if you compare them with foreign 
banks. […] if you look at the details, there are huge differences. 
 
Thus, differences in strategy, e.g. retail banking vs. corporate banking, result in a different 
range of products as well as a different structure (see also Table 52): 
 
P21: According to structures, ITA Bank is more private, this means, private customer-oriented, while 
AUT Bank has a strong and broad base on corporate banking […]. It is simply, with respect to volume, 
size, ahm, regarding structures, we are simply much larger [than ITA Bank]. 
 
P26: The structure partly gets assimilated, so that decisions that should have been made by us are now 
made in Italy and then the process takes longer […]. Over the course of time, or relatively early, it was 
clear that there will be a new structure. This means, we call it divisionalization, a divisional structure. 
[…] By doing this, the group tries to [gain control] in strategy in the whole bank. To think in divisions. 
This, of course, resulted [in the situation] that some of the former departments, like HR, […], that they 
get divisionalized. This means, all central departments are now structured into a certain division, the next 
[department] in this division, and the next in this division. 
 
P30: With respect to organizational structure […], it is clear and it still is not finished yet, you need a 
streamlining. This means, the bank was structured like the group and also all the other banks are aligned 
to the headquarters. So we [AUT Bank] got a totally new business model with the divisionalization […]. 
This resulted in departments that all have the same name in different countries. 
 
P32: A bank is simply hierarchical. You cannot lead it in a different way. […] The structure in a bank 
often is very hierarchical. I always have someone in the board of directors who has the say and the 
divisions with departments, with teams, with middle-managers; the typical hierarchical structure […]. 
No?! And with respect to that, ITA Bank is more distinctive [i.e. has a stronger hierarchy than AUT 
Bank] […]. 
 
Finally, while banks, in general, have a strong hierarchy, the way in which people are allowed 
to operate within such structures might considerably deviate across banks and countries, i.e. 
the degree of hierarchy might differ severely. This was also the case with ITA Bank and AUT 
Bank as 67% of the interview partners highlight:  
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P20: […] it is a different culture of leaders. In Italy more distinctive than [in Austria]. This is also 
reflected by legal governance. No?! We [AUT Bank], for example, have a considerate and friendly board 
of directors [i.e. were everyone has equal rights]. So, there is not a single boss. There is a spokesman or 
a chair […], but in reality it is a board of directors were all are liable and everyone has the same rights 
[…]. In contrast, in Italy, so to speak, there is one ‘director generale’ [P20 says that in an Italian tone] 
[smiles softly] or something similar and he is the absolute boss. […] All other hierarchies are below. This 
is different. This you recognize. No?! […] This is a different culture of leaders, which is more direct and 
is executed by a single person and not a considerate and friendly board of directors. 
 
P26: Everyone there [in ITA Bank] needs to ask the boss […] and ask whether this [a certain behavior, 
decision, etc.] is allowed. They [normal employees] have little responsibilities themselves. 
 
P33: AUT Bank always had a hierarchical structure. But the obedience to this structures is different 
[between ITA Bank and AUT Bank]. But structures have always been hierarchical. This means, you 
simply replace one hierarchical structure by another. 
 
In conclusion, major structural differences included (1) the divisionalization, i.e. matrix 
organization, and (2) the degree of hierarchy. Both considerably affected the way of doing 
business and changed AUT Banks structure to a large extent. 
 
7.2.1.3. Different strategy: Similarity and complementarity 
While AUT Bank and ITA Bank share a similar history – both emerged out of a series of 
M&As – ITA Bank mainly focused on retail banking, while AUT Bank was also strongly 
involved in corporate banking. 
As outlined above, the perceived compatibility of these strategies was one of the major 
reasons for the takeover and explains partly differences in organizational structures. Thus, 
some interview partners reported that there was also a different perception of how business 
should be run: 
 
P23: Sometimes it is a little bit difficult, because ITA Bank mainly had retail banking and they did not 
understand what we [AUT Bank with corporate banking] were doing. Because they did not have that 
before [the acquisition]. 
 
P27: The same, I think, was here, cross-border. Cross-border you have obviously the complexity that the 
markets are different. So also the interpretation of the business can be different. 
 
In addition, another difference was reported by interview partners: Strategic orientation 
towards measureable goals. This severely affected the way business was understood and how 
goals were set. Accordingly, operational processes were aligned to this premise: 
 
P24: With that [i.e. the strategic orientation] we are a little bit American. We [AUT Bank after the 
acquisition] measure everything and this we do very goal-oriented and always with a short-term 
perspective. No one is interested in the long-term orientation. There are projects which should result in 
improvements in the long-run, but they are done differently [compared to other projects]. 
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P35: What someone might say is, that maybe there is more awareness of economic efficiency calculations 
and profitability [in ITA Bank]. Stronger and more emphasis on that than before. This you recognize […] 
also in the daily business. […] I think they calculate more strictly [with respect to costs and gains]. 
 
In view of the above, the most frequently reported strategic differences were (1) the customer 
segment, i.e. retail vs. corporate banking, and (2) the business model, i.e. how they 
understood they way of doing business. 
 
7.2.1.4. Different working style: The Italian and Austrian way of doing business 
The aforementioned differences in culture, strategy and structure resulted in many observed 
differences in working style. Table 53 provides an overview of most frequently mentioned 
differences that are related to or describe differences in working styles and behavior. Due to 
the limited access to members of ITA Bank, only few differences were reported. 
 
Table 52: Reported differences between ITA Bank and AUT Bank 
ITA Bank AUT Bank 
Observed by 
acquirer Observed by acquired 
Observed by 
acquirer Observed by acquired 
• more flexible 
• constantly phoning 
someone 
• chaotic 
• less organized 
• short-range planning 
• strongly goal-orientated 
• more flexibility, 
improvising 
• different working hours 
• workaholics 
• no difference between 
private and working life 
• blindly obey rules and 
decisions 
• decisions are made by 
supervisor 
• face-keeping 
• anxious about 
implementing 
new tools 
• mixture of being 
structured and 
flexible 
• different way of 
communication 
style 
• more structured 
• long-range planning 
• testing tools before 
they are implemented 
• questioning decisions 
• decisions are 
collective decisions 
 
The following quotes provide insights in some of the perceived differences in working style 
as mentioned above: 
 
P21: But of course, there is a different working style. […] if you think about the typical stereotypes 
[laughs]. The way you walk through Italian streets and all people are phoning someone, also in business 
life. They make many phone calls and the mobile phone is an essential element [laughs]. This is quite 
funny. 
 
P21: To some extent there are less rules, but still regulated. It is more chaotic. If meetings are scheduled, 
planned, canceled, rearranged, [etc.]. […] This is sometimes chaotic. 
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P22: And once someone responded to the question ‘What is the difference between an Italian, a German 
and an Austrian’, that the German colleagues analyze everything in detail. Each problem, although it 
might be very small, should be anticipated. Alternative solutions are developed. They head forward and 
face a barrier and are totally surprised: ‘This cannot be.’ They step back and try again [to overcome the 
barrier], but the barrier is still there [and the Germans say]: ‘This is impossible, we have analyzed 
everything in detail.’ The Austrians head forward, also make a good analysis, […] face a barrier, shake 
their heads [and say]: ‘That is surprising. I would not have expected that.’ They shortly think about it and 
then turn left or right and walk around the barrier. The Italians turn right or left from the beginning 
[without needing to think about the situation]. 
 
P27: Having to meet a due date, because for that date you have to apply to the Central Bank or complete 
the legal process, fear is being able to perform properly the integration, the integration of the IT system, 
having it work properly. Having the famous switch-on. No!? You switch on the new system and the brains 
work. But you don’t know that it works before switching it on. So there is a big fear from this point of 
view [by AUT Bank that things might not work out as expected]. 
 
P34: There is a say, for example, between Italian and German and Austrian. If you talk to a, ahm, to an 
Italian, the Italian is saying that they are more flexible. So if you have a, I don’t know, if you have a 
problem this problem can be solved by just phoning to the, to the person that is in charge. So there is a 
flexibility that allows you to be pragmatic and flexible. If you talk with a German. Germans are saying, 
my strength is the organization, so the process. I build up the process and if the process is able to go by 
itself I don’t need to call anybody, because the process is coming in the end. Ahm, if you talk about it with 
an Austrian, the Austrian is saying yes, but the Germans are to structured and we have to play a bit, ahm, 
also phoning somebody, so it is a mix of the two. I think that for Italians it is good to team up with the 
German working style, […] and vice versa. Because just a combination of the two is something bigger 
than just a single part of it. 
 
In conclusion, most of these quotes refer to cultural issues. This is also supported by the 
findings shown in Table 52. In contrast to case study 01, which represented a domestic 
acquisition, in case study 02 much more quotes related to working behavior (Table 54). 
Therefore, national culture differences considerably contribute to the perception of differences 
between M&A partners in the selected cases. How these additional differences influenced the 
transformation process is outlined in the chapters on cultural, structural and operational 
transformation. Thus, the first condition for the emergence of hybridization is met, i.e. that 
organizational differences existed between AUT Bank and ITA Bank. 
 
Table 53: Number of coded quotes related to differences in working style and behavior in case study 01 (n 
= 19 interview partners) and case study 02 (n = 17 interview partners). 
 # of coded quotes 
Case study 01 Case study 02 
Different working style 77 97 
Different behavior 11 34 
TOTAL 88 131 
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7.2.2. 
ITA Bank had to cope with national culture differences as well as organizational culture 
differences. This is also known as ‘double-layered acculturation’ (Barkema et al, 1996) While 
many interview partners referred to these differences, only few quotes relate to cultural 
transformation. As can be seen from 
Acculturation strategy: Standardization through assimilation  
Table 55, structural transformation was mentioned by all 
interviewees. Representing 98 quotes, structural transformation dominated the interviews and 
turns out to be the most relevant process throughout this case study. Together with operational 
transformation, these processes had the most severe impact on interview partners.  
 
Table 54: Facets of transformation and acculturation strategy as reported by interview partners (n = 17) 
of case study 01 (n = 1930 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # of quotes 
Structural 
transformation 17 100% 98 
Operational 
transformation 16 94% 61 
Assimilation 15 88% 66 
Standardization of 
organizations 14 82% 23 
Integration 13 76% 33 
Separation 10 59% 29 
Cultural transformation 9 53% 35 
Marginalization 1 6% 1 
 
In order to find out which acculturation strategy was applied for each transformation process, 
a co-occurrence analysis for the respective codes was conducted. Results are shown in Table 
56. 
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Table 55: Co-Occurrence ratios for acculturation strategy and facets of integration in case study 02 (n = 
1930 coded quotes) 
 
cultural 
transformat
ion 
structural 
transformat
ion 
operational 
transformat
ion 
standardization of 
organizations 
integration Pearson Correlation .312** -.012 .136** .022 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .589 .000 .326 
assimilation Pearson Correlation .060** .372** -.018 .163** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .000 .437 .000 
separation Pearson Correlation .015 .010 .002 -.014 
Sig. (2-tailed) .506 .653 .929 .551 
marginalization Pearson Correlation -.003 -.005 -.004 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .892 .817 .857 .913 
cultural 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.014 .086** -.015 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .546 .000 .512 
structural 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation -.014 1 -.015 .149** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .546   .516 .000 
operational 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation .086** -.015 1 -.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .516   .384 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
In view of the above, it becomes clear that ITA Bank followed mainly a strategy of cultural 
and operational transformation. Cultural and operational transformation are closely related to 
each other in this case study. However, the co-occurrence ratios also reveal ‘cultural 
assimilation’, i.e. ITA Bank tried to harmonize cultural values within the organization. How 
this was achieved is outlined in the following chapter. 
With respect to structural transformation, ITA Bank aimed at adjusting the structures of AUT 
Bank so that they fit to the group. This acculturation strategy was mainly driven by the idea to 
standardize organizational culture, strategy, structure and operations in order to facilitate the 
collaboration between members of the group and guarantee control of all subsidiaries. 
Finally, the M&A was not characterized by separation. Only very few areas remained 
separate: Those departments which strongly operated in Austria under national regulations, 
e.g. retail banking, were less affected by the transformation process and the takeover in 
general. This suggests the existence of the deck of cards concept of hybridization in this case 
study: 
 
H23: It is strongly depending on where you are positioned. If you are somewhere in a small branch, you 
might not experience ITA Bank so much. 
  
H24: A bank which is less affected [by the acquisition], is one that is strongly related to national 
subsidies. Where it is important that you know the institutions and the conditions for certain subsidies 
[…]. 
 
H32: Most parts [are affected by the acquisition], except the Austrian retail banking, where Italians 
hardly interfere. There exists a head of retail in [the headquarters], […] but the direct business, it is 
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dominated by Austrians, because it is a classic national or local business. This I cannot control from 
somewhere else. 
7.2.3. 
In view of the above, organizational differences between ITA Bank and AUT Bank were 
blended mainly due to integration and assimilation efforts (see also 
Forms of hybridization identified in case study 02 
Figure 25). Thus, both 
conditions for hybridization are fulfilled.  
 
Figure 24: Visual summary of organizational differences between ITA Bank and AUT Bank 
 
 
Tables 56 to 59 show the number of quotes related to family codes representing a certain form 
of hybridization. As can be seen, there exists a considerable number of quotes for most forms 
of hybridization. However, boundary spanning seems to play a minor or even no role in the 
transformation process, as three codes were not assigned to any quote in case study 02 and 
two other codes are only represented by a single quote. In total, 50% of the set of codes 
related to boundary spanning are strongly underrepresented. Also Table 64 suggests that this 
form of hybridization did not emerge in this case study. With respect to the other three forms 
of hybridization a moderate number of codes seem to significantly co-occur (see also Table 
60 to Table 62). The following chapters will provide further insides and specify the presented 
findings. 
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Table 56: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing the vintage concept of hybridization in case study 02 (n = 1931 coded quotes) 
  Case study 02   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in% TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes* 
Vintage concept of 
hybridization (FC) 
Identification with old organization 21 24% 86 29 
Age (elder) 23 38% 60 20 
Adjustment problems 20 34% 58 19 
Identification with new organization 26 52% 50 17 
Age (younger) 21 43% 49 16 
No identification with the acquiring company 3 10% 29 10 
No adjustment problems 4 19% 21 7 
Acceptance 9 60% 15 5 
Age 1 14% 7 2 
No identification with old company 3 43% 7 2 
No acceptance 3 60% 5 2 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
 
Table 57: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing the deck of cards concept of hybridization in case study 02 (n = 1931 coded quotes) 
  Case study 02   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in% TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes* 
Deck of cards concept of 
hybridization (FC) 
Departments/individuals are differently affected by the M&A 43 24% 177 59 
Stepwise transformation 21 44% 48 16 
Replacement of supervisors 26 60% 43 14 
Replacement of owners 5 33% 15 5 
Replacement of personnel 0 0% 1 0 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
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Table 58: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing the uncontrolled local adaptation of management in case study 02 (n = 1931 coded quotes) 
  Case study 02   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in% TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes* 
Uncontrolled local 
adaptation of management 
knowledge (FC) 
Guidelines by acquirer 55 57% 96 32 
Poor communication 6 17% 35 12 
Communication problems 7 25% 28 9 
Lack of understanding 9 35% 26 9 
No/few communication/information 7 30% 23 8 
Misunderstandings 12 55% 22 7 
No transparency 14 74% 19 6 
Goals of the M&A/changes are not communicated 1 13% 8 3 
Future perspectives not communicated 1 14% 7 2 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
 
Table 59: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing boundary spanning through informal networks in case study 02 (n = 1931 coded quotes) 
  Case study 02   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in% TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes 
Boundary spanning 
through informal networks 
(FC) 
Strong hierarchy 45 27% 165 55 
Operational inertia 6 12% 50 17 
Cooperativeness 4 33% 12 4 
Long communication channels 0 0% 5 2 
Networks 5 100% 5 2 
Boundary spanning 2 50% 4 1 
Creating new networks 1 33% 3 1 
Strong internal networking due to business activities 0 0% 2 1 
Circumvent/adjust systems 0 0% 2 1 
Power networks 1 100% 1 0 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
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Table 60: Co-Occurrence analysis: Vintage concept of hybridization in case study 02 (n = 1931 coded quotes) 
 
identification 
with old 
organization 
age 
(elder) 
adjustment 
problems 
identification 
with new 
organization 
age 
(younger) 
no 
identification 
with acquired 
organization 
no 
adjustment 
problems 
acceptance age 
identification with old 
organization 
Pearson Correlation 1 .127** .039 .031 .037 -.004 -.005 -.007 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .090 .172 .103 .856 .834 .753 .917 
age (elder) Pearson Correlation .127** 1 .225** -.013 .311** -.004 -.005 -.008 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .000 .573 .000 .849 .826 .741 .913 
adjustment problems Pearson Correlation .039 .225** 1 -.012 -.011 -.004 -.005 -.007 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .090 .000   .600 .638 .859 .838 .759 .919 
identification with new 
organization 
Pearson Correlation .031 -.013 -.012 1 -.012 -.005 -.005 -.008 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .172 .573 .600   .591 .840 .815 .726 .907 
age (younger) Pearson Correlation .037 .311** -.011 -.012 1 -.004 .105** -.007 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .103 .000 .638 .591   .856 .000 .753 .917 
no identification with 
acquired organization 
Pearson Correlation -.004 -.004 -.004 -.005 -.004 1 -.002 -.003 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .856 .849 .859 .840 .856   .937 .906 .969 
no adjustment 
problems 
Pearson Correlation -.005 -.005 -.005 -.005 .105** -.002 1 -.003 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .834 .826 .838 .815 .000 .937   .891 .964 
acceptance Pearson Correlation -.007 -.008 -.007 -.008 -.007 -.003 -.003 1 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .753 .741 .759 .726 .753 .906 .891   .945 
age Pearson Correlation -.002 -.002 -.002 -.003 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.002 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .917 .913 .919 .907 .917 .969 .964 .945   
no identification with 
old organization 
Pearson Correlation -.004 -.004 -.004 -.005 -.004 -.002 -.002 -.003 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .856 .849 .859 .840 .856 .946 .937 .906 .969 
no acceptance Pearson Correlation -.004 -.004 -.004 -.005 -.004 -.002 -.002 -.003 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .856 .849 .859 .840 .856 .946 .937 .906 .969 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 61: Co-Occurrence analysis: Deck of cards concept of hybridization in case study 02 (n = 1931 coded quotes) 
 
departments/individuals 
are differently affected 
by the M&A 
stepwise 
transformation 
replacement 
of 
supervisors 
replacement 
of owners 
departments/individuals are 
differently affected by the 
M&A 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .086** .043 .130** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .057 .000 
stepwise transformation Pearson 
Correlation 
.086** 1 -.012 -.005 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .591 .815 
replacement of supervisors Pearson 
Correlation 
.043 -.012 1 -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .057 .591   .794 
replacement of owners Pearson 
Correlation 
.130** -.005 -.006 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .815 .794   
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 62: Co-Occurrence analysis: Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge in case study 02 (n = 1931 coded quotes) 
 
guidelines 
by 
acquirer 
poor 
communication 
communication 
problems 
lack of 
understanding 
no/few 
communication/ 
information 
mis-
understandings 
no 
transparency 
guidelines by acquirer Pearson Correlation 1 -.010 -.010 -.012 -.010 .066** -.015 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .675 .650 .607 .650 .004 .520 
poor communication Pearson Correlation -.010 1 -.003 -.004 -.003 .114** .105** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .675   .882 .867 .882 .000 .000 
communication problems Pearson Correlation -.010 -.003 1 -.004 -.004 .105** -.005 
Sig. (2-tailed) .650 .882   .856 .873 .000 .821 
lack of understanding Pearson Correlation -.012 -.004 -.004 1 -.004 -.005 .084** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .607 .867 .856   .856 .812 .000 
no/few 
communication/information 
Pearson Correlation -.010 -.003 -.004 -.004 1 .105** -.005 
Sig. (2-tailed) .650 .882 .873 .856   .000 .821 
misunderstandings Pearson Correlation .066** .114** .105** -.005 .105** 1 -.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .000 .000 .812 .000   .767 
no transparency Pearson Correlation -.015 .105** -.005 .084** -.005 -.007 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .520 .000 .821 .000 .821 .767   
goals of the M&A/changes 
are not communicated 
Pearson Correlation .133** -.001 -.001 -.002 -.001 -.002 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .955 .952 .945 .952 .937 .932 
future perspectives not 
communicated 
Pearson Correlation -.004 .408** -.001 -.002 -.001 -.002 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .864 .000 .952 .945 .952 .937 .932 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 63: Co-Occurrence analysis: Boundary spanning in case study 02 (n = 1931coded quotes) 
 strong hierarchy 
operational 
inertia cooperativeness networks 
boundary 
spanning 
creating 
new 
networks 
power 
networks 
strong hierarchy Pearson Correlation 1 .053* -.007 -.008 -.005 -.004 -.004 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .020 .757 .730 .827 .877 .877 
operational inertia Pearson Correlation .053* 1 -.003 -.003 -.002 -.001 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .020   .911 .901 .937 .955 .955 
cooperativeness Pearson Correlation -.007 -.003 1 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .757 .911   .919 .949 .964 .964 
networks Pearson Correlation -.008 -.003 -.002 1 -.002 -.001 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .730 .901 .919   .943 .959 .959 
boundary 
spanning 
Pearson Correlation -.005 -.002 -.001 -.002 1 -.001 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .827 .937 .949 .943   .974 .974 
creating new 
networks 
Pearson Correlation -.004 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 1 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .877 .955 .964 .959 .974   .982 
power networks Pearson Correlation -.004 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .877 .955 .964 .959 .974 .982   
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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7.2.4. 
Following what has been mentioned before, ITA Bank was challenged to unify AUT Bank 
with respect to national culture and organizational culture. 
Cultural transformation: The ‘One Culture’-Day 
Table 64 and Table 65 provide 
those codes that most frequently were related to national and organizational culture. 
 
Table 64: Most frequently assigned codes related to different national culture in case study 02 (n = 1930 
coded quotes)  
 # of interview partners 
# of quotes co-occurring 
with different national 
culture 
# quotes coded 
Different working style 13 76% 40 97 
Different behavior 9 53% 26 34 
Strong hierarchy 6 35% 13 45 
Blindly following the 
supervisor 3 18% 7 14 
 
Table 65: Most frequently assigned codes related to different organizational culture in case study 02 (n = 
1930 coded quotes)  
 # of interview partners 
# of quotes co-occurring 
with different 
organizational culture 
# quotes coded 
Cultural transformation 4 24% 7 35 
Identification with old 
company 3 18% 3 21 
Different working style 3 18% 6 97 
 
Two factors, namely different working style and strong hierarchy, were more often related to 
national culture, than to organizational culture. Thus, interview partners tended to perceive 
these differences as a result of different national cultures. To some extent this creates the 
impression as if national culture differences were more important than organizational culture 
differences. While this is partly true, it is necessary to mention that other factors seem to 
considerably influence the perception of the Italian culture: (1) the merger history of AUT 
Bank, (2) differences in language, (3) the ‘One Culture’-Day. 
As highlighted earlier, AUT Bank has a quite long M&A history and developed out of a series 
of mergers and acquisitions. At the time of the interviews, still some employees identified 
with the bank they started at: 
 
P26: This dates back to the old times, the past: ‘I am this person and I was this person and this person.’ [ 
referring to a certain company before the acquisition].   
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P31: The elder employees say: ‘I come from XY [a bank before the acquisition and before AUT Bank was 
founded].’ […] People identify with the bank they started [their working life]. 
 
Thus, it seems as if for some employees there was no collective organizational culture of 
AUT Bank before the takeover. This partly explains why organizational culture differences 
were less strongly perceived and most organizational differences were rather mentioned in 
connection with national culture differences (see also Table 52). 
Regarding differences in languages, English was the standard language in the group. On the 
one hand, this explains why only two interviewees referred to differences in language jointly 
with national culture differences, because the national language of the acquirer and of the 
target played only a minor role throughout the post-M&A phase. On the other hand, setting 
this standard represented a change for both companies: ITA Bank as well as AUT Bank had to 
adjust to a third language. 
ITA Bank developed an event which takes place every six month and where everyone is asked 
to participate: The ‘One Culture’-Day. The goal is to boost cultural transformation. This event 
should help to identify common values, which are later on printed on posters and ID-cards of 
employees. One of the interview partners showed his ID-card and it indicated values such as 
‘transparency’, ‘fairness’ and ‘trust’. These values are very broad and general and it can be 
expected that most individuals would agree to them, irrespective of their nationality or 
cultural background. By doing this, ITA Bank aims at building a common organizational 
culture with which everyone in the group can identify. While in the beginning this event 
created mixed feelings, many members of AUT Bank perceive it now as a positive method for 
cultural transformation. The following quotes provide some interesting insights in how this 
‘One Culture’-Day is organized and executed: 
 
P20: […] ITA Bank was approaching this issues [cultural differences] with care. […] They tried to 
communicate a lot. They sent people in both directions [from the headquarters to the subsidiaries and 
vice versa] […], [there were] a lot of meetings, in order to find common values, ‘One-Culture’-Days and 
such things. So they spent a lot of time on that, which was surely very well spent. Simply to strengthen 
trust among each other. […] and it seems as if the management was aware of the importance [of cultural 
differences]. 
 
P23: There exists the ‘One Culture’-Day, where we have six, seven values which are held up in the whole 
group. And this is also the attempt to give the whole group a common culture and an identity. 
 
P24: I mean, a lot of people laugh about the ‘One Culture’-Day. To some extent, I also did that, but I still 
think it is important, to talk about it by using this method, i.e. that really all people of the bank sit 
together and laugh together about it [and we say]: ‘Now they come again with this stupid thing. But here, 
in our team, it is working. We treat each other in a fair manner, but the stupid guys over there [i.e. other 
team].’ But to address these issues: What is working? What is not working? What can we do? How do we 
want to collaborate? And now you can talk about […] these words [i.e. questions and answers], which, of 
course are influenced by culture, but that the bank spends time on that and says: ‘Friends, let’s talk. How 
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do we treat each other? […] Do you feel well in here [in this bank or group]? Yes or no?’ It is also your 
decision, where you get told: ‘You also can go.’ Well, but I think it is good that the bank can afford this 
every year, for half a day. […] Everyone at the same time thinks about certain topics [provided top-
down]. It is a little bit like in kindergarten, with posters to fill out. […] Still there is more about it. People 
are finally talking to each other. […] It is surely an integrative activity. 
 
P36: But they really try to live that. Every year, for half a day […] everyone comes together and we 
talked about some topics related to organizational values. This is new every year […] in order to recall 
organizational values. So that you talk about them. This year we particularly talked about success stories. 
[…] and this year we asked: ‘About which success stories [within the bank] should we talk about and 
highlight.’ So, everyone had to think about a case […] it was about how to treat customers […]. Which 
particular examples can we highlight. Whom and why could we highlight. So there is a lot of time spent 
on this. There are also a lot of efforts [spent on that]. […] If somebody violates the values of the ‘One 
Culture’-Day, then you can go to the ‘One Culture’-Day ombudsman [who is a retired person and is not 
legally or financially bound to ITA Bank, thus is an independent person]. 
 
The question whether the cultural transformation efforts resulted in a stronger identification 
with ITA Bank and the whole group respectively, is answered in Table 66. Due to the fact that 
there was only the opportunity to interview two managers of ITA Bank, results for this group 
of people are strongly limited. With respect to AUT Bank, only small differences can be 
observed, i.e. there were slightly more individuals referring to identification with the new 
organization. 
 
Table 66: Number of quotes related to identification with new and old organization sorted by pre-M&A 
organizational membership (n = 1930 coded quotes) 
  # of interview partners # of quotes 
identification with new organization 
ITA Bank 
(n = 2) 1 5 
AUT Bank 
(n = 15) 10 21 
identification with old organization 
ITA Bank 
(n = 2) 1 5 
AUT Bank. 
(n = 15) 7 16 
 
However, the qualitative content analysis reveals that most interview partners did not refer to 
their own identification with one of the banks involved in the M&A, but talked about it more 
generally: Some members of AUT Bank identified with their company, because it was and 
still is among the largest banks in Austria. The feeling of having been part of something large 
and important is still in their heads. In addition, the fact that AUT Bank was an Austrian bank 
played a vital role to identify with the organization: 
 
H33: […] For AUT Bank this was a significant paradigm change. A bank that decided about its own 
faith, the largest Austrian bank, […] with one of the largest CEE networks […] suddenly becomes a sales 
unit. This, of course, severely changes one’s perception and identity of the bank. 
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P35: […] AUT Bank was one of the largest Austrian banks with rich know-how. [P35 explains that there 
could have been a national solution for AUT Bank on the capital market]. On the other hand, we would 
not be as big, not as international, and would not have such a network with Italy, Germany, Austria and 
the whole East European region. This I have to admit. But it would have been a national option [the 
capital market in contrast to the acquisition]. Still a lot of people talk about this [laughs] […][and say]: 
‘What would have been if…?’. This is still very present. Absolutely. 
 
Quite often, interviewees stressed that mostly elder employees tended to identify rather with 
the old organization than with ITA Bank. Also the co-occurrence analysis for the vintage 
concept of hybridization suggests that (see also Table 60): 
 
P26: So the old culture, this cultural thinking is gone. This is only the true for elder employees, but [for] 
younger employees it is more and more [that they are thinking less about the old culture of AUT Bank]. 
 
P31: Elder employees still say: ‘I am from X [a bank that existed before AUT Bank].’ […] It is really like 
that. If you say: ‘Hello, I started in Bank X.’ I don’t care [laughs], because I have not experienced the 
history, but they are proud.  
 
P36: And the young employees that we have, the very young ones, they do not have a problem [with the 
acquisition], because they do not know anything else [from the past] […], but if you worked for 15, 20, 
30 years in one, in the same Austrian environment, and you are therefore strongly socialized in a certain 
direction, […] [it] is difficult to get along with another culture. Very difficult. 
 
Finally, one of the two managers of ITA Bank outlined that a collective identity might be 
achieved by creating a context that allows to develop a single identity, e.g. through branding: 
 
P34: Another critical, ahm, driver for this identity, is also the brand. So, at the beginning, there was one 
brand […]and multiple brands across all the group. There was AUT Bank, there was GER Bank, there 
were all the banks in Central-Eastern Europe. We did during the last two years a transformation of those 
brands. Now all the banks have one, the red one and the same font for the, the name. 
 
In conclusion, the most important measure taken during the cultural transformation was the 
‘One Culture’-Day, which aimed at more communication within and across departments and 
the development of collectively held values. As many members of ITA Bank are now also 
working within AUT Bank, this created space for cross-cultural communication. 
Nevertheless, as will be outline in the following two chapters, culture was more often seen as 
a factor that negatively affected the transformation process. Finally, first evidence of the 
existence of the vintage concept of hybridization was provided. Due to the fact that most of 
the elder employees had a fixed position by contract, they were able to show their resistance 
more publicly without being afraid of losing their jobs that easily. A more detailed discussion 
on this form of hybridization will be provided in chapter 7.2.6 as its consequences mainly 
affected the operational level. Therefore, the cultural transformation efforts undertaken by 
ITA Bank could not alleviate or even avoid the emergence of the vintage concept of 
hybridization. In light of these findings, the question whether transformation measures, such 
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as the ‘One Culture’-Day, helped all acquired employees alike might very well be doubted. 
Figure 26 shows how the vintage concept of hybridization is related to other codes in case 
study 02. This form of hybridization caused a negative attitude towards the acquisition by 
elder employees, who developed an instrumental identity if they stayed with the organization.  
 
Figure 25: Vintage concept of hybridization in case study 02 
 
7.2.5. 
All interview partners reported about the structural transformation as it had the most severe 
impact on their current working life. 
Structural transformation: One standardized structure for all 
Table 67 provides more details about the organizational 
structures involved. Different working styles were most frequently mentioned, which 
frequently co-occurred with national culture differences (see also Table 64). In particular, the 
introduction of a matrix organization was a fundamental step towards a standardization of all 
members of ITA Group and had a considerable impact on the way business was run in AUT 
Bank after the takeover. 
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Table 67: Most frequently assigned codes related to structural transformation in case study 02 (n = 1930 
coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
Different working style 16 94% 97 
Standardization of organizations 14 82% 23 
Different structure 13 76% 39 
Company size (FC) 12 71% 49 
Strong hierarchy 11 65% 45 
Duality 11 65% 23 
Matrix organization/divisionalization 9 53% 13 
Flexibility 5 29% 8 
Spatial changes 5 29% 7 
Operational inertia 4 24% 6 
Hierarchy 4 24% 5 
Different systems 4 24% 4 
Slow decision-making processes 3 18% 5 
Support units 3 18% 5 
 
Standardization of organizations was the primary premise of ITA Bank and mainly meant 
assimilation of structures, as summarized in Table 56 and Table 68.  
 
Table 68: Codes that were most frequently co-occurring with structural transformation in case study 02 (n 
= 1930 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners 
# of quotes co-occurring 
with structural 
transformation 
# quotes coded 
Assimilation 14 82% 33 66 
Guidelines by acquirer 6 35% 9 55 
Loss of responsibilities 5 29% 8 51 
Departments/individuals are 
differently affected by M&A 5 29% 7 43 
Fast transformation 4 24% 5 18 
Allocation of responsibilities 3 18% 4 22 
Costs 3 18% 4 18 
 
However, not all departments of AUT Bank were equally affected by this standardization, 
what supports the existence of the deck of cards concept of hybridization. In particular 
departments were less affected which are strongly related to national regulations or where 
employees have to work closely together with national citizens. One of the interview partners 
summarized it as follows: 
 
P36: But those people who are in typical sales units do not realize a lot [of this acquisition]. […] for 
example the Austrian accounting department is not affected by Italians. The head of finance is an Italian, 
but [on the next lower hierarchical level] […] there is again an Austrian. […] It would be meaningless 
[to have an Italian in this department]. What should an Italian do there? If he calls the Austrian tax office 
[laughs] and likes to talk English. This does not make sense. This is worth nothing. […] And therefore, of 
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course, some management positions changed. Responsibilities have changed […]. A lot has happened 
there. […] This could have meant that some departments got considerably down-sized, that some 
departments were pooled together, that some were dissolved completely. 
 
National culture differences contributed to the emergence of this form of hybridization. Figure 
27 shows the relationships of the deck of cards concept of hybridization with other 
phenomena or codes in this case study. 
 
Figure 26: Deck of cards concept of hybridization in case study 02 
 
 
Very often, interview partners from AUT Bank reported about the strong hierarchy and the 
desire by ITA Bank to quickly unify those departments that had strategic responsibilities. 
While AUT Bank enjoied a high level of autonomy after the takeover by GER Bank, because 
the German bank was financially struggling, the loss of strategic responsibilities was mainly 
perceived as negative. This was the first time that members of AUT Bank really had the 
impression that they were not an headquarter anymore: 
 
P24: Basically we, a self-controlling unit, have become an externally controlled one. From a 
headquarter, which had subsidiaries in CEE itself, to a subsidiary. […] we are still responsible for the 
Austrian market, but with guidelines and structures, which are more or less set by Italians. 
 
P27: So they still, in Italy [there is] still the major CFO. AUT Bank, AUT Bank suffered a little bit, 
because of the fact that AUT Bank was a kind of autonomous, ahm, sub-holding for CEE, what is still the 
case. Because it is still the sub-holding of CEE but now clearly the group also wants to have efficiency in 
terms of certain processes, cost-efficiencies across the whole region. 
 
P29: We, and to some extent I as well, also had responsibilities, which had been far more than compared 
to those that we have now, because we were the headquarter. We developed strategies, we 
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operationalized them. We decided how something should enter the balance sheet, and, and, and. Yes. All 
this we do not have anymore. You can be sad about this, but the basic problem is not being sad, but the 
feeling that you lost responsibilities. You had ten-times more power. You are still doing the same, but you 
simply had the power to decide. And there you recognize, that you need to get rid of this generation [of 
people] in order to run the group. […] for me, this is a rule. Especially if people resist. Or, as I did, 
change your tasks [and consequently the department] where you do not have a history, where you start 
again [from zero].  
 
The fact that ITA Bank provided strict guidelines for the structural transformation is also 
reflected by their speed of transformation: 
 
P27: I would take care of IT. So IT is quite crucial to do it properly and quickly and efficiently. 
 
P34: So you need to integrate as soon as possible technically, but it is not finished after three months, one 
year, two years. 
 
P35: And this was, as I said before, decided very quickly [and] strictly. […] Core units were really 
changed within 1½, two years and I think this is a short time. This was executed very, very quickly. […] If 
this was appreciated by us [i.e. AUT Bank] or not, is a different story, and the emotions […]. But how 
they [i.e. ITA Bank] executed it [the change], how they did that strategically, ahm, really […] in a very, 
very short time. 
 
The introduction of a division-based structure resulted in considerable changes in some 
departments, which were not always seen positively. The following quotes describe this 
change: 
 
P21: […] if you change from a hierarchical structure to a matrix organization, this is a huge change. 
Ahm. This, everyone, who experienced that, will tell you. But it also provides changes, ahm, flexibility.  
 
P24: Divsionalization was an essential activity. Divide et impera. [sarcastically]. The bank, as it was, is 
split in different business units, which are themselves already like banks on their own. The retail business 
separated from corporate banking. Investment banking separated. So, the local national units are 
smaller. Certain units, like accounting or controlling are set up across countries. Controlling is a cross-
border unit, not an Austrian unit anymore. But it provides services for the top management. […] Divide et 
impera. This is a purposeful approach to destroy established structures in order to gain a unified 
structure. This is understandable. This makes sense. I would do the same. 
  
P33: The bank got dividisionalized. Do you know what that means? [I: Yes, grouped in divisions, in order 
to split (…)] Yes, exactly. This means that the single bank in the country loses its power. Yes?! AUT Bank 
lost its power […].[Power to] design products, its own faith, etc.. Because the head of retail banking of 
AUT Bank only very formally reports to the general head of AUT Bank. In reality, he reports to the head 
of retail in Italy.  
 
In conclusion, the structural transformation was mainly driven by standardization of AUT 
Bank, i.e. assimilation towards the group of ITA Bank. The process of adjusting to new 
structures mainly resulted in loss of responsibilities/power and was characterized by clear 
guidelines of ITA Bank. It was a top-down process which did hardly allow any deviations 
from these regulations and led to many negative emotions. As outlined, the deck of cards 
concept existed. The following chapter will highlight, that this form of hybridization emerged 
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partly due to new supervisors and new top management as results show in Table 57: 60% of 
all interview partners in this case study referred to replacement of supervisors.  
7.2.6. 
In this case study, operational transformation was mainly perceived as negative due to loss of 
responsibilities/power and a rigorous exchange of supervisors/managers (deck of cards 
concept of hybridization). Most interview partners reported about adjustment problems of 
themselves or others, especially elder employees (vintage concept of hybridization). 
Operational transformation: Trust and loss of responsibilities/power 
Table 69 
lists those codes that were most frequently mentioned throughout the interviews and were 
directly related to operational transformation. 
 
Table 69: Most frequently assigned codes related to operational transformation in case study 02 (n = 1930 
coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
Loss of responsibilities 11 65% 51 
Exchange of supervisors/managers 10 59% 26 
Allocation of responsibilities 9 53% 22 
Adjustment problems 8 47% 20 
Personnel gets mixed up 8 47% 20 
Lay-offs 8 47% 14 
Resignation of acquired employees 7 41% 17 
Individuals as key-factors 6 35% 8 
Loss of job 5 29% 12 
Joint social activities/meetings 5 29% 5 
Inclusion of affected employees into the 
transformation process 4 24% 15 
No inclusion of affected employees into the 
transformation process 4 24% 7 
 
Despite of the fact that AUT Bank was a subsidiary of GER Bank before the takeover of ITA 
Bank, AUT Bank still had many responsibilities. This changed significantly as ITA Bank 
became the new owner and considerable structural changes took place. The negatively 
perceived change caused lay-offs and resignations of employees, in particular in those units, 
were strategic decisions were transferred to the head of ITA Group and employees were not 
included in the transformation processes (deck of cards concept of hybridization). Thus, 
individuals who had the chance to shape the change were willing to adjust more easily. Some 
members of AUT Bank simply could not or did not want to adjust to the new business format. 
 
P26: I can say: ‘I could decide before the acquisition. Now I cannot do that anymore, but somebody else. 
I just need to put something into practice.’ Good. If I need to put this into practice and I do not agree to 
what I should put into practice, I can resist or I say: ‘No, I am not for it. I do something else.’ This is an 
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option. I give up this job, although I am a supervisor, because I cannot behave on my own anymore, but I 
need to do what somebody else says. I give up being a supervisor and do something totally different. This 
is an option. Second option is to say: ‘I want to continue being a supervisor, but I cannot decide anymore 
and therefore I look out for a new organization, where I can do that.’ 
 
P25: This is maybe more difficult to accept for somebody who worked in the headquarters for 20 years, 
because in the headquarters the feeling exists that this is, so to speak THE centre of […] power of the 
bank and the group. People lose this illusion relatively fast [during a takeover]. Although somebody 
might have had no decision-rights […], the […] illusion disappears that the centre of decisions is […] in 
[Austria]. For the local business, this still may be true, but not for topics related to the group. And this is 
difficult to accept. I am convinced about that. 
 
P29: And in GER Bank [the first foreign acquirer of AUT Bank] […] when ITA Bank took them over, the 
first and second hierarchical level left the organization […]. This was a problem, because they left the 
organization that quickly so that they [ITA Bank] got a supervisory problem. 
 
P36: Of course, if decisions are made in Italy […], they become intransparent for us [AUT Bank]. That is 
clear. Everything is intransparent. We only receive decisions against which we cannot resist. Also totally 
clear. Ahm. What are those things? Many employees leave the bank. Also clear. This was the same with 
every merger [including AUT Bank]. With every merger people left. The merger between AUT Bank and 
KR Bank [another Austrian Bank] resulted in a massive loss of supervisors in KR Bank. Now it is the 
same. No?! Many supervisors of AUT Bank leave, because they get good offers [from other companies]. 
No?! And because they cannot or do not want to cope with the new situation. Also is the case. This starts 
at the board of directors and affects all management levels. But this always happened. This happened in 
the past as well. No?! 
 
In view of the above, operational transformation was also strongly influenced by structural 
changes. The divisionalization created new departments or led to the dissolution of other parts 
of AUT Bank. Table 70 shows that operational transformation was accompanied by many 
negative emotions.  
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Table 70: Codes that were most frequently co-occurring with operational transformation (FC) in case 
study 02 (n = 1930 coded quotes) 
 
 
# of interview 
partners 
# of quotes co-occurring 
with operational 
transformation (FC) 
# quotes coded 
Structural transformation 10 59% 17 98 
Negative emotions (FC) 9 53% 19 88 
Resistance of acquired 
employees 8 47% 21 52 
Guidelines by acquirer 7 41% 11 55 
Integration 7 41% 9 33 
Integration management 7 41% 11 18 
Internal communication 6 35% 7 70 
Assimilation 6 35% 6 66 
Age (elder) 6 35% 12 23 
Good integration 
management 6 35% 7 21 
Identification with new 
company 5 29% 7 26 
Different national culture 4 24% 5 110 
Separation 4 24% 4 29 
Active participation in the 
transformation processes 4 24% 4 25 
Age (younger) 4 24% 4 21 
Identification with old 
company 4 24% 4 21 
 
More than half of the interview partners reported about emotions involved in this change 
process. In conjunction with operational transformation, resistance of acquired employees was 
mentioned, partly due to emerging negative emotions: 
 
P21: This is, so to speak, a denial of reality, but people tend to harbor an illusion. […] I think, this is very 
dangerous. 
  
P24: As is the case with every merger or takeover, you have 10% of people who are, in principle, against 
everything. Although nothing may change, they are against it. [laughs]. You always have 10% who make 
trouble. Of course, in such situations they are even louder and they always knew it all along […]. 
 
P29: At that time [there was] relatively strong resistance to ITA Bank from Mr. G. [former member of the 
board of directors] who still had power. […] He came with implicit requests like: ‘Get on your feet and 
resist. They are no good and they only want to change structures and such stupid things.’ Now we can 
discuss whether this is good or bad, but if the headquarter says that [the group] will be structured across 
Europe. And Austria is always different. Therefore we resisted for quite a long time, what actually 
worsened our position. 
 
P36: […] everything that smells like ‘strategy’ is decided in [city where headquarter is located]. This is 
totally clear. Absolutely clear, because they are not going to buy a bank if they do not want to have the 
say. It is clear. No?! But on the personal level it is, of course, difficult for many people in [city where 
AUT Bank is located] to cope with that. This is also a reason why many elder employees run around and 
mourn. But this is logical. This is completely clear. 
  
As rather elder people identified with their former company (see chapter 7.2.4), this was also 
the group that showed more resistance. As mentioned in the chapter on structural 
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transformation, many elder members of AUT Bank had a fixed position by contract due to 
national regulations set up in the early stages of AUT Bank.  In contrast, younger employees 
of AUT Bank saw new opportunities in working for a larger international group. Therefore it 
was easier for elder employees to resist, as they less feared losing their jobs: 
 
P20: Of course, it is more difficult for people who are, since 30 or 40 years, used to a certain working 
style […], who have the feeling, that what they have built up is not of the same importance anymore. They 
are not motivated, [but] frustrated […], not able to integrate themselves, so that they want to tackle [the 
situation]. Therefore, sooner or later, they become, to be brutally frank, disruptive elements. 
 
P21: You cannot bring back the past. […] We need to make sure that we can move and develop 
something in the future […] it is necessary that you […] can identify yourself within the group and find 
your opportunities and chances. If not, then it is better to drop it. This is my opinion. So, this is surely an 
essential aspect and more difficult for certain people. This is surely a question of mentality and personal 
attitude. How much can you cope with changes. Of course, it is easier for younger employees compared 
to elder employees. 
 
P25: Maybe there also exist problems of accepting [changes]. At least for elder employees. 
 
P31 (is 24 years old): Especially for me, because we are so large in Italy, Germany and Eastern Europe, 
I thought, the opportunity to go everywhere I want [within the group], was actually the reason why I 
started to work here [AUT Bank after the acquisition]. I think it is cool, that it is so big. If I want I can go 
to Kazakhstan or Bosnia Herzegovina or so. […] and there [in AUT Bank after the acquisition] I have the 
opportunity. 
 
P32: And there are some […] people who play that card in Austria, where they say: I don’t care what 
happens. ITA Bank shall do what it wants, I have my job and retire with 60 years. No?! 
 
Differences in national culture often led to critical incidents in this case study, which 
strengthened the resistance to change and certain forms of hybridization, e.g. the vintage 
concept of hybridization and uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge (see 
also Figure 28): 
 
P25: The final ultimate [is] the headquarter [with respect to decision-making]. Yes?! And if an Italian 
colleague […] comes to [AUT Bank] and gives the order: ‘And that is the way I want it to be done.’ This 
is an order or a working instruction or what have you. So. But [the Italian] always comes half an hour 
too late [the Italian]. So. Then these are problems of acceptance, where a colleague, here or there, can 
also say: ‘First, he is not accepting me. Second, therefore I am not respecting him. And, third, he can tell 
me what he wants, but I definitely don’t like to do that.’ Yes, logical. However, the Italian colleague does 
not care about coming half an hour later, but was surprised why everyone is already sitting [in the 
meeting] and drinking this bad coffee [laughs], which he never would drink [laughs]. Well. It is about 
small things. 
 
P36: […] these different cultural differences caused that elder employees became very frustrated, 
because this change in thinking is something you need cope with. 
 
In view of these quotes, national cultural differences were perceived as a major reason why 
working styles differed. In total, national culture differences and differences in working style 
co-occurred in 40 quotes. While many interview partners observed such differences, the 
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meaning behind certain procedures or behavior of employees of ITA Bank did not seem 
logical or reasonable, which provides evidence for uncontrolled local adaptation of 
management knowledge. In light of the presented findings, the negative effects of this form of 
hybridization were strengthened by the fact, that (1) Italian supervisors replaced Austrian 
supervisors (deck of cards concept of hybridization), who (2) introduced their way own of 
doing business (differences are explained in chapter 7.2.1.4), which was strongly shaped by 
(3) their national cultural background. Therefore the impact of the deck of cards concept on 
uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge was severe. Of course, Italian top 
managers, who replaced Austrian supervisors, introduced their way of doing business. This 
new way of leading and managing human resources was difficult to understand for many 
employees. Figure 28 provides a visual representation of uncontrolled local adaptation of 
management knowledge in this case study.  
 
Figure 27: Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge in case study 02 
 
 
The following exemplary quotes provide evidence for the existence of uncontrolled local 
adaptation of management knowledge and highlight that mainly the considerable differences 
in working style, especially the obedience to hierarchies, was not completely understood by 
employees of AUT Bank. Sometimes it was even interpreted as arrogance and lack of trust in 
AUT Bank. Nevertheless, employees of AUT Bank learned to adjust to it and cultural shock 
in the early stages of this M&A turned into cultural stretch (Fink & Holden, 2007) in later 
steps of the transformation process: 
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P26: The so-called ‘handshake quality’ to which we were used to did not work anymore. Because [in] the 
system [of ITA Bank], it was not accepted practice. If we agree [informally] on something with the 
German colleagues, it is counting. That’s it. They [employees of ITA Bank] need to knock at the doors of 
their bosses and ask whether this is even allowed. 
 
P28: And this was the difference then, because some people kept being stubborn with their own system 
[the way of doing and organizing things]. They did not understand how the other one is seeing things.  
 
P31: [Italians] look totally arrogant, only talk Italian and think they are extremely important. 
 
P36: What I recognized, but I am not sure whether this is a cultural thing or if this is typical for ITA 
Bank, the Italians are very precise in planning. For Austrians this is hard to understand. They plan in 
extraordinary detail. […] for example, we started at the beginning of the financial crisis to develop a 
three-year-plan. And everyone shook his head and said: ‘Please, why do we need NOW a three-year-
plan, when we do not even know what will happen in the next month?’ [later in the interview] And it was 
very difficult for us to find out, that we actually need to be cautious, not to pass over the boss, because he 
actually has the final say. Yes, and the second, of course, not to simply […] say: ‘Ok, I make it that way.’ 
[…] I can only say: ‘I would do it that way, but I need to ask my boss first.’ 
 
With reference to cultural transformation of ITA Bank and AUT Bank, it also has to be 
mentioned that the ‘One Culture’-Day, seems to have a less positive impact on elder 
employees. Therefore the cultural transformation efforts did not help to alleviate or avoid the 
emergence of the vintage concept of hybridization, which was identified as one of the sources 
of resistance and negative emotions. 
In conclusion, operational transformation was mainly influenced by the way the structural 
transformation took place as all interview partners reported about the introduction of a 
divisional structure. Most interviewees mentioned negative emotions with respect to 
operational transformation. Those who decided to stay with the new organization had either a 
fixed position and did not want to give up this privilege (mainly elder employees) or saw new 
opportunities in becoming a larger and more international group (mainly younger employees). 
Thus, the vintage concept of hybridization explains to a large extent the different perceptions 
of this takeover and the corresponding reactions set by individuals. Apart from that, 
uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge complicated the operational 
transformation. A major reason for the emergence of this form of hybridization are 
differences in working styles cause by different national and organizational cultures. 
Furthermore, the deck of cards concept of hybridization, i.e. the replacement of Austrian top 
managers, by Italian supervisors, considerably contributed to the development of uncontrolled 
local adaptation of management knowledge. 
 
7.2.7. 
65% of all interview partners in this case study reported about the importance of M&A 
experience. As outlined at the beginning, in 2005 AUT Bank was the result of a series of 
M&A experience: The type of experience counts 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 140 
mergers and acquisitions within Austria. This experience helped people to better cope with 
changing dominant owners. However, hardly any of the employees of AUT Bank was ever 
involved in a cross-border M&A as the target company where the acquirer was a non-
German-speaking company. The following quotes provide insights in how M&A experience 
was perceived as a facilitator: 
 
P21: As you can see, with my long career I participated in many takeovers [referring to AUT Bank’s 
M&A history] [laughs] […] Not many things can shock me anymore […]. Yes, this is a difference, I think, 
if there exists a certain routine [i.e. experience with M&As]. Yes, I think it plays an important role, […] if 
it is not the first takeover. So, this is also the experience I made and colleagues made. Those who are 
affected by a takeover the first time, simply react differently compared to those who do that for the third 
time. […] There exists more uncertainty [for the inexperienced employees]. This is the big issue with 
respect to takeovers, de facto, when you get to know about the takeover or are under threat [of being 
taken over]. No?! What is happening? What happens to me? How is it going on? How is this affecting my 
job? My environment? My tasks? My future? These are all questions, which automatically become 
relevant. That is clear. […] If you experience that the first time, as with all things of course, it is more 
dramatic or traumatic [laughs] […] compared to those who experience this the third time. You say [if you 
are experienced]: ‘Well, there is always a time after that. And it will continue the one or the other way.’  
 
P22: […] we [i.e. AUT Bank] have something to do with someone, who has rich experiences with 
integrations [i.e. transformation processes]. And there were people standing opposite each other who 
knew what they wanted. For that you need a certain robustness […]. 
 
In view of the above, negative emotions – also those triggered by forms of hybridization – 
were partly reduced. However, the fact that it was the first time that a non-German-speaking 
company was involved, alleviated the positive impact of M&A experience. Thus, certain 
types of experiences (domestic vs. cross-border acquisition) are of different relevance for 
certain M&A contexts. In case study 02, the experiences gained with domestic M&As 
contributed only slightly to the cross-border acquisition with ITA Bank. This stands in line 
with Porrini (2004), who found that experiences from on acquisition might not necessarily 
affect the transformation processes in future M&A deals. 
7.2.8. 
Many positive but also many negative issues have been raised in the interviews. According to 
Success of the M&A deal 
Table 71 more than a half of the interview partners reported about the success and failure of 
the transformation alike. However, considerably more quotes were related to success of the 
M&A. 
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Table 71: Perceived success of the M&A and the transformation process in case study 02 (n = 1930 coded 
quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
successful transformation (FC) 
ITA Bank 
(n = 2) 2 100% 7 
AUT Bank 
(n = 15) 12 80% 44 
unsuccessful transformation (FC) 
ITA Bank 
(n = 2) 2 100% 4 
AUT Bank 
(n= 15) 10 67% 25 
 
A more fine-grained analysis reveals that the two interview partners of ITA Bank see the 
M&A as a full success. They only refer to an unsuccessful transformation with respect to 
recommendations they have and outlined what could turn an acquisition into a failure: 
 
P27: Obviously […], I think it is much more painful if you don’t say immediately what you want to 
achieve. So, because the merger, again, is a, I mean if you have two heads after the merger you have one 
[after the transformation]. So one of the two is not [in this position anymore]. So this is a cost […], 
because everybody knows it, because everybody is anticipating that everybody is playing to be the one 
who will survive. [what finally harms the transformation process]. […]But I think, […] it could have been 
done better, I think it was a quite successful process, I would say. 
 
P34: So this part is, ahm, let me say, not exactly the best one, and in that moment, ahm, the mistake you 
shouldn’t do is, to overcome all, all the plus that the new bank has. So if you have a new bank with a lot 
of know-how, best practices and so on, you should be very careful in preserving those values, because 
otherwise you pay for nothing. Because if you destroy everything it does not work. So you have to adjust. 
Leaving the best practices alive. 
 
Members of AUT Bank appreciated the professionalism of ITA Bank. In addition, most 
interview partners referred to a successful cultural transformation: 
 
P21: From this point of view the collaboration and cooperation was always very, very pleasant. Until 
now everyone was very professional and very, ahm, correct in the way they [employees of ITA Bank] 
worked and what they did. Actually I cannot say anything [against that]. Thank god [laughs]. 
 
P23: I think that, in the meantime, we do have a common spirit. 
  
P32: And this ITA Bank developed from scratch, so to speak, and they do very well. […] They change 
things very quickly. Very often to the best, I would say. Actually, I would not perceive it as too critical. 
 
P33: But this was very well done from the beginning. Very professionally communicated. 
 
P35: To put it in a nutshell, everything got bigger, and we could strengthen our network and make it even 
faster and better. This was really a positive impression. 
  
For this case study a more comprehensive financial data analysis was possible and a 
comparison between both organizations was made as AUT Bank publishes its own financial 
reports in addition to the consolidated financial statements by ITA Bank. Applied industry 
benchmarks for Austria and Italy were retrieved from the OECD-database, which allowed to 
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differentiate between common industry developments and acquisition-specific changes in 
selected key ratios. Relative figures were given preference, as OECD-statistics provided only 
aggregated absolute figures and no median or mean for certain items in the balance sheet or 
the profit and loss account were available. 
In banks ‘interest income’ represents what is generally understood as ‘revenues’ in other 
organizations. Therefore ‘operating profit’ is labeled ‘net interest income’ in the profit and 
loss account of banks. Considering ITA Bank and AUT Bank, different developments of 
‘growth in net interest income’ can be observed. Since 2004, AUT Bank generates a 
considerably higher growth in net interest income than the Austrian industry (see also Figure 
29). While no significant change in growth can be observed between 2005 (year of 
acquisition) [4.21%] and 2006 [4.53%], AUT Bank reports an increase in net interest income 
of about 46% in 2007. This remarkable rise is mainly due to the fact that AUT Bank became 
responsible for those organizations in the CEE region, which had been part of ITA Bank 
before the acquisition. Therefore AUT Bank shows a considerable increase in net interest 
income as a result of the acquisition. Thus, this rise in net interest income is less due to 
improved productivity, but has been triggered by organic growth of AUT Bank. 
 
Figure 28: Growth of net inerest income of AUT Bank before and after the takeover in comparison to the 
Austrian banking industry 
 
 
In case of ITA Bank, growth in net interest income mainly followed the Italian banking 
industry and remained rather low (see also Figure 30) compared to the Austrian market. In 
2006, the first year where ITA Bank had to consolidate the financial results of AUT Bank, a 
tremendous increase in growth of net interest income of about 134% was reported. This has 
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definitely been a result of the acquisition, as the Italian banking industry showed no 
significant changes with respect to this key ratio. In 2007 the financial crisis set in and 
resulted in a downturn in financial performance for ITA Bank. Nevertheless, since the 
acquisition, ITA Bank outperforms the Italian industry. This speaks strongly in favor of a 
successful acquisition. 
 
Figure 29: Growth of net inerest income of ITA Bank before and after the takeover in comparison to the 
Italian banking industry 
 
 
A major key ratio for the efficiency of a bank is the ‘cost/income ratio’. It relates the costs 
resulting from running a business to income. Thus, a low ‘cost/income ratio’ indiciates a 
higher efficiency of a bank. With respect to ITA Bank and AUT Bank similar developments 
can be observed. Both organizations reported better ‘cost/income ratios’ in the years 2003 and 
2004 than in the years after the acquisition (see also Figure 31 and Figure 32). A major reason 
for that can be found in the large geographic expansion of ITA Bank through the acquisition 
of AUT Bank. The increase in company size of ITA Bank required more adiministration and 
transformation, which causes costs to rise. As was reported by interviewees, the assimilation 
process, i.e. standardization of the group, is not finished. Therefore the positive effects of a 
standardized structure might not have led to the expected cost efficiencies until now. 
Nevertheless, a positive development for ITA Bank can be observed as the ‘cost/income ratio’ 
improved in comparison to the Italian banking industry. In 2009, ITA Bank even performed 
slightly better than the rest of its domestic competitors. 
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Figure 30: Cost/income ratio of AUT Bank before and after the takeover in comparison to the Austrian 
banking industry 
 
 
Figure 31: Cost/income ratio of ITA Bank before and after the takeover in comparison to the Italian 
banking industry 
 
 
The available data for both organizations allowed to measure productivity by comparing staff 
costs to income. In a first step, the growth rates for staff costs were analyzed (see Figure 33 
and Figure 34). In case of AUT Bank, changes in staff costs mainly followed the Austrian 
banking industry. ITA Bank, however, reports a remarkable increase in staff costs, due to the 
acquisition. The larger group involves many more personnel, thus costs rose respectively. 
From 2007 on, this key ratio nearly adjusts to the common Italian industry standards and turns 
even negative in 2008, i.e. personnel was reduced (see Figure 34). However, this decrease in 
personnel seems to be unrelated to the acquisition, as even the Italian banking market reports 
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negative growth rates in 2008. Thus, the decline in staff costs might rather be a result of the 
financial crisis than of the acquisition. 
 
Figure 32: Growth of staff costs of AUT Bank before and after the takeover in comparison to the Austrian 
banking industry 
 
 
Figure 33: Growth of staff costs of ITA Bank before and after the takeover in comparison to the Italian 
banking industry 
 
 
Finally, a more convincing measure for productivity represents the ‘staff costs/income ratio.’ 
It relates the necessary costs for personnel to achieve a certain income level. Similar to the 
‘cost/income ratio’, a low score would indiciated a higher productivity. For AUT Bank, the 
acquisition resulted in no significant changes in this financial ratio. As can be seen from 
Figure 35, AUT Bank’s ‘staff costs/income ratio’ lies considerably above the Austrian 
banking industry benchmark, but the scores for AUT Bank mainly follow the developments of 
domestic market. 
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Figure 34: Staff costs/income ratio of AUT Bank before and after the takeover in comparison to the 
Austrian banking industry 
 
 
Different results are found for the acquiring bank (see Figure 36). While ITA Bank’s ‘staff 
costs/income ratio’ was considerably higher than the Italian industry benchmark before the 
acquisition, it dropped remarkably after the acquisition to the Italian market standard. 
Although most banks in Italy could improve this key ratio since 2004, it becomes obvious that 
ITA Bank became more productive than before the acquisition. Thus, in terms of ‘staff costs 
to income’ the acquisition was successful and helped ITA Bank to improve its productivity. 
 
Figure 35:  Staff costs/income ratio of ITA Bank before and after the takeover in comparison to the Italian 
banking industry 
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In light of the conducted financial data analysis, the acquisition had more positive effects for 
the new group than for AUT Bank alone. ITA Bank could improve efficiency (cost/income 
ratio) and productivity (staff costs/income ratio). These findings support the perceptions of 
interview partners who more frequently referred to a success of this acquisition than to a 
failure.  
7.2.9. 
To sum up, ITA Bank acquired AUT Bank because of its strong presence in CEE and its 
position as one of the market leaders in Austria. Mainly national culture differences 
influenced the transformation process, especially the cultural transformation. With respect to 
structures, ITA Bank aimed at standardization of all subsidiaries, which finally resulted in the 
assimilation of structures of AUT Bank. A matrix organization was implemented which 
differs considerably from the old structure of AUT Bank. This had a severe impact on the 
operational transformation as many employees lost their responsibilities, especially those who 
where involved in international banking strategies in AUT Bank. In order to integrate the new 
members into ITA Group, the ‘One Culture’ Day was introduced. This event aims at 
discussing organizational values. While at the beginning this integrative management tool was 
perceived as ridiculous, many people changed their mind to the positive, at least slightly, later 
on. The transformation process itself resulted in many negative emotions due to ITA Bank’s 
perception of doing business. 
Summary of case study 02: A cross-border M&A is not like a domestic M&A 
Figure 37 visually summarizes the second case study. As can be seen, AUT Bank was 
completely assimilated to ITA Bank. While the cultural assimilation has yet not led to a 
common and collective organizational culture across the group, a clear trend into this 
direction is observable. 
  
Figure 36: Summary of case study 02 – Results of assimilating AUT Bank 
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With respect to hybridization, the vintage concept of hybridization, the deck of cards concept 
of hybridization, uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge and boundary 
spanning were stressed by interview partners. 
The vintage concept of hybridization was mainly driven by the fact that elder employees had 
fixed jobs by contract. Thus, they could resist without having to fear losing their jobs. In 
addition, the replacement of top and middle managers and the concomitant loss of 
responsibilities/power indirectly contributed to the emergence of this form of hybridization. 
Such replacements also caused the deck of cards concept and uncontrolled local adaptation of 
management knowledge, because Italian managers introduced their way of doing business, 
which remarkably deviated from the Austrian working style and initially was hardly 
understood by employees of AUT Bank. Moreover, the deck of cards concept emerged, 
because certain departments of AUT Bank were mainly related to the national market and 
required knowledge about the national language of Austria, i.e. German. Such organizational 
units are retail banking and departments that are related to national banking regulations and 
norms. Some interview partners referred to boundary spanning and its positive effects on 
communication throughout the transformation process. It helped to overcome language 
barriers as not all employees were familiar with the standardized group language, i.e. English. 
According to the interview partners and the financial data analysis, the acquisition was rather 
successful than unsuccessful. However, the positive results for the financial key ratios are 
mainly driven by economies of scale than by a proper transformation process, e.g. cost-cutting 
through personnel reduction, etc. 
7.3. Case study 03: Assimilation, separation and marginalization in a hostile 
takeover 
In case study three, some employees of WAT Engineering decided to leave the organization 
during or after the transformation process and opened up their own business. Thus, it was 
possible to conduct interviews with (1) former employees of WAT engineering who stayed 
with the organization, (2) former employees of WAT Engineering who left the organization 
and (3) employees of SMS Group Austria. 
7.3.1. 
Most often, differences in organizational culture were reported in this case study, which 
became manifest in observed differences in working style. With respect to company size (see 
also chapter 
Organizational differences: Domestic giant vs. small internationalized 
7.3.1.3) SMS Group Austria was perceived as a large organization, which 
dominated the Austrian market. The strategy of SMS Group is to set up subsidiaries, which 
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are mainly responsible for the local market, plus some neighbor countries. Thus, SMS Group 
Austria’s main activities concentrate on the Austrian market and some CEE countries, like 
Rumania and Bulgaria. In contrast, WAT Engineering was considerably smaller, but had more 
activities abroad. About 90% of WAT Engineering’s business consisted of export and can be 
seen as a major competitor of SMS Group on the global market. Finally, it has to be 
mentioned that WAT Engineering was a headquarter by itself and SMS Group Austria a 
subsidiary. Thus, the latter were used to be under control of their German headquarter. Table 
72 shows the most frequently mentioned organizational differences in this case study. 
 
Table 72: Major organizational differences as reported by interview partners (n = 19) of case study 03 (n = 
1942 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # of quotes 
Different organizational culture 17 89% 72 
Different working style 16 84% 99 
Company size (FC) 15 79% 59 
Different structure 15 79% 47 
Different markets 10 53% 25 
Different behavior 9 47% 20 
Different strategy 8 42% 11 
Different national culture 5 26% 19 
 
Organizational culture differences were often mentioned in conjunction with different 
structure, different working style and different behavior (Table 73). In particular, different 
working style was mentioned in conjunction with many organizational differences. The co-
occurrence analysis reveals that differences in working style are strongly related to structural 
differences. In comparison to the other two case studies, interviewees of the third case study 
reported most often about differences in working style (see also chapter 7.3.1.4 for a detailed 
discussion). The described opposing strategies of SMS Group Austria and WAT Engineering 
were related to all reported organizational differences, except cultural differences. 
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Table 73: Co-Occurrence analysis for organizational differences between SMS Group Austria and WAT 
Engineering (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
 
different 
organizational 
culture 
different 
national 
culture 
different 
strategy 
different 
structure 
different 
working 
style/ 
processes 
different 
organizational 
culture 
Pearson Correlation 1 .008 -.015 .058* .116** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .719 .514 .011 .000 
different national 
culture 
Pearson Correlation .008 1 -.008 -.016 .096** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .719   .741 .491 .000 
different strategy Pearson Correlation -.015 -.008 1 .122** .076** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .514 .741   .000 .001 
different 
structure 
Pearson Correlation .058* -.016 .122** 1 .222** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .491 .000   .000 
different working 
style 
Pearson Correlation .116** .096** .076** .222** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .001 .000   
different 
behavior 
Pearson Correlation .196** .042 .060** -.016 .115** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .066 .008 .479 .000 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Although national culture differences were mentioned by five interview partners, these 
differences did not play a role in the transformation process. As mentioned above, WAT 
Engineering operated internationally and most individuals reported about national culture 
differences when referring to former acquisitions of WAT Engineering, e.g. in Latin America. 
As they are of minor importance for this case study, the discussion will focus rather on 
organizational culture, which represents the most frequently mentioned difference. 
7.3.1.1. Different organizational culture: Family vs. lonely fighter 
WAT Engineering was described as a family business, where people strongly identified with 
their job, projects and the organization as a whole. The difference in organizational culture 
was mainly described by differences in working style:  
 
P40: It is a huge culture difference. These are simply two different organizations with different histories 
and the culture of an organization is something you should never underestimate. […] there clashed two 
worlds. 
 
P41: […] some people did not greet. This I could not understand. Maybe this was also due to their [SMS 
Group Austria] mentality. No?! SMS Group Austria had a different mentality compared to WAT 
Engineering and when you brought together these people, then everyone brought his own mentality with 
him/her. 
 
P42: There [in SMS Group Austria] were all the doors shut. Everyone was sitting in his small room und 
you never saw anyone outside. In front, there was also a small room. There you got smoked if you stayed 
five minutes inside [because it was the smoking room]. So, there was not really a place were you could 
meet. Our people [WAT Engineering] were quite shocked. In WAT Engineering we had in the corridor 
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high desks. There was a coffee machine. If somebody made a short break he went outside […] or 
discussed open points [after a meeting]. 
 
P45: […] we [employees of WAT Engineering] met another world. This I need to say. Many others and I 
felt that WAT Engineering was a family. We all stuck together and we tried to do our best in order to 
realize and finish collectively projects. And to do that together. I personally experienced in SMS Group 
Austria that there are many lonely fighters. And I missed the collectivity […] that there is a collective 
goal, which should be reached. This was for me pretty difficult [to cope with]. 
 
P49: WAT Engineering was very family-like within the departments. You know the name of the wife, you 
know the name of the kids [of colleagues]. Maybe you are doing something together privately. […] there 
was a more family-like relationship and here [in SMS Group Austria] it was: Yes, this is [just] a 
colleague. You go for a coffee with him. You meet him at lunch or so. But you did not knew about his 
environment […]. This did not exist. 
 
In view of the above, it can be concluded that these differences were mainly perceived as 
negative. The fact that this acquisition was seen as a hostile takeover, strengthened the 
negative attitudes and made differences in organizational culture even more dramatic. 
Consequently, achieving a successful transformation was much more difficult: 
 
P39: We had been competitors before. Suddenly we are comrade-in-arms. Allies under the same roof. 
This was surely also very difficult. […]it was rather a hostile takeover, because they tried to eliminate a 
competitor. 
 
P40: This was not a desired takeover from our side and therefore it was hard from the outset. 
 
P49: It was a hostile takeover.  
 
In conclusion, organizational culture differences had mostly a negative impact on the 
transformation process. Members of WAT Engineering clearly outline that SMS Group 
Austria’s organizational culture turned many things to the worse. This perception does not 
only hold for organizational culture, but also for all other reported organizational differences. 
This acquisition was most considerably perceived as negative compared to the other two case 
studies. 
7.3.1.2. Different strategy: Internationalized vs. domestic 
SMS Group Austria and WAT Engineering strongly differed with respect to strategy. WAT 
Engineering was strongly involved in export, while SMS Group Austria mainly focused on 
the Austrian market. 
 
P40: Our WAT Engineering business was an international business, based in Austria. In comparison to 
that, SMS Group Austria is actually an Austrian company with Austrian sales responsibilities. 
 
P51: […] they [SMS Group Austria] only operate in Austria. They had two or three export projects and 
we had 90% export. Our total volume was export-oriented and they [SMS Group Austria] had absolutely 
few experience how to handle contracts of authorized signatory. 
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One of the interview partners gave a short introduction into the diverse strategies in their 
industry. As this was done after the interview, only field notes were taken. 
WAT Engineering ran turn-key projects, i.e. they engineered complete machines and installed 
it were the buyer needed it. They tailored the product to their customers. As WAT 
Engineering did not produce all components themselves, they had several suppliers. SMS 
Group Austria, however, was mainly involved in engineering components that can be 
standardized and supplied to other organizations. Consequently, both organizations set up 
different structures as different processes are necessary in order to realize their strategies (see 
also Table 73). While WAT Engineering needed to know how the components fit together, 
employees of SMS Group Austria were rather focusing on the engineering of certain parts of a 
machine. Quotes that are partly related to this issue are provided below: 
 
P46: Maybe my perspective is a different one regarding this takeover. Because if you consider that most 
people came from WAT Engineering in this case [in this department] and Engineering or Technique-
Engineering [departments/tasks in WAT Engineering] never were an issue at this location [in the city 
were SMS Group Austria is located], thus we took over SMS Group Austria in this respect. […] But on 
the international level and in particular the market that we had, this is the CEE region, ahm, there existed 
almost nothing [in SMS Group Austria]. They had some projects […], but not of such a size that you 
would talk about turn-key-jobs. 
 
P48: […] the companies are fundamentally different. Because WAT Engineering was basically organized 
in projects und SMS Group Austria is a large group which has a lot to do with products and standardized 
solutions. […] and projects hardly fit into their [SMS Group Austria] processes. This implies that 
projects which have different requirements, are forced into the structures [of SMS Group Austria]. 
 
P53: And in Europe it was almost only WAT Engineering which provided so-called turn-key-projects 
[…]. So WAT Engineering was at that point the only provider. This meant that WAT Engineering was a 
relatively strong competitor for SMS Group Austria, in particular in Germany. 
 
In conclusion, the difference in business approach was an important factor and considerably 
affected the way how working processes and structures were designed. The differences can be 
summarized as: Domestic standardization (SMS Group Austria) vs. international 
specialization (WAT Engineering).  
7.3.1.3. Different structure: Stronger hierarchy and more bureaucracy 
Members of WAT Engineering and partly of SMS Group Austria reported that the acquirer 
was much larger and therefore had a more bureaucratic structure, i.e. a strong hierarchy. In 
contrast WAT Engineering had a more flat structure, which allowed the individual employee 
to work with more responsibilities, thus, more freedom: 
 
P42: This was completely different in SMS Group Austria. It is more bureaucratic. This is also due to the 
larger organizational structure. Of course it is not that easy as it was for WAT Engineering, where it was 
a bit more flat [the hierarchy]. But it is harder to work, because the bureaucracy is not becoming less 
[…]. There is a lot of paperwork. 
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P55: It takes time until information of SMS Group Austria, from the top level, leaks, because there exist 
certain paths. In WAT Engineering this was done quite quickly. 
 
Employees of WAT Engineering showed a negative attitude towards these structural changes. 
Some acquired employees even mentioned that members of SMS Group Austria are like civil 
servants: Obeying to rules, doing only what is told, and showing less motivation. These are 
typical characteristics for instrumental identity: 
 
P39 [member of SMS Group Austria]: SMS Group Austria is large, […] not the THE most dynamic or 
THE most modern company. 
 
P42: And the people working there, yes, you somehow become a civil servant, because you cannot change 
the system. […] And people accept that […]. 
 
P51: People  from SMS Group Austria are like civil servants. They come at eight [o’clock] and leave at 
four. […] they lay down the pencil and go. This was something that was unusual for us. 
 
Finally, differences in structure were also related to differences in strategy. As outlined above, 
the strategic approach of WAT Engineering and SMS Group Austria were to some extent 
related, but not comparable. In line with the generic model of organizational culture, 
structures need to stand in line with the selected strategy and vice versa. Consequently a 
standardization strategy may require a completely different structure, which also requires a 
certain company size to be profitable. Findings summarized in Table 73 empirically support 
this assumption for case study 03. The following exemplary quote provides more details on 
this issue: 
 
P52: […] they had different methods, how they approach things. They said: ‘This is how it is structured 
in the house of SMS Group Austria.’ And what happens there is slowing us both down. […] but why 
should you change something that […] worked for a hundred billion [years]? 
 
7.3.1.4. Different working style: Fast vs. slow  
All the aforementioned differences resulted in differences in working style (see also Table 
73). A more detailed overview of reported differences in, or major factors affecting working 
behavior are listed in Table 74.  
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Table 74: Reported differences between SMS Group Austria and WAT Engineering 
SMS Group Austria WAT Engineering 
observed by 
acquirer observed by acquired observed by acquirer 
observed by 
acquired 
• more general 
knowledge 
• more 
independence 
• more 
bureaucracy 
• less flexible 
• slow processes 
• strong hierarchy 
• prefer working on their 
own 
• less contact to others 
• are not greeting 
• obey to structures 
• strictly following the 
working hours 
• being at the building site 
• different remuneration for 
traveling abroad 
• operated in exotic 
countries 
• no sense for the overall 
picture 
• small working packages 
• different project 
processes 
• friendly 
treatment of 
colleagues 
• traveling to 
the building 
sites 
• collective 
spirit 
 
Most quotes related to differences in working style can be found in the second and third case 
study (Table 75). In case study 02, national culture differences can be blamed for the 
considerable higher number of quotes. Case study 03, however, represents a domestic merger 
 
Table 75: Number of quotes related to differences in workings style/processes for case study 01 (n = 19 
interviewees), case study 02 (n = 17 interviewees) and case study 03 (n = 19 interviewees)  
 # of quotes 
case study 01 case study 02 case study 03 
differences in working style 
77 
(84% of 
interviewees) 
97 
(84% of 
interviewees) 
99 
(84% of 
interviewees) 
 
Individuals in case study 03 reported more often about differences in working style than 
interviewees in case study 01, because in case study 03 nearly twice as many individuals 
perceived the M&A deal as a hostile takeover (see also Table 76). The hostility in case study 
03 did not only negatively affect the perception of organizational differences, but also the 
whole transformation process. In the following chapters this will be outlined in more detail. 
 
Table 76: Perception of a hostile takeover in case study 01 (n = 19 interviewees), case study 02 (n = 17 
interviewees) and case study 03 (n = 19 interviewees) 
 # of quotes 
case study 01 case study 02 case study 03 
hostile takeover 
5 
(21% of 
interviewees) 
1 
(6% of 
interviewees) 
12 
(37% of 
interviewees) 
 
In conclusion, fundamental organizational differences existed between WAT Engineering and 
SMS Group Austria. Therefore, the first condition for the emergence of hybridization is met. 
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7.3.2. 
As can be seen from 
Acculturation strategy: Assimilation, separation and marginalization 
Table 77, the transformation processes was mainly shaped by 
assimilation and separation. However the qualitative content analysis reveals that assmilation 
shared several characteristics of marginalization. Cultural transformation was only few times 
mentioned. Operational and structural transformation were the main issues reported by 
interview partners. 
 
Table 77: Facets of transformation and acculturation strategy as reported by interview partners (n = 17) 
of case study 03 (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # of quotes 
Operational 
transformation 18 89% 69 
Structural 
transformation 18 89% 60 
Assimilation 13 68% 36 
Separation 13 68% 28 
Integration 9 47% 15 
Cultural transformation 7 37% 33 
Marginalization 3 16% 5 
 
Table 78 provides the co-occurrence ratios for acculturation strategies and facets of 
transformation, thus show how these factors related to each other. Operational and structural 
transformation consisted of integration, assimilation and separation. In contrast, cultural 
transformation was most frequently referred to as assimilation, i.e. adjustment towards SMS 
Group Austria. A more detailed discussion on the consequences of these acculturation 
strategies follows in the respective chapters below and highlights how marginalization 
unfolded in this case study, although it did not turn significant in the co-occurrence analysis. 
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Table 78: Co-Occurrence ratios for acculturation strategy and facets of transformation in case study 03 (n 
= 1942 coded quotes) 
 cultural 
transformation 
structural 
transformation 
operational 
transformation 
integration Pearson Correlation -.012 .052* .142** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .609 .021 .000 
assimilation Pearson Correlation .071** .196** .056* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .000 .013 
separation Pearson Correlation -.016 .153** .187** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .484 .000 .000 
marginalization Pearson Correlation -.007 -.009 -.010 
Sig. (2-tailed) .769 .690 .668 
cultural 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation 1 .000 -.025 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .984 .266 
structural 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation .000 1 .046* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .984   .042 
operational 
transformation 
Pearson Correlation -.025 .046* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .266 .042   
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
7.3.3. 
In view of the above, also for the third case study, both conditions for the development of 
hybridization are fulfilled, i.e. organizational differences existed and were blended throughout 
the transformation process. 
Forms of hybridization identified in case study 03 
Figure 38 provides an overview of these differences and the 
applied acculturation strategies to unify SMS Group Austria and WAT Engineering. 
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Figure 37: Visual summary of organizational differences between SMS Group Austria and WAT 
Engineering 
 
 
Tables 78 to 81 provide the number of quotes related to family codes for different forms of 
hybridization. As can be seen many quotes are related to the vintage concept of hybridization 
and uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge (in particular in comparison to 
the number of total quotes across all case studies). A moderate number of quotes is related to 
the deck of cards concept of hybridization. Finally, very few references were made to 
boundary spanning by interview partners in case study 03. 
The results of the co-occurrence analysis for different forms of hybridization are shown in 
Tables 82 to 85. Findings clearly suggest the emergence of the vintage concept of 
hybridization throughout the transformation process. Rather few codes are co-occurring in the 
set of codes related to the deck of cards concept of hybridization and uncontrolled local 
adaptation of management knowledge. The latter form of hybridization shows only significant 
co-occurrences with three codes: ‘lack of understanding’, ‘goals of the M&A/changes are not 
communicated’ and ‘future perspectives not communicated’. Finally, the results for boundary 
spanning (see Table 86) refer only to organizational differences and less to boundary spanning 
activities. Thus, only the qualitative content analysis will clarify whether this form of 
hybridization emerged. The following chapters will discuss the cultural, structural and 
operational transformation process and will explore the mechanisms and consequences of 
hybridization identified in this M&A deal. 
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Table 79: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing the vintage concept of hybridization in case study 03 (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
  Case study 03   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in% TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes* 
Vintage concept of 
hybridization (FC) 
Identification with old organization 28 33% 86 29 
Age (elder) 26 43% 60 20 
Adjustment problems 31 53% 58 19 
Identification with new organization 11 22% 50 17 
Age (younger) 14 29% 49 16 
No identification with the acquiring company 18 62% 29 10 
No adjustment problems 12 57% 21 7 
Acceptance 6 40% 15 5 
Age 4 57% 7 2 
No identification with old company 0 0% 7 2 
No acceptance 2 40% 5 2 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
 
Table 80: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing the deck of cards concept of hybridization in case study 03 (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
  Case study 03   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in% TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes* 
Deck of cards concept of 
hybridization (FC) 
Departments/individuals are differently affected by the M&A 57 32% 177 59 
Stepwise transformation 4 8% 48 16 
Replacement of supervisors 11 26% 43 14 
Replacement of owners 0 0% 15 5 
Replacement of personnel 1 100% 1 0 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
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Table 81: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing the uncontrolled local adaptation of management in case study 03 (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
  Case study 03   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in% TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes* 
Uncontrolled local 
adaptation of management 
knowledge (FC) 
Guidelines by acquirer 18 19% 96 32 
Poor communication 9 26% 35 12 
Communication problems 0 0% 28 9 
Lack of understanding 10 38% 26 9 
No/few communication/information 6 26% 23 8 
Misunderstandings 2 9% 22 7 
No transparency 1 5% 19 6 
Goals of the M&A/changes are not communicated 6 75% 8 3 
Future perspectives not communicated 6 86% 7 2 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
 
Table 82: Number of quotes related to the set of codes representing boundary spanning through informal networks in case study 03 (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
  Case study 03   
 Codes representing this form of hybridization # of quotes in % TOTAL QUOTES MEAN # of quotes 
Boundary spanning 
through informal networks 
(FC) 
Strong hierarchy 35 21% 165 55 
Operational inertia 5 10% 50 17 
Cooperativeness 5 42% 12 4 
Long communication channels 1 20% 5 2 
Networks 0 0% 5 2 
Boundary spanning 0 0% 4 1 
Creating new networks 2 67% 3 1 
Strong internal networking due to business activities 0 0% 2 1 
Circumvent/adjust systems 0 0% 2 1 
Power networks 0 0% 1 0 
* … represents the mean # of quotes across all three case studies 
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Table 83: Co-Occurrence analysis: Vintage concept of hybridization in case study 03 (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
 
identification 
with old 
organization 
age 
(elder) 
adjustment 
problems 
identification 
with new 
organization 
age 
(younger) 
no 
identification 
with acquired 
organization 
no 
adjustment 
problems 
acceptance age 
identification with old 
organization 
Pearson Correlation 1 .023 .054* .048* -.010 .078** -.010 -.007 -.005 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .301 .018 .033 .650 .001 .674 .767 .809 
age (elder) Pearson Correlation .023 1 .164** -.009 .149** .082** .048* -.006 -.005 
Sig. (2-tailed) .301   .000 .699 .000 .000 .034 .775 .816 
adjustment problems Pearson Correlation .054* .164** 1 -.010 .038 .031 .042 -.007 -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .018 .000   .672 .097 .178 .062 .755 .799 
identification with new 
organization 
Pearson Correlation .048* -.009 -.010 1 -.006 -.007 -.006 -.004 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .033 .699 .672   .777 .748 .793 .853 .880 
age (younger) Pearson Correlation -.010 .149** .038 -.006 1 -.008 .149** -.005 -.004 
Sig. (2-tailed) .650 .000 .097 .777   .717 .000 .835 .865 
no identification with 
acquired organization 
Pearson Correlation .078** .082** .031 -.007 -.008 1 -.008 -.005 -.004 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .178 .748 .717   .737 .813 .847 
no adjustment problems Pearson Correlation -.010 .048* .042 -.006 .149** -.008 1 -.004 -.004 
Sig. (2-tailed) .674 .034 .062 .793 .000 .737   .847 .875 
acceptance Pearson Correlation -.007 -.006 -.007 -.004 -.005 -.005 -.004 1 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .767 .775 .755 .853 .835 .813 .847   .911 
age Pearson Correlation -.005 -.005 -.006 -.003 -.004 -.004 -.004 -.003 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .809 .816 .799 .880 .865 .847 .875 .911   
no acceptance Pearson Correlation -.004 -.004 .124** -.002 -.003 -.003 -.003 -.002 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .864 .869 .000 .915 .904 .891 .911 .937 .949 
*. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 84: Co-Occurrence analysis: Deck of cards concept of hybridization in case study 03 (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
 
departments/individuals 
are differently affected 
by the M&A 
stepwise 
transformation 
replacement 
of 
supervisors 
departments/individuals are 
differently affected by the 
M&A 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .059** -.013 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .009 .563 
stepwise transformation Pearson 
Correlation 
.059** 1 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .009   .880 
replacement of supervisors Pearson 
Correlation 
-.013 -.003 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .563 .880   
replacement of personnel Pearson 
Correlation 
-.004 -.001 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .862 .964 .940 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 85: Co-Occurrence analysis: Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge in case study 03 (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
 guidelines by acquirer 
poor 
communication 
lack of 
understanding 
no/few 
communication/ 
information 
mis-
understandings 
no 
transparency 
goals of the 
M&A/changes are 
not communicated 
guidelines by acquirer Pearson Correlation 1 -.007 -.007 -.005 -.003 -.002 -.005 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .771 .759 .813 .891 .923 .813 
poor communication Pearson Correlation -.007 1 -.005 -.004 -.002 -.002 -.004 
Sig. (2-tailed) .771   .829 .867 .923 .946 .867 
lack of understanding Pearson Correlation -.007 -.005 1 -.004 -.002 -.002 .126** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .759 .829   .860 .919 .943 .000 
no/few 
communication/information 
Pearson Correlation -.005 -.004 -.004 1 -.002 -.001 -.003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .813 .867 .860   .937 .956 .891 
misunderstandings Pearson Correlation -.003 -.002 -.002 -.002 1 -.001 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .891 .923 .919 .937   .974 .937 
no transparency Pearson Correlation -.002 -.002 -.002 -.001 -.001 1 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .923 .946 .943 .956 .974   .956 
goals of the M&A/changes 
are not communicated 
Pearson Correlation -.005 -.004 .126** -.003 -.002 -.001 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .813 .867 .000 .891 .937 .956   
future perspectives not 
communicated 
Pearson Correlation -.005 -.004 -.004 -.003 -.002 -.001 .164** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .813 .867 .860 .891 .937 .956 .000 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 86: Co-Occurrence analysis: Boundary spanning in case study 03 (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
 strong hierarchy 
operational 
inertia cooperativeness 
long 
communication 
channels 
strong hierarchy Pearson Correlation 1 .222** -.007 .168** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .762 .000 
operational inertia Pearson Correlation .222** 1 -.003 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .909 .959 
cooperativeness Pearson Correlation -.007 -.003 1 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .762 .909   .959 
long 
communication 
channels 
Pearson Correlation .168** -.001 -.001 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .959 .959   
creating new 
networks 
Pearson Correlation -.004 -.002 -.002 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .848 .943 .943 .974 
**. Co-Occurrence is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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7.3.4. 
Due to company size, different historical background and business strategy, many 
organizational culture differences existed between WAT Engineering and SMS Group 
Austria. The transformation process was overshadowed by a fundamental negative attitude of 
WAT employees towards the acquisition. This was largely due to the fact that both 
organizations were fierce competitors before the acquisition. In particular on the international 
market, WAT Engineering and SMS Group were rivals. Thus, the harmonization of cultures 
was even more difficult. One of the interviewers summarized this mixture of factors that 
finally led to the assimilation of organizational cultures: 
Cultural transformation: Two incompatible worlds clash 
 
P40: So, if you make a takeover today and you are not considering the culture of a company and you do 
not try to understand it and simply put the culture of the owner over the other, then it will not work out. 
Or work out badly. The question is: ‘Can it be done differently?’ If you come to SMS Group Austria and 
say: ‘I change my culture because of WAT Engineering.’ This will work neither. And finally they [SMS 
Group Austria] are the buyer and can dictate. On the other hand, of course there is potential and 
capacity, if you want to maintain it [the culture], then you need to think about culture. This was maybe 
underestimated. This was surely underestimated that WAT Engineering had a completely different culture 
compared to SMS Group Austria. SMS Group Austria is very centralized [led] from Germany [i.e. from 
the headquarters of SMS Group Austria]. There exists very little individualism in SMS Group Austria. At 
least as much as I experienced in the short time, there is a strong hierarchy. Decisions are made top-
down. In WAT Engineering it was usual and welcome that each employee, even on the lowest level, can 
express his opinion. That you can bring forward critique for debate. So, it was rather a communicative 
discussion about certain decisions, which is not always optimal, because if every decision of the 
management is criticized and discussed and is not put into action, this is not optimal. But, these have 
been the cultures [WAT Engineering and SMS Group Austria], actually two worlds clashed and, finally, 
the culture of WAT Engineering drew the short straw. And this is of course, also for employees who 
worked 20, 30 years in this culture [of WAT Engineering], to accept this will take some years, or may 
never will happen. But that is the way it is. 
 
None of the interview partners referred to measures taken by SMS Group Austria to culturally 
unify people. According to P40, especially elder employees had problems to adjust to the new 
situation and provides first evidence for the vintage concept of hybridization. However, there 
were social activities and events, organized by the acquirer, which should have helped to ease 
the operational transformation (see also chapter 7.3.6). Considerably more quotes were related 
to organizational culture differences (79) than to cultural transformation (33). One of the 
interview partners concluded: 
 
P48:  They only analyzed numbers and the market, but the organizational culture is not considered at all. 
On the other hand, I am not sure whether I would consider it. […] Maybe you should consider it in a 
merger […], because then the integration [i.e. transformation] process will most likely be different. It 
would be easier. 
 
Since it was perceived as a hostile takeover, loaded with negative emotions and a lack of 
cultural integration, it can be expected that the identification with the old organization was 
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much higher than with the new one. As can be seen from Table 87, 70% of all former 
employees of WAT Engineering identified rather with their former organization. One of these 
7 individuals left the company before the takeover, one is still working for SMS Group 
Austria and the other 5 people left during the transformation process and now work together 
in a new organization. 
 
Table 87: Number of quotes related to identification with new and old organization sorted by pre-M&A 
organizational membership (n = 19 coded quotes) 
  # of interview partners # of quotes 
identification with new 
organization 
SMS International Austria 
(n = 9) 
3 
(33%) 4 
WAT Engineering 
(n = 10) 
3 
(33%) 7 
identification with old 
organization 
SMS International Austria 
(n = 9) 
3 
(33%) 12 
WAT Engineering 
(n = 10) 
7 
(70%) 16 
 
The following exemplary quotes provide some details on the identification with the new and 
old organization and consequences related to that: 
 
P39: They came into [SMS Group Austria]. Many had a WAT Engineering sign with them. Logos, really 
huge paperweights and many of them had them on their tables in order to show that they are proud that 
they had been a member of WAT Engineering. There was a certain pride. A huge Austrian company. 
 
P55: And now there was something which is deadly, in retrospect. In the role where you get acquired you 
are proud of being strange [compared to the acquirer]. Therefore you are not motivated to change this 
[…] This has a certain elite-thinking. Well, it is nice to be different from others. As long as you are better. 
No?! You also believe that you are better if you are different. It is a little bit an adolescent behavior. But 
you always find this human characteristics in business. 
 
In conclusion, the cultural transformation was not successful as some people still are not 
feeling part of SMS Group Austria and only developed an instrumental identity: 
 
P38: There are people who completely adjust and stay with the company. There are people who are not 
willing to adjust and leave the company. And there is a third category, these are the worst, who do not 
adjust but stay with the organization. 
 
P40: As far as I am informed it is still not finished [the operational transformation]. But there is hardly 
anyone still there [from WAT Engineering in SMS Group Austria]. But those who stayed are still the 
outsiders. 
 
P41: Actually, the wrong people resigned. The elder employees remained in the organization. Probably 
this may sound brutal and inconsiderate: Elder employees stayed, because they were less productive […] 
and it was difficult for them to find another job. The younger employees […] left the organization. 
 
P50: To those employees of WAT Engineering to whom we still have contact, are still not integrated […]. 
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The presented quotes provide clear evidence for the existence of the vintage concept of 
hybridization. Figure 39 shows how this form of hybridization unfolded in case study 03 and 
shows that the major consequences were (1) resistance by employees of both sides, and (2) 
instrumental identity. These effects were strongly influenced by bad job alternatives for elder 
employees. As these negative effects had a severe impact on the operational transformation, 
more details and representative quotes are provided in chapter 7.2.6. 
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Figure 38: Vintage concept of hybridization case study 03 
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7.3.5. 
Due to the fact that WAT Engineering was considerably smaller, the organizational structure 
of SMS Group Austria was predominant. Thus, structural transformation was mainly driven 
by assimilation and marginalization. In line with 
Structural transformation: Cut in pieces to make it fit 
Table 88, this included elimination of 
dualities, pooling departments together – also spatially – and introducing work flows and IT-
systems that existed in SMS Group Austria. 
 
Table 88: Most frequently assigned codes related to structural transformation in case study 02 (n = 1942 
coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
Different workings style/processes 16 84% 99 
Different structure 15 79% 47 
Duality 14 74% 35 
Company size of acquirer 14 74% 28 
Company size of acquired 13 68% 36 
Spatial changes 12 63% 39 
Strong hierarchy 11 58% 35 
Spatial distance 6 32% 6 
Support units 4 21% 13 
Additional work load 4 21% 7 
Operational inertia 4 21% 5 
 
The following quotes describe the situation in more detail: 
 
P37: Even the systems that were better than the system which newly came from SMS Group Austria, 
people saw: No chance [that our system will survive]. SMS Group Austria says that it wants a unified 
system, although [the other] system is […]admittedly better, which came from WAT Engineering. [But] it 
was not compatible with the international system of SMS Group Austria and therefore there was no 
chance [that the system of WAT Engineering could be adopted]. 
  
P47: If the whole thing is so much smaller and WAT Engineering represented 5% of SMS Group or less 
than 5% of SMS Group, then you need not fool yourself in order to know what will happen. Then the 
small company is sorted into the larger one. And this categorization is not consistent, because they are 
organized differently [i.e. it was not totally clear which organizational unit in WAT Engineering belongs 
to which organizational unit in SMS Group Austria]. This means, you had to separate a lot of topics into 
single pieces and these single pieces were correctly sorted [into the acquiring organization]. And there 
[in the acquiring organization] is a different structure […] The case of WAT Engineering was the worst 
possible for the affected employees. They are acquired by someone, who is that huge, that WAT 
Engineering is cut into pieces and becomes part of another organization and loses, as a whole, its identity 
and also its parts. 
 
P40: WAT Engineering […] was cut into pieces and was assigned to small units somewhere […] in SMS 
Group. And […] WAT Engineering does not exist anymore in SMS Group Austria. This [WAT 
Engineering] is not a company which is a subsidiary of SMS Group, which still operates, but now is 
called SMS Group Austria […] but was cut into pieces and many small units were integrated [i.e. 
assimilated] into SMS Group. 
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According to the interview partners, the structural transformation represented a mixture of 
assimilation and marginalization, i.e. WAT Engineering completely ‘disappeared’ within 
SMS Group Austria as organizational units were either adjusted to the common structure, or 
eliminated. However, there was also separation mentioned in relation to structural 
transformation (see also Table 78). The reasons for that can be found in former WAT 
Engineering customer projects, which were still running at the time of the transformation. As 
it was not possible to close these projects immediately, certain structures continued to exist 
for the life of a project. Thus, the structural transformation did not affect all individuals alike. 
Those who were involved in such customer projects continued to work together with their 
former colleagues and used the same working tools as before: 
 
P39:  They [WAT Engineering] worked there [in SMS Group Austria] but with different systems. So, 
everyone had his own system, his own SAP system. Everyone had a different billing system. Everyone 
used the old names to make out an invoice, this is SMS Group Austria and WAT Engineering. That is the 
way it happened. 
  
P41: There existed parallel worlds. […] A lot of money was lost due to this inefficiency. SAP system. For 
a certain period of time there existed parallel SAP systems. Because the purchasing department […] of 
WAT Engineering had its own system, SMS Group Austria had its own system and both were not ready to 
talk to each other in order to find a solution. Of course, you could not use the old SMS Group Austria 
[system] one-to-one, because here [in SMS Group Austria] there did not exist any export activities. And 
WAT Engineering had a lot of export activities. [Therefore] it would have been necessary to find a […] 
solution. But such things were impossible. This was solved when those, who had power and where against 
it, left the organization. Only then, with those people who came [and filled the positions of those who 
left], […] it was possible to agree on one system. 
 
P42: In principle, they [employees of WAT Engineering] continued working in their projects. They 
[employees of both sides] were not mixed up. 
 
P43: […] SMS Group Austria worked in their own old projects and WAT Engineering worked in their 
own old projects. We [employees of both sides] were just sitting next to each other. So in the first year 
[…] we [employees of WAT Engineering] only had contact to our own colleagues and less to the new 
ones. 
  
P52: People came and continued to work in their old projects and in the same way as they did before. 
 
After these projects ended, a stepwise assimilation or marginalization process set in, which 
was characterized by assigning former organizational units of WAT Engineering to existing 
departments of SMS Group Austria. However, several interview partners reported that not all 
departments were equally affected or equally successful in being unified: 
 
P39: Basically we are in sales [department]. This means, it [the acquisition] hit us completely [the 
change process]. 
 
P43: With respect to range of tasks, nothing changed. This stayed as it was. I need to say, in [the 
department of P43] the integration [i.e. transformation] worked very well. However, the project leaders 
from SMS Group Austria and WAT Engineering quarreled a lot. And in [department of P43] such things 
did not happen. 
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P45: I mean, we have a small department […], they came together quite well. There a former WAT 
Engineering employee took over the supervision of this group. There it works quite nicely […]. They get 
on with each other quite harmoniously […] and the others [who resist] already have a certain age. 
 
This provides evidence that the deck of cards concept of hybridization emerged throughout 
the structural transformation processes. Therefore, not the initial separation between projects 
of SMS Group Austria and projects of WAT Engineering created this form of hybridization, 
but the processes that followed after these projects ended. Figure 40 visually summarizes this 
form of hybridization and its relationship to other phenomena and codes.  
 
Figure 39: Deck of cards concept of hybridization in case study 03 
 
 
Nevertheless, the consequences of the deck of cards concept of hybridization were moderate. 
Mainly the vintage concept of hybridization (see also last quote of P45 above) and the fairly 
high degree of hostility between employees of both organizations contributed to the outcome 
of this M&A and the operational transformation process respectively. 
In conclusion, the structural transformation can be summarized as a stepwise process that was 
mainly described as separation followed by assimilation or marginalization. 
7.3.6. 
Operational transformation was related to assimilation, separation, integration (see also 
Operational transformation: Hostility, resistance and uncontrolled local 
adaptation of management knowledge 
Table 
78) as well as marginalization. Separation was taking place at the beginning of the 
transformation process, due to existing projects that had to be finished. Integration strongly 
related to the fact, that some employees of WAT Engineering became a supervisor in SMS 
Group Austria, thus could even improve their position. With ‘assimilation’ interview partners 
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referred to those individuals who decided to stay with the organization, but did not 
significantly benefit from it. Many elder employees developed an instrumental identity as they 
needed the salary, but did not identify with the new organization. Thus, operational 
transformation was shaped by the vintage concept of hybridization, which contributed to 
negative emotions and, consequently, to resistance on both sides. Marginalization refers to the 
large group of middle-managers who, collectively, left the organization, because they lost 
power and responsibilities (a common symptom of marginalization) and systematically 
became encapsulated and isolated. 
Many issues were mentioned in relation to operational transformation and most assigned 
codes are also strongly associated with the vintage concept of hybridization (Table 89 and 
Table 90). Due to the high level of hostility in this case study, most interview partners 
preferably talked about interpersonal conflicts, which affected them more than structural or 
even cultural differences. Also elements of marginalization, such as lack of communication 
between WAT Engineering and SMS Group Austria became evident in the interviews.  
 
Table 89: Most frequently assigned codes related to operational transformation in case study 03 (n = 1942 
coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
Resignation of acquired 18 95% 114 
Loss of responsibilities 14 74% 34 
Adjustment problems 14 74% 31 
Lay-offs 13 68% 37 
Joint social activities/meetings 12 63% 30 
Supervisor of acquired company 
appointed for a position 11 58% 19 
Loss of job 10 53% 23 
New supervisor 9 47% 13 
Inclusion of affected employees into 
the transformation process 7 37% 25 
Get to know each other 7 37% 16 
Exchange of supervisors/managers 7 37% 11 
Retain personnel 7 37% 10 
No adjustment problems 6 32% 12 
Personnel gets mixed up 5 26% 10 
Individuals as key-factor 5 26% 9 
Allocation of responsibilities 5 26% 6 
Retained responsibilities 4 21% 7 
Personnel gets not mixed up 4 21% 6 
No resignations by acquired 4 21% 6 
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Table 90: Codes that were most frequently co-occurring with operational transformation (FC) in case 
study 03 (n = 1942 coded quotes) 
 # of interview partners 
# of quotes co-occurring 
with structural 
transformation 
# quotes coded 
Negative emotions (FC) 16 84% 45 171 
Resistance of acquired 
employees 10 53% 23 70 
Fear 10 53% 19 53 
Different workings 
style/processes 8 42% 14 99 
Structural transformation 8 42% 10 48 
Poor integration 
management 8 42% 10 19 
Different organizational 
culture 8 42% 9 72 
Departments/individuals are 
differently affected by M&A 8 42% 8 56 
Good integration 
management 7 37% 9 19 
Separation strategy 7 37% 9 28 
Age (young) 7 37% 7 14 
Age (old) 6 32% 9 26 
Spatial changes 6 32% 8 39 
Openness 6 32% 7 26 
Resistance of acquiring 
employees 5 26% 8 20 
No identification with 
acquiring company 5 26% 8 18 
Group formation 5 26% 7 31 
Quarrels 5 26% 7 21 
Different structure 5 26% 6 47 
Leadership style 5 26% 6 16 
Good integration 5 26% 6 15 
Integration management 5 26% 6 13 
Internal communication 5 26% 5 47 
Cultural transformation 4 21% 7 33 
Assimilation 4 21% 5 36 
Duality 4 21% 5 35 
Negative attitude towards 
the M&A 4 21% 5 28 
Supervisor 4 21% 5 27 
Slow transformation 4 21% 5 19 
Trust 4 21% 4 8 
Strong hierarchy 4 21% 4 35 
Company size of acquired 4 21% 4 28 
 
Most interview partners mentioned, that due to lack of authentic internal communication, the 
goals of the takeover were not clear, which created considerable lack of understanding and 
rumors. This speaks clearly in favor of uncontrolled local adaptation of management 
knowledge, because individuals were not able to properly make sense of the information 
received by the acquirer or even obtained no information. This intransparency did not only 
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result in lack of understanding, but also considerably shaped the perception of this deal in a 
very negative way. Figure 41 illustrates uncontrolled local adaptation of management 
knowledge in the context of the third case study and its impact on the operational 
transformation. It can be said that individuals were marginalized due to poor or no 
communication. Therefore, uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge 
consistutes the result of marginalization of acquired employees due to lack of information. 
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Figure 40: Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge in case study 03 
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Members of the target company had the impression that SMS Group Austria was only 
interested in destroying WAT Engineering in order to reduce competition on the market (see 
also chapter 5.3). Consequently employees perceived this M&A as a hostile takeover: 
 
P42: […] officially they communicated something. It was said, [they acquire us] because they want 
certain products, which are of interest to them and it fits their product range. But there were also a lot of 
areas where it was complete nonsense, because even an amateur would have seen that there are overlaps 
with respect to products. 
 
P46: People [in WAT Engineering] who served the Austrian market where afraid that they will not be 
considered [for a position] anymore. There were enough people at SMS Group Austria who served the 
Austrian market already.  
 
P47: The phase of uncertainty started when somebody starts to take me over, and lasts until the point in 
time when somebody tells me what will happen to me. This is the most unpleasant phase. It takes about 
half a year. For some it took 2 years in WAT Engineering. This is bad for business. But this is also […] 
frustrating for the employees. 
 
P50: […] we also had overlapping product portfolios. And everyone was fighting for his product, 
because he was of the opinion, if his product, where he came from, where his past was, continues to live, 
he will surely not be fired […]. There existed a fight, rivalry […]. 
 
P51: The human […] side […], this was the problem. That they [SMS Group Austria] did not speak 
openly to people, but tried to fool the other. 
 
P55: […] many people talked, but the management was not authentic. People from WAT Engineering 
listened and said: ‘We do not believe in his words.’ Maybe also a reason why they did not communicate 
the reasons for the takeover. We [employees of WAT Engineering] could only say: ‘Ok, SMS Group 
Austria wants to buy us.’ But why, was not totally clear. It never turned out what it really was. 
 
In combination with a high level of identification with their old organization, employees of 
WAT Engineering felt very frustrated and were afraid of losing their jobs. Interview partners 
stressed that especially elder employees had problems to adjust to the new organization 
(vintage concept of hybridization). As a consequence, many negative emotions emerged, 
which often became manifest in open and hidden resistance.  
 
P37: I mean, this is clear, but the human side, maybe it is totally hidden, because no one likes to show it. 
But […] this tension was sometimes close to burst. Sometimes on a totally informal and hidden level 
[resistance was shown]. And what happened was incredible. Things happened, such as documents 
disappeared, […][or] processes were slowed down due to passive resistance, due to tricks that were 
played, or, or, or. […] the human side, also trust is important, which was not built up […] this can also 
be a breaking point for an integration [transformation]. 
 
P39: And we had colleagues [from WAT Engineering] […] who were upset because of the toilet paper in 
the toilets for women. This was a massive problem for them. And I was puzzled, because we have the 
same one. This was not only a single person [that was upset]. We all use the same toilet paper and it is a 
very normal, ordinary one. And then the consultant [from an external company] said, that this toilet 
paper is a substitute for many problems of those people, who cannot talk about them [the problems]. 
 
P41: Maybe it was done a bit clumsy. They sent people from Germany, which you could recognize 
already according to their phonetics [Austrian and Germans both talk German, but with different 
accents]. As you normally recognize a German [laughs]. […] And then the first time a bad mood was 
expressed [by employees of WAT Engineering]. That we will lose our jobs and that they will run over us. 
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And then they did something, which was a strict secret of WAT Engineering: They opened up our 
calculations. People started to sniff around in our calculations. Many took that as an insult, because it 
was top secret […] At that time I was in India for a project and only experienced all this from distance. 
But when I returned you could see everywhere posters saying: ‘Big threat and there will be many 
dismissals.’ And the employee representative committee already spoke ill [of this takeover]. And they 
brought the devil from hell [i.e. spoke extremely ill of this takeover]. In […] 2005, as far as I know, […] 
everything was fixed. SMS Group Austria took over WAT Engineering. This led to many resignations [of 
employees of WAT Engineering], totally unmotivated [by the takeover] and without knowing what will 
happen next. 
 
P47: And during the acquisition phase, which took a long time, the still independent organizations [i.e. 
organizational units of WAT Engineering] try to be particularly brilliant on the market and in 
competition in order to show how good they are, although they will become sisters in the future [WAT 
Engineering and SMS Group Austria] […].[…] this is the phase were everyone wants to show that he/she 
is better than the other one. And therefore there was fierce competition [between WAT Engineering and 
SMS Group Austria], aggressive competition, which increased emotions even further and when you 
recognized which projects you also acquired, under which bad conditions, because of this aggressiveness, 
just to win two more contracts, although the company does not exist anymore [smiles softly]. These are 
those things that are part of this [takeover]. 
 
A special form of resistance, caused by the deck of cards concept of hybridization and 
marginalization, was the resignation of numerous supervisors who set up together their own 
business. This was mainly due to the fact that they were replaced by supervisors of SMS 
Group Austria and suffered from a loss of power and responsibilities. Thus, another 
organization emerged out of this acquisition, which became a new, but considerably smaller 
competitor that now ‘fights’ against SMS Group Austria and SMS Group respectively:  
 
P37: […] those people, who were not too old, took the initiative and set up their own business, […] and 
now generates more volume than SMS Group Austria in these segments. They started up a new business 
and in the first half of the year of being a separate organization, they made two million Euro and SMS 
Group Austria created the same volume in its own segment. […] and this happened in many segments. 
 
P41: There still existed a hard core of former employees of WAT Engineering, which persistently resisted 
the new system. And interestingly they teamed up and left the organization together and started up 
together [a new company]. So to speak a competitor of SMS Group Austria. And those people, many of 
them good friends of mine – I now them for many years – try to do everything in order to harm SMS 
Groups Austria. No?! They professionalized their anger. 
 
The level of resistance was not only considerably increased by loss of responsibilities/power, 
but also by severe organizational culture differences: 
 
P39: […] WAT Engineering was a headquarter, but our had is [now] in Germany. This means, the 
Germans are telling us: ‘You are going this direction.’ And you have to go into this direction. This did 
not exist in WAT Engineering, as far as I know. In principle, they were their own bosses. And this was 
also the big problem: Being subject to German instructions. […] From headquarters to subsidiary […]. 
This was surely a huge problem. This surely represented […] for many on the supervisory level a huge 
problem, and actually all of them left, except of my partners. […] But the rest of the supervisors left. 
 
P40: […] the freedom […], to shape one’s own future, this was taken away from us. 
  
P44: And then there existed parts of the organization where it was still critical, where it was necessary to 
replace personnel. Where it was necessary to replace supervisors. 
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P47: Those who were in Austria were used to be the headquarters from a small company, but they 
thought, they are controlling from there the whole world. And they had to recognize that they have 
become a small part of a larger whole. So, for them the changes were much larger. 
 
Not only acquired employees resisted and showed negative emotions, also members of SMS 
Group Austria had a negative attitude towards this integration. Therefore both groups strongly 
contributed to the situation throughout the merger. In particular in one department, were 
suddenly the majority of individuals were from WAT Engineering and not from SMS Group 
Austria, interpersonal conflicts emerged. Here the deck of cards concept becomes manifest 
through the different number of employees assigned to a new organizational unit: 
 
P44: The most difficult task is to bring the best of both together […], but it also implies that there will be 
frustration in your own company as well, in the acquiring company. Because, if suddenly the supervisor 
of the acquired company becomes the boss, then there was quickly the opinion: ‘Hey, we bought the 
company and now he [a supervisor of WAT Engineering] becomes my boss. How can that be?’ This 
results in even more demotivation in the acquiring company. 
  
P49: In retrospect, people from SMS Group were surely made uncertain or intimidated because of our 
behavior. […] it was surely for them as traumatic as it was for us. 
 
Besides structural changes and differences in organizational culture, also spatial changes 
turned out to be of great importance. Although both organizations were located in the same 
city, the move from the Western part of the city to the Eastern part contributed to the high 
level of resignations by employees of WAT Engineering: 
 
P40: They are [emotionally] bound to the region. Now they need to get to [the part of the city where SMS 
Group Austria is located]. For some this is good, because they live there. For some it is bad […] and for 
some it does not matter […]. But with respect to emotions, this was their home, ahm, and now they need 
to go somewhere else where they feel like strangers. Well, these are things that cannot be changed. 
 
P42: I think we were 55 people when we left [the building of WAT Engineering] […]and there are 10, at 
maximum, who stayed. 
 
P44: They need to work at the same place as soon as possible and therefore we [SMS Group Austria] 
said: ‘Well, winners and losers will level each other out. Distance to work. Distance to work. Winners 
and losers’ […]. And there we made a crucial mistake. Because […] people who lived in the West [of the 
city] worked for WAT Engineering and those who lived in the North, East and South, worked for SMS 
Group Austria. People really [considered this] when they applied for a job. […] They did not travel an 
our hour further. 45 minutes. And we did not consider this. We thought: ‘Well, if two companies will 
merge, winners and losers will level each other out, with respect to distance to work. This needs to be 
equally [distributed].’ However, this was, by far, not the case. 
 
SMS Group Austria set numerous integration/assimilation measures in order to successfully 
‘integrate’ the new employees. On the one hand they sought help of external consultants, 
which should support the guidance of the transformation process. On the other hand, the 
transformation activities were not very successful due to lack of authenticity and faulty 
organization and planning of the acquirer. This perception was, of course, strongly influenced 
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by the early hostile attitude towards the M&A, initiated by uncontrolled local adaptation of 
management knowledge: 
 
P39: We had different activities outside [the company]. We made trips […] twice a year. Christmas 
celebrations or we once got a bonus, [or] somehow as an award for a successful year, we made a trip. 
We made an adventure program and tried to forge a bond between us. Of course, does not help at all, to 
be honest. […] We had large flip charts with new slogans. We set our goals which we want to reach 
together. All this does not help. A drop in the ocean. […] if employees are not convinced and supervisors 
do not set an example, it cannot work. 
 
P40: You had the feeling that this is not meant honestly […]. Somebody in Germany said: ‘Ok, you need 
to do this.’ […] they surely had consultants who said: ‘Do that. Go with them to Burgenland [a region of 
Austria] and run some presentations and try to get more closely in touch with them.’ But you always had 
the feeling, they [SMS Group Austria] are doing it, because a consultant said it and not because they 
really wanted to do that. 
 
P42: They took a kind of moderator, someone external, a consultant […] who elaborated priorities. What 
is going wrong? What are the problems? What kind of goals should I set? What are they [employees of 
WAT Engineering] thinking and what do they expect from their new job? […] I had somehow the feeling 
that: Ok, they did that for their own sake, because then no one could say: ‘You did nothing.’ But nothing 
happened when it was time to put these points [i.e. the questions mentioned at the beginning] into action, 
because they [only] talked about it and at some point all this subsides and no one talked about it 
anymore. At some point people were also tired of talking again and again about it. Then, one day, it was 
said: ‘Well, in principle, the integration [i.e. transformation] is finished.’ […] and happily they 
announced: ‘Now we are all integrated. And this process is finished. We do not need a coach anymore.’, 
and reported this to the board of directors. […] They had a consultant who said: ‘Well, let’s make a 
workshop or do this or that.’ Then they [SMS Group Austria] did that and ticked it off as done. List [of 
tasks] completed. […] Let me put it that way, sometimes I have the impression that the management is not 
doing it whole-heartedly. 
 
P43: This was a little bit badly planned. Because they [SMS Group Austria] did not care about the 
employees [who participated in a social event], who had a long way home. It [the event] was in the late 
afternoon and lasted until late in the night. Then we returned to [city were SMS Group Austria is located] 
and it was nearly midnight. And many [people] who needed to use the public transport had problems 
[because in the night there is no public transport in the city]. They did not reach their connection. They 
did not take care about the way people get back home again. And this was always the case.  
 
Considering the presented quotes, it has to be concluded that the operational transformation 
was not successful. It was characterized by many resignations, negative emotions, open and 
hidden resistance as well as poor communication. As the latter played a particular role in this 
case study, it is worth providing some details about communication in this acquisition. 
Several times poor or lack of communication was mentioned in relation to this acquisition 
contributing to the emergence of uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge. 
All interview partners reported about communication, resulting in 166 coded quotes. Table 91 
lists those codes that are related to communication in case study 03. 
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Table 91: Most frequently assigned codes related to communication (FC) in case study 03 (n = 1942 coded 
quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
Internal communication 16 84% 47 
Quarrels 9 47% 21 
Good communication 8 42% 9 
Positive slogans 6 32% 10 
Face-to-face communication 6 32% 9 
Rumors 5 26% 9 
Poor communication 5 26% 9 
External communication 4 21% 4 
 
At the beginning of the acquisition, information about the transformation was provided to 
employees of WAT engineering, but mainly from their former supervisors. This was 
considered as good communication. In contrast, communication between employees of WAT 
Engineering and SMS Group Austria was in most cases perceived as poor and led even to 
quarrels: 
 
P43: We already were part of SMS Group Austria and partly worked together. Then there were some 
information days, there you learned a lot about it [the new organization, i.e. SMS Group Austria]. There 
was information provided how we get integrated [assimilated] and so on. This was at least convincing. 
[later in the interview] How they [the supervisors] treated each other, the leadership styles, with respect 
to exchange of information and that there always were quarrels between people of SMS Group Austria 
and WAT Engineering, I was dissatisfied and wanted to leave the organization. A colleague of mine who 
earlier left the organization started up a new business and he asked me [to join him] and that is how I left 
SMS Group Austria. 
 
P51: [in some departments] it was even worse. […] there still exist quarrels between former WAT 
Engineering employees and members of SMS Group Austria. They even put sheets of paper on the doors 
where they appeal to the other to be more kind. [laughs]. 
  
P55: It is like two soccer teams that merge and you need to say: ‘They also only play soccer.’ […] By 
doing so you can take away a lot of fear. And this process was really good, because at the end of the day, 
only few people of us [WAT Engineering] were afraid. 
 
In view of the above, uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge can be 
strongly blamed for the failed operational transformation and the high degree of resistance. 
This form of hybridization was mainly driven by the poor communication policy of SMS 
Group Austria. Especially the goals of the M&A and future perspectives were not properly 
communicated and resulted in a high degree of hostility. Employees of WAT engineering 
could not make sense of this M&A and the corresponding changes. 
7.4. Success of the M&A deal 
Although there was a lot of resistance, the transformation process was neither perceived as 
successful nor as unsuccessful, comparing the number of interview partners referring to the 
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success and failure of the M&A deal (see also Table 92). However, considering the number of 
quotes, the deal was rather perceived as unsuccessful. Nevertheless, several interview partners 
indicated that the acquisition was successful. This might seem like an unexpected result due to 
the described difficulties in the operational transformation process. Recalling the perceived 
goals and motives of this deal, i.e. adjustment of the market, it has to be concluded that this 
goal was achieved. WAT Engineering does not exist anymore. However, a significant 
increase in additional projects was not really realized. This is due to the fact that many 
employees of WAT Engineering left the organization and set up a new company, which now 
has become a direct competitor to SMS Group Austria. Thus, the acquisition resulted in an 
unexpected spin-off, which now reduces the volume of potential projects for SMS Group 
Austria. 
 
Table 92: Perceived success of the M&A and the transformation process in case study 02 (n = 1942 coded 
quotes) 
 # of interview partners # quotes coded 
successful transformation (FC) 
SMS Group Austria 
(n = 9) 6 67% 26 
WAT Engineering 
(n = 10) 10 100% 26 
unsuccessful transformation (FC) 
SMS Group Austria 
(n = 9) 5 56% 26 
WAT Engineering 
(n = 10) 10 100% 37 
 
For the financial data analysis, WAT Engineering was compared with SMS Group and not 
with SMS Group Austria. This decision was based on the fact that (1) inteviewees reported 
that WAT Engineering was rather a player on the global market and generated most of its 
revenues abroad. Therefore their direct competitor was SMS Group and not the Austrian 
subsidiary. (2) Only the consolidated financial statements of SMS Group were available and 
the segment report did not include figures for certain geographical regions, such as Austria. 
As both organizations involved in this deal operated in different industries, six industry 
benchmarks, based on the Austrian version of the ‘Statistical Classification of Economic 
Activities in the European Community’ (ÖNACE; in French: ‘Nomenclature statistique des 
activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne’), were available to evaluate the 
performance based on selected key ratios from 2004 to 2008: 
• Computer programming, consultancy and related activities (J62; ÖNACE 2008) 
• Construction of buildings (F41; ÖNACE 2008) 
• Civil engineering (F42; ÖNACE 2008) 
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• Specialised construction activities (F43; ÖNACE 2008) 
• Manufacture of electrical equipment (C27; ÖNACE 2008) 
• Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (C28; ÖNACE 2008) 
For the years 2001-2003 only the following benchmarks were used due to changes in industry 
classifcation standards from ÖNACE 2003 to ÖNACE 2008: 
• Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (D29; ÖNACE 2003) 
• Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (D31; ÖNACE 2003) 
With respect to WAT Engineering only limited data was available as historic financial 
statements of WAT Engineering were hardly available. The scarce data for this organization 
was retrieved from the archives of ‘finanzen.net’. 
Some interview partners stressed that the acquisition of WAT Engineering was an economic 
necessity, because otherwise the organization would not have survived. The financial data 
analysis partly supports this assumption as will be shown in the following. 
The capital ratio (see Figure 42) provides insights into the capital structure of an organization. 
A low capital ratio would imply that a company has more liabilities than equity, which might 
indicate an upcoming insolvency. With reference to Figure 42, it can be concluded that (1) 
WAT Engineering suffered from a negative development of the capital ratio and (2) that SMS 
Group could improve its capital ratio before the acquisition, but faced a downturn after the 
acquisition. This shift towards a negative development of SMS Group’s capital ratio stands in 
contrast to the development on the Austrian market: Organizations operating in the respective 
Austrian industries all show a positive trend since 2001. Regarding WAT Engineering, the 
negative trend of the capital ratio can be interpreted as first evidence for operational problems 
as the results of the profit and loss account form part of an organization’s equity. 
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Figure 41: Capital ratio of WAT Engineering and SMS Group before and after the acquisition 
 
 
Similar findings are found for the second ratio: ‘net sales/assets ratio’. This financial figure 
indicates how well an organization uses its assets to generate revenues. SMS Group shows a 
slight decrease since 2001 and performs considerably worse than all other related industries 
on the Austrian market. IDE Llc, however, could increase its ‘net sales/assets ratio’ from 2001 
to 2004. 
 
Figure 42: Net sales/assets of WAT Engineering and SMS Group before and after the acquisition 
 
 
Comparing the development of revenues, operating income and earnings before tax (EBT) of 
WAT Engineering (see Figure 44), it can be seen that despite increasing revenues, the 
operating profit dropped in 2004. Thus, a considerable rise in costs can only be blamed for 
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this development. Considering the EBT, it becomes clear that WAT Engineering already 
reported negative results in 2002 and 2003. 
 
Figure 43: Development of revenues and operating income of WAT Engineering before the acquisition (in 
million EUR) 
 
 
While the presented key ratios can only provide limited insights into the successfulness of the 
acquisition in this case study, it was shown that (1) WAT Engineering negatively performed 
in the years before the acquisition, thus would have required financial support, and (2) that 
SMS Group was neither positively nor negatively affected by this takeover. However, most 
interview partners stressed that the costs for acquiring WAT Engineering might have 
exceeded the benefits. 
7.5. Summary of case study 03: Failed but successful? 
In the last case study, the motives and goals of the acquisition had been not clear to 
employees of the target company. Either SMS Group Austria acquired WAT Engineering in 
order to expand in certain core businesses or this deal was just signed to adjust the market, i.e. 
eliminate a competitor. 
SMS Group Austria and WAT Engineering represented two organizations that differed with 
respect to structure (large hierarchical domestic company vs. small international 
organization), strategy (turn-key projects vs. standardized components) and organizational 
culture, mainly reported as differences in working style. The structural transformation was 
considerably shaped by assimilation, i.e. WAT Engineering was mainly reorganized and 
assigned to departments that already existed in SMS Group Austria. The ‘integration’ of 
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people, however, has to be considered as not successful as many individuals left the 
organization before or during the transformation process.  
Figure 45 provides a visual summary of case study three by showing the final result after the 
post-M&A transformation. Due to the size of SMS Group Austria it was clear that WAT 
Engineering will have to completely assimilate to the acquirer to allow for common structures 
and control. As mentioned above, departments were split up and assigned to already existing 
divisions of the group. Therefore case study three was considerably shaped by assimilation as 
well as marginalization. 
 
Figure 44: Summary of case study 03 – Results of assimilation and marginalizaiton of WAT Engineering 
 
 
With reference to hybridization, the vintage concept of hybridization, the deck of cards 
concept of hybridization and uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge 
emerged. The vintage concept of hybridization was mainly driven by a very strong 
identification with WAT Engineering and loss of power and responsibilities. This resulted in a 
severe number of resignations, especially of former supervisors of the target company, who 
started their own business. Rather moderately, the deck of cards concept of hybridization 
influenced the operational transformation process and was characterized by an unequal 
assignment of employees of WAT engineering to certain departments, e.g. in some 
departments people of the target company were in the majority. Finally, uncontrolled local 
adaptation of management knowledge negatively affected the whole M&A. This form of 
hybridization was especially caused by marginalization, which became manifest in unclear 
communication of goals and motives of the M&A. This created a severe level of hostility 
between employees of both organizations.  
The takeover of WAT Engineering can be considered of being successful, if the goal of 
eliminating a competitor is taken as a point of reference. With respect to the financial data 
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analysis, SMS Group could not increase their performance, thus might be considered less 
successful. 
 
8. THE RELATIVE EXPLANATORY POWER OF DIFFERENCES IN 
PERSONALITY TRAITS AND INDIVIDUAL VALUE PREFERENCES: A 
COMPARISON OF PRE-DEFINED CLUSTERS  
So far the relevance of personality traits, in particular openness to new experiences, as a 
moderator of certain forms of hybridization was indicated. In this chapter, the results of the 
NEO-FFI (personality traits) and the PVQ (individual value preferences) are presented. As not 
all interview partners agreed to fill out the questionnaire, this chapter will shortly describe the 
quantitative sample with reference to the qualitative sample. After that, major findings are 
discussed in the light of different forms of hybridization. 
8.1. Qualitative sample vs. quantitative sample: Implications for the 
interpretation of quantitative findings 
Besides the qualitative data collection, interview partners were asked to fill out two 
questionnaires. 34 out of 55 individuals (i.e. about 62%) agreed to fill out the NEO-FFI and 
the PVQ. Feedback was gathered to identify reasons why certain individuals refused to fill out 
the questionnaire. The majority of individuals responded that they do not want to answer such 
personal questions, although anonymity was guaranteed.  
The goal of this doctoral thesis is to develop a theory, which ‘speak[s] specifically for the 
populations from which it was derived and [which] applies back to them’ (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998, p. 267). Thus, the final theory should be able to explain, at least, phenomena observed 
in all three case studies, i.e. have explanatory power in the analyzed contexts. In order to 
deduce meaningful conclusions from findings based on the quantitative sample, i.e. the 34 
questionnaires, it is necessary to understand to which extent it deviates from the qualitative 
sample. Figure 46 shows the relative frequency distribution of the qualitative and quantitative 
sample. As only individuals from the qualitative sample can form part of the quantitative 
sample, non-response bias can be identified through differences in relative frequency 
distributions between both samples, i.e. whether a specific group, defined by certain cluster 
criteria, particularly refused to answer the questionnaire. If this is the case, results based on 
the quantitative analysis might not be representative for the qualitative sample. 
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 Figure 45: Comparison of the qualitative sample and quantitative sample based on relative frequency 
distributions 
cluster criteria 
qualitative 
sample 
(n = 55) 
quantitative 
sample 
(n = 34) 
sample 
deviation 
case study 
case 01 35% 35% -0.7% 
case 02 31% 32% -1.4% 
case 03 35% 32% 2.2% 
survivors vs. non-survivor survivor 80% 79% 0.6% 
non-survivor 20% 21% -0.6% 
# of years in organization < 12 years 47% 44% 3.2% 
>= 12 years 53% 56% -3.2% 
 
Findings suggest that the qualitative and quantitative sample are nearly equally distributed 
among three major categories, which form the criteria to compare personality traits and 
individual value preferences in the following chapters: ‘Case study’, ‘survivor vs. non-
survivor’, and  ‘# of years in organization’. With respect to ‘# of years in organization’, the 
cluster criterion was 12 years. The decision to use this specific value to distinguish between 
two groups resulted from analyzing the mean (12.85 years) and the median (10.50 years) 
based on the quantitative sample. 
Also other factors could be used to classify groups across all case studies, such as gender or 
organizational membership (acquirer vs. target company), but they seem less relevant and 
meaningful for this doctoral thesis, considering the small size of the quantitative sample. 
Differences in gender were never mentioned during the interviews. Also the qualitative 
content analysis did not reveal any considerable differences with respect to what was reported 
by male and female interviewees. 
Organizational membership played a significant role throughout all case studies. However, 
only in case study 01, the target (IDE Llc.) itself never acquired another organization or had 
any experience with M&As (see also chapter 5). AUT Bank (case study 02) and WAT 
Engineering (case study 03) were acquiring organizations in the past and had rich experiences 
with such deals due to the fact that they were headquarters themselves. Therefore the 
differentiation between acquirer and target company would pose severe problems and lead to 
wrong conclusions when interpreting potential differences, as the distinction is not as clear 
cut. Apart from that, it can hardly be expected that individuals significantly change their 
personality or value preferences depending on their role in an acquisition. Thus, results of the 
NEO-FFI and the PVQ should rather be understood as independent variables in the context of 
the analyzed case studies. 
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Although the collected data is quantitative in nature, sample size and sampling technique, i.e. 
theoretical sampling, restrict the applicability of commonly used statistical methods. 
Therefore findings presented in the following chapters are mainly interpreted from a 
qualitative viewpoint, i.e. no reference to statistical significance or generalizability of results 
will be made or can be expected. However, according to Figure 46, findings are 
‘representative’ for the theoretically sampled set of interview partners. The main contribution 
of this analysis is (1) to identify further contextual factors that might help to explain certain 
phenomena more precisely and (2) to provide additional support for certain findings based on 
the qualitative content analysis (i.e. triangulation of data and methods).  
8.2. Differences of personality traits and individual value preferences between 
cases 
As Table 11 outlined at the beginning of this doctoral thesis, all three case studies differed 
with respect to certain characteristics, e.g. case study 02 represented a cross-border 
acquisition, while case study 01 and 03 were domestic acquisitions. Further differences can be 
identified by considering Figure 47 and Figure 48. 
 
Figure 46: Comparison of centred NEO-FFI scores between all three case studies (n = 34 interview 
partners) 
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Figure 47: Comparison of centred PVQ scores between all three case studies 
 
 
With respect to personality traits, results for case study 01 and 02 seem to be quite similar. 
However, case study 03 shows slight differences for neuroticism and openness to new 
experiences. Interview partners of case study 03 scored relatively lower on openness to new 
experiences and relatively higher on neuroticism, in particular compared to case study 02. 
Differences in openness to new experiences between these two case studies might explain, 
why individuals in case study 02 hardly ever referred to the acquisition as a hostile takeover 
and interview partners of case study 03 most frequently reported about hostility during the 
transformation processes (see also Table 76). Contrary to case study 03, interviewees from 
case study 02 frequently reported about certain benefits due to the acquisition. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn when comparing the PVQ scores between case studies. 
Again, case study 03 scores relatively lower on hedonism, stimulation and self-direction. 
These values are related to openness to change (see Schwartz, 2006) as high scores would 
imply that an individual prefers “excitement, novelty” or “creating, exploring” (Schwartz, 
2006, p. 5). In addition, individuals of case study 03 score high on values that are labeled 
‘conservation’ by Schwartz (2006). Thus, compared to individuals of case study 01 and 02, 
interviewees of case study 03 prefer maintaining certain standards and norms in order to avoid 
uncertainty. Protecting traditional norms could become manifest as strong resistance to 
changes throughout the post-M&A phase and may lead to many resignations by acquired 
employees. This is true for case study 03. 
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8.3. Differences of personality traits and individual value preferences between 
survivors and non-survivors 
In line with Dauber & Fink (2010), M&A survivors are different to non-survivors. The 
decision to develop a positive or negative attitude towards an acquisition might not only be 
affected by the hostility of a deal or organizational culture differences. On the individual 
level, also personality characteristics could play a role. Figure 49 shows that survivors score 
relatively higher on openness to new experiences than non-survivors. With respect to the 
other four personality traits no remarkable differences can be observed. This finding stands in 
line with results from the qualitative content analysis (see case studies above) and conclusions 
drawn by Dauber & Fink (2010): Individuals who are more open, tend to see changes more as 
a chance than as a threat. Consequently, those individuals scoring high on openness to new 
experiences might resist less during transformation processes and are more willing to stay 
with the organization. In light of boundary spanning, open individuals are more likely to 
extend their network, thus increase their chance to survive as they become part of the new 
structure and the organization as a whole. 
 
Figure 48: Comparison of centred NEO-FFI scores between survivor and non-survivor (n = 34 interview 
partners) 
 
 
According to Figure 50, survivors score relatively higher on personal focused values 
(achievement, power, hedonism, etc.), while non-survivors score relatively higher on social 
focused values (security, conformity, tradition), etc. It can be concluded, that non-survivors 
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strongly value the collective in which they are embedded before a takeover. They identify 
with their group and aim at protecting it. Schwartz (2006) refers to security, conformity and 
tradition as conservation values. Thus, during the transformation process, non-survivors are 
confronted with the elimination of what they try to protect, i.e. the collective group they had 
been part of and which had a certain tradition. In view of the above, non-survivors are (1) less 
open to changes and (2) tend to protect the old collective with which they identify. 
 
Figure 49: Comparison of centred PVQ scores between survivor and non-survivor (n = 34 interview 
partners) 
 
8.4. Differences of personality traits and individual value preferences between 
elder and younger employees 
The vintage concept of hybridization assumes that elder employees react differently to an 
acquisition than younger employees. As individual values and personality traits shape our 
behavior it can be expected that generational differences, as a component of the vintage 
concept of hybridization, might also be reflected by the results of the questionnaires. Figure 
51 and Figure 52 provide an answer to that. 
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Figure 50: Comparison of centred NEO-FFI scores between elder and younger employees (n = 34 
interview partners) 
 
 
Figure 51: Comparison of centred PVQ scores between elder and younger employees (n = 34 interview 
partners) 
 
 
While the results for the NEO-FFI show no considerable differences, the findings of the PVQ 
clearly indicate that elder employees, i.e. those interview partners who stayed longer with the 
respective organization, tend to score higher on ‘power’. Individuals scoring high on ‘power’ 
appreciate having control and responsibilities in an organization (Schwartz, 2006). Elder 
employees (in particular in Austria) improve in status due to the number of years spent in the 
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organization. Also with respect to the interviewees in all three case studies, rather employees, 
who spent many years in the organization, were members of the board of directors or in top 
management positions. Recalling that acquisitions often imply loss of responsibilities/power, 
elder employees have more to lose than younger ones, in particular status and power. This 
might provide another reason why the vintage concept of hybridization can emerge during the 
transformation process: Different levels of ‘loss of power’. Especially in combination with the 
deck of cards concept of hybridization, where former top management gets replaced, might 
increase the frustration and resistance by elder employees, as they more strongly value 
‘power’. In conclusion, individual value preferences and personality traits can affect the 
intensity of negative and positive effects of different forms of hybridization. 
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9. DISCUSSION: HYBRIDIZATION IN THE LIGHT OF EXISTING RESEARCH & 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
In the past, a lot of research had been conducted on M&A deals with respect to culture, 
acculturation strategies and performance outcomes. As the literature review showed, there is a 
consensus that culture plays an important role in such operations. However, whether cultural 
differences positively or negatively affect the post-M&A phase is still subject to 
investigations. This doctoral thesis contributes to this field of research by considering 
contextual factors as proposed by Stahl & Voigt (2008). They argue that moderating variables 
can significantly shape the direction of cultural effects; in particular of organizational culture. 
Hybridization represents a phenomenon that does not only relate to other variables/factors 
explored in M&A research, but also systematically links them to each other in a meaningful 
way. Thus, moderating or mediating variables turn into explanatory variables in different 
forms of hybridization and provide a more clear picture about when and how cultural effects 
have an impact on M&A processes. As outlined in the analyzed case studies, certain forms of 
hybridization consist of phenomena that have so far been treated as separate independent 
constructs, e.g. company size (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Puranam et al., 2006; Paruchuri et 
al. 2006; Puranam et al. 2009; Nadolska & Barkema, 2007; Nemanich & Vera 2009; 
Homburg & Bucerius 2006; Meschi & Metais, 2006; Colombo et al., 2007; Zollo & Singh, 
2004; Ellis et al., 2009; Cording et al., 2008) or speed of integration/assimilation (Angwin, 
2004; Cording et al., 2008; Homburg & Bucerius, 2006). Moreover, the relevance of different 
acculturation strategies was empirically outlined, as few scholars suggest from a theoretical  
point of view (e.g. Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Nahvandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1988). 
The following chapters will indicate how the exploration of different forms of hybridization 
adds value to existing research with respect to culture, acculturation strategies and 
performance in the context of M&As. In the last part, implications for the management of 
M&As are provided. 
9.1.  Effects of cultural differences can be better explained by considering their 
respective contexts 
This doctoral thesis contributes to M&A research dealing with consequences of cultural 
differences. A considerable number of empirical studies provide valuable insights into single 
phenomena related to organizational and/or national culture differences (e.g. Cartwright & 
Cooper, 1993; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Child et al.; 2001; Datta, 1991; Fink & Holden, 2007; 
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Hurt & Hurt, 2005; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; Olie, 1994; Teerikangas & Very, 2006; 
Weber, 1996; Weber, et al., 1996). In contrast, hybridization can be considered as a higher-
order construct, which defines a set of relationships between several phenomena, e.g. fear, 
identity, communication, etc.. Thus, outcomes of blending organizational cultures dependent 
on contextual factors (see also Stahl & Voigt, 2008). Colombo et al. (2007) and Schweizer 
(2005) argue that each M&A is unique, which calls for more research considering contextual 
factors to explain how certain phenomena, such as culture differences, unfold as is 
emphasized in this doctoral thesis. 
Furthermore, it has been found that not only culture on the organizational or national level can 
explain certain phenomena, but also individual value preferences and personality traits. In 
particular the latter have shown remarkable relevance for the emergence of certain forms of 
hybridization, e.g. openness to new experiences which moderates the vintage concept of 
hybridization. 
In view of the above, findings presented in this doctoral thesis support the common 
proposition that culture affects M&As (e.g. Datta, 1991; Fink & Holden, 2007; Hurt & Hurt, 
2005; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; Olie, 1994; Teerikangas & Very, 2006; Weber, 1996; 
Weber, et al., 1996; etc.). Apart from that, also valuable insights on how and when such 
cultural effects can influence post-M&A performance, have been provided as proposed by 
Teerikangas & Very (2006). 
9.2.  Acculturation strategies: Integration or assimilation as basic conditions 
for hybridization 
As this doctoral thesis shows, acculturation strategies influence M&A success and empirical 
evidence was found that even mixtures of acculturation strategies on different organizational 
levels, i.e. organizational culture, strategy, structure and operations, can produce different 
post-M&A outcomes. 
With respect to hybridization, it can be concluded that this phenomenon depends on certain 
acculturation strategies. As was shown, only through integration or assimilation blending of 
organizational cultures takes place. However, some forms of hybridization might more 
strongly depend on acculturation strategies than others. For example, the vintage concept of 
hybridization might emerge also if the level of integration/assimilation is rather low. On the 
contrary, uncontrolled local adaptation of management will always require assimilation or 
marginalization. 
In light of existing research findings, all three analyzed case studies support the assumption 
that the level of integration/assimilation considerably shapes transformation processes and 
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affects the overall performance of a deal (e.g. Zollo & Singh, 2004; Larsson & Finkelstein, 
1999; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Meyer, 2008). Furthermore, this doctoral thesis showed that 
considering separation and marginalization might provide an even more complete picture of 
M&A deals and might constitute a good starting point to enhance clarity in M&A research, 
i.e. help to identify why different studies produce different results with respect to M&A 
performance and cultural differences. 
9.3. Performance in M&As and hybridization 
In this doctoral thesis, two approaches for measuring M&A success were selected: (1) A 
qualitative assessment by interview partners and (2) a quantitative assessment via financial 
key ratios. Although the quanitative analysis was limited by the availability of appropriate 
data, it was found that the perception of interview partners did not always coincide with the 
results of the financial data analysis. This deviation might be explained by the fact that 
economies of scale and scope are rather reflected by general financial key ratios, but refer 
mainly to the structural transformation. However, consequences of operational transformation 
processes, which were most often reported by interviewees, are not directly reflected in 
consolidated financial statements and would require more detailed data, e.g. flucation rates on 
a monthly basis or reports about the productivity and performance of certain departments. 
Also effects of hybridization on M&A success mostly unfold on the operational level, thus 
indirectly affect the financial statements of organizations. 
Despite these limitations, it was shown that only one identified form of hybridization has the 
potential to positively contribute to M&A success: Boundary spanning through informal 
networks. All other forms of hybridization tended to have a rather negative effect on the post-
M&A phase in the selected case studies. 
Finally, it has to be mentioned, that the success of M&As is dependent on the goals and 
motives behind such a deal. For example, while the acquisition of WAT Enginerring (case 
study 03) has to be considered as a failure in financial terms, it unfolded as being successful 
considering the pre-defined goal of adjusting the market. Consequently, M&A success does 
not necessarily refer to increased financial key ratios, but might be related to rather soft facts, 
such as technology acquisition, elimination of a competitor, extending one’s core business, 
etc.. Whether such motives and goals turn into a financial success, represents a different 
question. This perception of M&A success is more closely related to ‘value creating 
synergies’ as defined by Harrison et al. (2001, p. 686) than to common measures of M&A 
performance such as ROA, return on sales or abnormal stock returns (e.g. Zollo & Singh, 
2004; Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Porrini, 2004; Homburg & Bucerius, 2006; Cording et al., 
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2008; Stahl & Voigt, 2008; Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Meschi & Metais, 2006, etc.). Therefore, 
the decision to buy another organization might not necessarily be driven by financial or 
synergistic benefits. 
9.4. Managing transformation processes means managing hybridization 
The desire to explain the higher failure rate of M&As has triggered many research projects 
and resulted in a remarkable number of publications in the last decades. However, a ‘best 
practice’ to manage post-M&A transformation has yet not been found. Also this doctoral 
thesis does not claim to provide the ultimate truth, but might represent a significant step 
towards a more holistic approach to M&A management. The identified forms of hybridization 
should not be understood as given barriers or problems that emerge in the process of unifying 
organizations and to which managers only can react. Different forms of hybridization 
influence the transformation process, because a certain combination of factors unfavorably 
influence each other. This doctoral thesis highlights which factors were relevant for three 
different M&A deals and describes how they unfolded throughout the acquisition. Based on 
the presented findings, managerial implications can be formulated, for example: 
• Different acculturation strategies have different consequences for the transformation of 
companies, 
• Generational differences can result in different reactions to change, 
• Communication is not enough; ‘authentic’ communication is more important, 
• ‘Quick wins’ obtained by a fast structural assimilation may turn into ‘long-term 
losses’, 
• Employees who decide to stay with an organization are not necessarily a gain for the 
acquirer due to instrumental identity, etc.. 
In conclusion, hybridization calls for a more holistic approach to M&As and helps to better 
diagnose or assess emerging dysfunctionalities. While these recommendations are mainly 
based on three case studies, several links to other empirical research findings exist and have 
been described. 
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10.  LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
For this doctoral thesis data from various sources was collected in order to provide a holistic 
perspective on three different M&A deals. However, there are certain limitations due to this 
approach which will be addressed in this chapter. 
10.1. Inductive theory building vs. deductive theory testing: Limitations 
through sampling and selected methodology 
The aim of this doctoral thesis is to provide a meaningful theory of hybridization that is 
grounded in the collected data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), thus, can be generalized to the 
analyzed sample. Therefore, the richness and diversity of data plays an important role in order 
to be able to develop a theory that covers different facets of an observed phenomenon. This 
was achieved via theoretical sampling for most of the case studies. However, in case study 02, 
i.e. the cross-border acquisition, mainly interview partners of the target company were 
interviewed. Access to the acquiring company was severely limited. As turned out after one of 
the interviews with an Italian top-manager, most of those people who actively participated in 
the takeover of AUT Bank were already somewhere else to manage the next acquisition. 
These interviewees were neither located in Italy nor in Austria, but work in various countries 
which posed a severe barrier to data collection. Thus, results for case study 02 are mainly 
limited to the perception of acquired employees. Nevertheless, they provide meaningful 
insights into different forms of hybridization, in particular those, which are strongly related to 
the target company, e.g. the vintage concept of hybridization. 
With respect to the quantitative sample, not all interview partners agreed to fill out the 
questionnaires. The rather small sample did not allow for common statistical methods and 
data was only analyzed on a qualitative basis. From a quantitative perspective, this represents 
a considerable limitation. However, it was found that the quantitative sample is representative 
for the qualitative sample, thus provides meaningful results from a qualitative viewpoint and 
it was possible to relate results of this analysis to qualitative findings. 
All three case studies referred to acquisitions involving Austrian organizations. Findings as 
well as the theory of hybridization are mainly limited to an Austrian context. However, the 
aim of this doctoral thesis was not to develop a theory that can be generalized to different 
national culture contexts, but can be logically derived from the collected data. The focus on 
Austrian organizations allowed to control for national culture values in case study 01 as well 
as case study 03, and helped to identify major effects of blending organizational culture. This 
seemed reasonable as hybridization was, ex-ante, defined as ‘blending of organizational 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 198 
culture’ (Fink, 2008, p. 10). However, future research might extend the theory by 
investigating in M&A deals in other cultural contexts, as national culture differences played 
an important role in case study 02. 
Finally, all three acquisitions tended to be rather unsuccessful with respect to the 
transformation process. Thus, no positive forms of hybridization were identified (e.g. 
negotiated knowledge migration). Apart from that, this doctoral thesis cannot fully clarify 
whether the identified forms of hybridization – and their negative effects – also emerge in 
more successful deals. Further research is necessary to investage into this issue. 
10.2. Future research directions: Exploring other forms of hybridization and 
testing the theory 
In the three analyzed case studies, five different forms of hybridization were identified. 
However, hybridization might also become manifest in other forms as indicated by Dauber & 
Fink (2011). Thus, case studies investigating in other M&A deals might provide new results 
and extend the developed theory. However, this doctoral thesis showed, that hybridization can 
only emerge under two conditions: (1) existence of organizational differences between 
acquirer and target company, and (2) interaction of organizational differences. Thus, a clear 
differentiation between hybridization and other phenomena can be made and should provide 
valuable guidance for future research. 
While People’s Twist was identified as one form of hybridization, the nature of this 
phenomenon was not explored to the full extent. This is mainly due to the fact that People’s 
Twist requires a more participative research design as this phenomenon can hardly be 
reported through interviews or questionnaires. This form of hybridization becomes manifest 
in behavior and only in-group members know, whether certain behavior contains a hidden 
message. Thus, to properly investigate in this phenomenon it would be necessary to become 
part of the in-group. Research designs, such as ‘action research’ (e.g. Reason & Bradbury, 
2008; Stringer, 2007) might help to appropriately explore People’s Twist. Moreover, other 
forms of hybridization, such as ‘negotiated knowledge migration’ were not identified in the 
analyzed case studies and require further qualitative investigations to empirically clarify its 
characteristics and impact on M&A success. 
Besides extending the theory via qualitative methods, it is also possible to test the existence of 
different forms of hybridization by applying quantitative research methods. For example, a 
questionnaire could be developed based on the rich descriptions of hybridization provided in 
this doctoral thesis. Future research might build on these empirical findings in order to test 
hypotheses in representative samples, i.e. a larger number of M&A deals. 
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Finally, other research questions related to this phenomenon might stimulate researchers to 
investigate into hybridization, e.g.: ‘Can more positive forms of hybridization be identified?’; 
‘Do negative forms of hybridization also emerge in more successful deals?’; or ‘Do certain 
industries suffer more strongly from certain forms of hybridization?’ 
11. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This doctoral thesis addresses the problem of the high failure rates of M&As. It is argued that 
understanding hybridization, which refers to the blending of organizational cultures, can 
provide a clearer picture on post-M&A processes. Existing research highlights the importance 
of understand the impact of cultural differences between acquirer and target company, 
however empirical studies suggest different and often contradictory explanations how culture 
affects M&A deals. The aim of this doctoral thesis is to provide rich insights into post-M&A 
processes and shed light on different forms of hybridization. The following questions guided 
the research processes: 
• What are the basic conditions for hybridization to take place? 
• Which forms of hybridization can be identified? 
• How does hybridization work in a real-life context? 
• How does hybridization affect the transformation process? 
In order to find answers to the these research questions a solid research design was developed, 
which consisted of qualitative as well as quantitative methods. On the one hand, narrative 
interviews were conducted to gain an in-depth perspective on transformation processes in 
three different case studies. On the other hand, quantitative data was collected to (1) explore 
other potential factors which were mainly not covered via narrative interviews (i.e. 
personality traits and financial performance) and to (2) support existing findings and 
relationships. A co-occurrence analysis was conducted to systematically and comprehensibly 
screen the qualitative data and develop relationship between reported phenomena. 
Based on this research design, it is found that the emergence of hybridization depends on two 
conditions: (1) organizational differences between acquirer and target company need to exist 
and (2) these differences need to be blended through interaction of the organizations involved. 
The latter condition stresses the importance of acculturation strategies, which are often 
unconsidered in empirical analyses in M&A research. Based on the conducted interviews, it 
becomes clear that hybridization can only take place if, at least partly, integration or 
assimilation strategies are pursued by the acquirer. Pure separation and marginalization 
strategies would not result hybridization. 
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With reference to the three analyzed M&A deals, five different forms of hybridization were 
identified: 
The vintage concept of hybridization is caused by generational differences of employees 
within the respective organizations. It is found that elder employees, who identify more 
strongly with their old organization, react differently to fundamental changes than younger 
employees. 
Deck of cards concept of hybridization results from the replacement of certain departments 
or groups of individuals. Thus, not all parts of an organization are equally affected by a 
merger or acquisition. Interview partners often mentioned that there was a stepwise 
transformation processes. 
Uncontrolled local adaptation of management knowledge refers to the hasty application of 
assimilation strategies on organizational culture, strategy, structure and operations. Due to a 
poor communication policy of the acquirer, individuals cannot make sense of changes and 
information provided to them. 
Boundary spanning accounts for effects resulting from informal communication and power 
networks. According to the interview partners boundary spanning through informal 
information networks can help to overcome communication barriers on the formal level. 
Power networks, however, get destroyed through continous and extensive restructuring efforts 
People’s Twist unfolds as hidden resistance by attributing two different meanings to certain 
patterns of behavior or offical texts, depending on context. This form of hybridization 
emerges in order to suberversively undermine the acquirer’s power. 
This doctoral thesis shows that most forms of hybridization negatively affect M&A processes 
in all three case studies, thus are of relevance for the management of such deals. Only 
boundary spanning through informal information networks can help to overcome barriers 
throughout the operational integration/assimilation of two organizations. Due to the fact that 
all three case studies have to be considered as less successful with respect to transformation 
processes this conclusion is limited. 
In comparison to existing research, this empirical study stresses the importance of considering 
contextual factors when analyzing effects of culture differences in M&As. Apart from that, 
acculturation strategies are of vital importance and can significantly shape the outcome of 
mergers or acquisitions. Finally, common methods to measure M&A success were less 
successful in predicting transformation performance. With respect to the collected data, other 
than financial motives can trigger acquisitions and do not affect M&A performance directly. 
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Future research might investigate into other forms of hybridization, e.g. those mentioned by 
Dauber & Fink (2011) or test the developed theories in a larger sample and across different 
cultural settings. In addition, more research is necessary to fully understand how acculturation 
strategies affect post-M&A processes. This doctoral thesis provides a good empirical well-
gournded starting point for research into these directions and helps to understand how 
organizational culture differences affect M&As from a more holistic perspective. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: List of interview partners 
ID gender age 
in 
organization 
since 
case 
study 
organizational 
membership 
(pseudonym) 
role in M&A 
left the 
company 
due to M&A 
P01 male 41 2003 1 IDE Llc. target no 
P02 female 23 2005 1 IDE Llc. target no 
P03 male 43 2003 1 IDE Llc. target no 
P04 male 44 2001 1 ABC International Austria acquirer no 
P05 male 46 1999 1 ABC International Austria acquirer no 
P06 male - - 1 ABC International Austria acquirer no 
P07 male 24 2004 1 IDE Llc. target no 
P08 female 49 2003 1 IDE Llc. target no 
P09 male 35 2001 1 ABC International Austria acquirer no 
P10 male 36 2004 1 IDE Llc. target no 
P11 female 39 2000 1 ABC International Austria acquirer no 
P12 female 33 2004 1 ABC International Austria acquirer no 
P13 male 35 2003 1 IDE Llc. target no 
P14 female 38 2002 1 IDE Llc. target no 
P15 male - - 1 ABC International Austria acquirer no 
P16 male 45 2007 1 ABC International Austria acquirer no 
P17 female 37 2004 1 ABC International Austria acquirer no 
P18 male - - 1 ABC International Austria acquirer no 
P19 female 35 2001 1 ABC International Austria target no 
P20 male 43 1994 2 AUT Bank target no 
P21 male 43 1993 2 AUT Bank target no 
P22 male 53 1985 2 AUT Bank target no 
P23 male 37 1999 2 AUT Bank target no 
P24 male 49 1989 2 AUT Bank target no 
P25 male 33 1998 2 AUT Bank target no 
P26 male 50 1990 2 AUT Bank target no 
P27 male 41 1996 2 ITA Bank acquirer no 
P28 male 45 1991 2 AUT Bank target no 
P29 male 54 1989 2 AUT Bank target no 
P30 female 45 1989 2 AUT Bank target no 
P31 female 25 2006 2 AUT Bank target no 
P32 male 49 1989 2 AUT Bank target no 
P33 male 46 1994 2 AUT Bank target no 
P34 male 44 1991 2 ITA Bank acquirer no 
P35 male 58 1990 2 AUT Bank target no 
P36 male 52 1982 2 AUT Bank target no 
P37 male 42 2000 3 SMS Group Austria acquirer no 
P38 male 55 1976 3 WAT Engineering target yes 
P39 female 32 2004 3 SMS Group Austria acquirer no 
P40 male 40 1989 3 WAT Engineering target yes 
P41 male 39 2002 3 WAT Engineering target no 
P42 male 44 1997 3 WAT Engineering target yes 
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P43 male 27 2002 3 WAT Engineering target yes 
P44 male 50 1985 3 SMS Group Austria acquirer no 
P45 female 39 1996 3 WAT Engineering target yes 
P46 male 39 1990 3 WAT Engineering target no 
P47 male 50 1978 3 SMS Group Austria acquirer no 
P48 male 37 2005 3 WAT Engineering target yes 
P49 female 49 1978 3 WAT Engineering target no 
P50 male 44 1995 3 SMS Group Austria acquirer no 
P51 female 45 1990 3 WAT Engineering target yes 
P52 male 27 2003 3 SMS Group Austria acquirer no 
P53 male 61 1972 3 WAT Engineering target yes 
P54 male - - 3 WAT Engineering target no 
P55 male 53 1982 3 WAT Engineering target yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniel Dauber  Hybridization in M&As 
 214 
Appendix B: Set of codes assigned to ‘communication (CF)’ 
 Assigned codes # of quotes 
Communication (FC) Internal communication 186 
Rumors 47 
Quarrels 46 
Fast information of those who are affected by M&A/change 45 
Knowledge transfer 44 
Poor communication 35 
Face-to-face communication 30 
Limited number of those who know about M&A before 
signing 30 
Communication problems 28 
Good communication 26 
Informal communication 26 
Misunderstandings 22 
Positive slogans 21 
Filtered information 16 
Authentic communication 15 
Official communication 14 
Slow decision-making processes 13 
External communication 12 
Future perspectives communicated 12 
Bad timing for informing the acquired people 11 
Communication top-down 11 
Fast decision-making processes 11 
Lying 11 
Meaningless slogans 9 
Communicating positive goals of the M&A 8 
Goals of the M&A/changes are not communicated 8 
Too much information 7 
Future perspectives not communicated 7 
Long communication channels 5 
Few knowledge about the acquirer 4 
Communication within departments 3 
Communication among acquired employees 3 
Moarning 3 
Late process of informing about takeover 3 
Talking about old times 2 
Strong internal network due to work 2 
Formal approvement of the deal 1 
Early contact to the future supervisor 1 
Early contact with future colleagues 1 
Communication outside the organization 1 
Facilitated communication 1 
Hectic communication among acquired employees 1 
Weak communicative links between departments 1 
Strong communicative links between departments 1 
Informed about the takeover by chance 1 
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Appendix C: Set of codes assigned to ‘good communication (CF)’ 
 Assigned codes # of quotes 
 Good 
communication(FC) 
Good communication 26 
Goals of the M&A/changes are communicated 16 
Authentic communication 15 
Future perspectives communicated 12 
No language barriers 8 
Facilitated communication 1 
 
Appendix D: Set of codes assigned to ‘company size (CF)’ 
 Assigned codes # of quotes 
Company size (FC) Company size of acquirer 90 
Company size of target 89 
Company size 65 
 
Appendix E: Set of codes assigned to ‘complexity (CF)’ 
 Assigned codes # of quotes 
Complexity (FC) Complexity of integration 24 
Complexity of structure 9 
Complexity of work increased 6 
Complexity of products 1 
Complexity of business 1 
 
Appendix F: Set of codes assigned to ‘negative emotions (CF)’ 
 Assigned codes # of quotes 
Negative emotions 
(FC) 
Fear 104 
Negative emotions 97 
Negative attitude towards the M&A 63 
Quarrels 46 
Shock 34 
Lack of understanding 26 
Negative atmosphere 24 
Ignorance 21 
Unfairness 20 
Disagreement of directors 4 
Dissatisfaction 4 
Moarning 3 
Feeling of oppression 2 
Bad working atmosphere 2 
Jealousy 1 
Miserliness 1 
Dissatisfaction of acquire employees with their old company 1 
Perception of traitor 1 
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Appendix G: Set of codes assigned to ‘operational transformation (CF)’ 
 Assigned codes # of quotes 
Operational 
transformation (FC) 
HR transformation 198 
Resignations by acquired employees 192 
Loss of responsibilities 115 
Reduction of personnel by acquirer 87 
Loss of job 70 
Adjustment problems 58 
Inclusion of affected employees into the transformation 
process 52 
Replacement of supervisors 43 
Joint social activities/meetings 39 
Allocation of responsibilities 37 
Personnel gets mixed up 36 
Get to know each other 36 
Retain personnel 32 
New supervisor 28 
Supervisor of acquired company appointed for a position 25 
Individuals as key-factors 24 
No adjustment problems 21 
New employees 18 
Replacement of owners 15 
Consider individual needs 13 
No resignations by acquired employees 13 
New team 12 
No inclusion of affected employees into the transformation 
process 10 
Irredeemablitity of acquired employees 9 
No resignations by acquiring employees 8 
Retain responsibilities 8 
Early inclusion of affected employees into the transformation 
process 7 
Natural selection 7 
Personnel does not get mixed up 6 
Team building activities 5 
Hardly any personal contact to colleagues 3 
No face-to-face communication 3 
Treatment of acquired employees 3 
Selection of supervisors 2 
Hybrid filled positions 2 
Fast getting to know each other 2 
Stronger inclusion of affected employees into the 
transformation process 2 
Replacement of personnel 1 
Early contact to the future supervisor 1 
Early contact with future colleagues 1 
No replacement of supervisors 1 
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Appendix H: Set of codes assigned to ‘successful transformation (CF)’ 
 Assigned codes # of quotes 
Successful 
transformation (FC) 
Identification with new organization 50 
Good transformation 25 
Positive change 20 
Positive performance after takeover 14 
Successful takeover 13 
Improvement due to takeover 11 
No transformation problems 7 
Positive impact on operating business 6 
Successful operationalization 4 
Merger of organizations 4 
Goals of the takeover achieved 2 
 
Appendix I: Set of codes assigned to ‘unsuccessful transformation(CF)’ 
 Assigned codes # of quotes 
Unsuccessful 
transformation (FC) 
Faulty transformation 36 
Negative consequences for operative business 33 
Negative consequences for third parties 13 
To be out of depth with transformation 13 
Faulty IT-transformation 12 
Negative consequences 12 
Poor performance after the takeover 12 
Loss know-how 9 
Unsuccessful/less profitable takeover 8 
Transformation problems 8 
Negative changes 7 
Faulty operationalization 6 
Poor planning of transformation 5 
No optimal transformation process 2 
 
